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Cooperation or Compromise? Understanding the Farm Bill
as Omnibus Legislation
Professor Margaret Sova McCabe*
“Since the early days of the revolution, the founding fathers had
fought together for the future of their country. But . . . divisions
had slowly begun to form between them that, once hardened,
would lead to the formation of the United States of America’s
first political parties. Key to their emergence were fundamental
differences in what the revolutionaries believed ought to be the
fabric of American society – the dream of a nation of farmers
versus the vision of a merchant and trader elite.”1
I. Introduction: Making Food Law with Omnibus
Legislation
Is the development of American food law and policy
benefited or burdened by a Farm Bill (“the Bill” or “Bill”) that
sets appropriations and policy for commodities, conservation,
trade, nutrition, credit, rural development, forestry, and energy?2
On one hand, a broad Bill that ties together many pieces of the
food system under one legislative process could be a brilliant
way to infuse systems thinking and alignment into a complex,
politicized realm. On the other, the Bill, as omnibus legislation,
could simply represent a classic case of logrolling3 that does little
Professor of Law; Faculty Fellow, Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership & Public
Service, University of New Hampshire School of Law. Professor Sova McCabe has
been selected as Dean of the University of Arkansas School of Law and assumed her
duties on July 1, 2018.
1
Andrea Wulf, Founding Gardeners: The Revolutionary Generation,
Nature, and the Shaping of the American Nation 83 (Vintage Books 2011).
2
See generally Agriculture Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
3
Ted A. Donner & Brian L. Crowe, Attorney’s Practice Guide to Negotiations
§ 12:46 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2009) (“Logrolling is often described as a concession
tactic that is difficult to utilize in competitive negotiations because it involves one side’s
conceding his or her lesser concerns for the other side’s more substantial concerns, in
*
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to promote a deeply coordinated, systematic approach to one
of the most important components of stable democracy and the
economy: food and its production.
The distinction between urban and rural agendas in U.S.
food law and policy stretches back to the country’s political roots,
as the introductory quote captures.4 As time has passed, the issues
and demographics have evolved to shift dominance from agrarian
interests to the urban agenda.5 However, one thing remains
constant: producing and consuming affordable, accessible food
is essential to all Americans. Given that the Bill represents our
nation’s traditional process for setting food law and policy, this
essay explores the modern influence of the urban-rural divide
and how omnibus legislation has bridged that gap. That bridging
remains essential to developing balanced food law and policy,
but with each Bill it becomes increasingly apparent that without
overarching, bi-partisan goals for the American food system the
process will continue to be bogged down in divisive politics that
are fueled, in part, by the Bill’s omnibus nature.
Omnibus legislation is typically “[a] single bill containing
various distinct matters, usu[ally] drafted in this way to force the
executive either to accept all the unrelated minor provisions or
to veto the major provision.”6 By definition, omnibus legislation
produces compromise.7 But, should the American food system be
a compromise? Are there ways that the policy tensions sought to
be resolved with omnibus legislation could instead be made more
transparent to law makers and citizens with the goal of aligning
order to encourage a ‘high joint benefit.’ Logrolling has also been, perhaps more often
described as a tactic that involves a process of ‘aggregating dissimilar provisions in
one [proposal] in order to attract the support of diverse groups.…’ Logrolling is thus
a common tactic for legislators to employ although there is considerable disagreement
over whether walking from one log to another in such a manner is an appropriate or
even ethical practice in government.”).
4
See Wulf, supra note 1, at 83.
5
See Christopher Bosso, Framing the Farm Bill: Interests Ideology, and the
Agricultural Act of 2014 35-43 (University of Kansas Press 2017) (discussing the
policy evolution in U.S. agriculture from the 30s to modern day).
6
Bill, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
7
Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress, 45 Am. J. of
Pol. Sci. 210, 211 (2001).
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interests to spur innovation, rather than simply positioning for
compromise?
This essay wants readers to consider whether we should
reimagine the Bill as an opportunity to set rural and urban
policy in ways that maximize economic supports in both areas.
This essay emphasizes that such a reimagining would align the
American population’s interest in a reliable, affordable, and
healthy food supply rather than settling for the Bill to be an everyfive-year opportunity to simply logroll support for commodities
and nutrition programs. While the latter scenario clearly has had
its benefits for both titles over the years, the political dynamics
of the 2014 Farm Bill illustrate that the simplistic tension may no
longer be useful. However, that possibility should not lead us to
conclude that continuing to use the omnibus vehicle is not in the
interests of farmers and consumers.
II. The Farm Bill 1949 – 2014: Slowly Changing
Traditions
In 1933, as President Roosevelt moved to address
the devastation the Dust Bowl wrought on many farmers and
the agricultural markets, he acknowledged that “free-market
agricultural economics [were] over for good.”8 Congress first
moved to control markets with the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933.9 And, five years later, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 became the first omnibus farm bill.10 It offered payments to
farmers, price supports, and crop insurance among other tools that
represented government management of agricultural markets.11
The Act also authorized the use of these tools for five years so
that Congress could shape agricultural market management
Timothy Egan, The Worst Hard Time: The Untold Story of Those Who
Survived the Great American Dust Bowl 133 (2006) (discussing the origins of
The Agricultural Adjustment Act as well as describing, in detail, the devastation the
Dust Bowl wrought on its landowners and farmers).
9
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
10
Bosso, supra note 5, at 35, 37 (discussing the origins of the farm bills in the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1933 and 1938).
11
Agriculture Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938); see Bosso, supra
note 5, at 37-38.
8
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in response to economic shifts.12 As 2014 would illustrate, the
1949 Congressional revision to the 1938 market management
techniques – known as the ‘permanent law’ – remains highly
relevant to the success of each Bill.13 If no Bill passes, then the
commodity programs set by these laws once again become ‘the
law of the land.’14 Thus, the procedural mechanism of omnibus
legislation has been part of American food law and policy nearly
from the inception of government intervention in agricultural
markets.15 And, the existence of the ‘permanent law’ is a powerful
tool to prompt Congressional action, lest it let farm policy supports
revert to 1949 levels.
Through the 50s and 60s, the American economy would
shift dramatically, moving from rural to urban.16 President
Kennedy’s victory has been identified as one starting point for
seeing the shift in influencing food policy from rural interests to
urban ones.17 This is because Kennedy’s victory was propelled by
urban and suburban voters – signaling that support for rural issues
and interest was set to decline.18 And, it did. By 1973, it was
necessary for the ‘farm bloc’ to accept that “no bill supporting
commodity programs would ever get enough votes beyond
the Agriculture Committees unless it also did something for
nutrition.”19 This marriage survives today, even following a 2014
attempt at separation, as discussed below. Significantly, nutrition

Bosso, supra note 5, at 37.
Kate Giessel, On the Permanence of Permanent Law: An Argument for the
Continued Presence of the Permanent Law Provisions in the Farm Bill, 13 Cardozo
Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 765, 767 (2015).
14
See Neil Hamilton, The 2014 Farm Bill: Lessons in Patience, Politics, and
Persuasion, 19 Drake J. of Agric. L. 1, 23 (noting that the 2014 effort to replace the
1949 permanent law to ease future pressures to pass a Farm Bill failed); see Bosso,
supra note 5, at 38 (emphasizing that though an arcane point, the suspension of the
permanent law in each farm bill creates an incentive for Congress to pass a new Bill).
15
See Giessel, supra note 13, at 766.
16
Miranda N. Smith et al., Nat’l Info. Mgmt. & Support Sys., How Migration
Impacts Rural America 1 (2016), http://w3001.apl.wisc.edu/pdfs/b03_16.pdf.
17
Bosso, supra note 5, at 58.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 59.
12
13
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appropriations accounted for 80% of 2014 spending.20
There are several excellent analyses of the political
dynamics surrounding the details of 2014 Farm Bill.21 The
richness of the political process is beyond the scope of this essay,
but readers are encouraged to review some of those analyses as the
2018 votes approach. For the purposes of this essay’s discussion
of whether omnibus legislation is helpful or harmful to the Bill,
three key attributes of the 2014 Bill are relevant:
• The Farm Bill at one point was split into two bills in the
House – removing nutrition provisions from the remainder
of the Bill.22 This break from the tradition set in 1973 is
the reflective of some politicians’ desire to decouple food
system interests to push for more radical changes in the
law.
• In the final outcome, neither party could claim political
victory and the omnibus process served to secure many
compromises in important areas such as conservation,
crop insurance, dairy, and SNAP.23
• Innovation and food system change continued to advance
as evidenced by funding of ‘progressive’ programs such
as support for fruits, vegetables, organics, and significant
initiatives to fund healthy food financing and food and
agriculture learning.24
Projected Spending Under the 2014 Bill, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/projectedspending-under-the-2014-farm-bill/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2018).
21
See, e.g., Bosso, supra note 5; see, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 14; see, e.g., Stephen
Ansolabehere & Kattalina Berriochoa, Why does the American Public Support
Redistributive Logrolls? An Analysis of Policy Preferences for the 2014 Farm Bill
(May 2016), https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Ansolabehere05122016/DraftAnsolabehere-Berriochoa-Who-Benefits_-v2.pdf.
22
Hamilton, supra note 14, at 5.
23
See Bosso, supra note 5, at 156 (“In some ways, and all the noise aside, passage
of the Agricultural Act of 2014 resembled the normal Farm Bill process. It was just
messier than usual, to be sure, but Congress ultimately got the job done, and in the
end, it did so with bipartisan majorities.”); see Hamilton, supra note 14, at 35 (“[f]or
the Tea Party members who believed the farm bill process could be used to gain major
reforms, the final bill was a disappointment.”).
24
See Agriculture Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, §4209, 128 Stat. 649, 829; see, e.g.
Food and Agriculture Service Learning Program, 7 U.S.C. §7633 (2014).
20
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All three points have a common denominator. They are,
in part, a product of the omnibus process. The first – the splitting
of the bill – was a direct attack on the benefits of the omnibus
approach and could signal that a contentious 2018 process will
again cause peeling off of major issues to achieve particular
outcomes or political victories. The second two illustrate that
omnibus legislation both protects ‘the middle’ by requiring
compromise (which is likely where most citizens’ interest are
represented) and creates space for cross-aisle and cross-sector
dialogue to advance the food system.
With the protective effect of omnibus legislation in mind,
we should also consider how food law and policy benefit from
an expansive bill. Marion Nestle has described the Bill this way:
There isn’t anything in American agriculture,
farming, and health that this bill doesn’t touch,
but there is no overarching agenda. The Farm Bill
is simply a collection of government-supported
programs, each with its own collection of
lobbyists, proponents, and opposing forces. You
get the sense that everyone said, “Let’s just throw
this program in.” There is nothing rational in the
Farm Bill.25
While some would find rationality in the Bill, it is simply
not coherently designed based on a common understanding of the
goals of the American food system. Regardless of its rationality
or design, the Bill has played a critical role in maintaining a
stable food system by supporting farmers and eaters with federal
dollars deployed in the way that its titles’ subject matter experts
have determined optimal.26 However, because there are disparate
and broad ranging areas of expertise and seemingly no political
Interview by Louisa Kasdon with Marion Nestle, Paulette Goddard Professor of
Nutrition, Food Studies, and Public Health, N.Y.U., in New York, New York (Jan. 16,
2012),
http://23.23.183.38/2012/01/16/5-courses-with-marion-nestle#.Wtup8IjwbIU
[hereinafter Nestle Interview].
26
See Austin Igleheart & Arthur Scott, Nat’l Ass’n of Counties, Farm Bill
101: An Overview of NACo Priorities Throughout the Farm Bill 4-6 (2018),
http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/FARM%20BILL%20101_0.pdf.
25
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process designated to align the desired outcomes of each title with
a coherent, overarching food policy, the Farm Bill falls short of
synthesizing many important components of the food system.
And, in that sense, omnibus legislation, without clear underlying
values is a blunt instrument ill-suited for the challenges facing the
American food system domestically and internationally.
The Farm Bill is the principal driver of U.S. food law and
policy. It is also economic legislation that subsidizes the American
food system – either in the way it stabilizes agricultural markets
with a variety of economic tools or by providing means for needy
Americans to purchase foods through feeding programs such
as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”).27
Since 1973, when ‘food stamps’ were added to the Farm Bill, it
has been characterized as a legislative tool to promote economic
security for rural communities and the farmers who live in them
by ensuring that elected officials, who are principally from urban
and suburban areas, will vote for their needs because they are
inextricably linked to the need for the food security offered
by SNAP.28 Senators McGovern and Dole are credited with
creating this strategy,29 but 45 years later the question is whether
the oversimplification of the rural-urban logroll and the rise of
partisan politics threatens to stagnate or stymy future Bills.
III. Farm Bill 2018: Reframing the Omnibus as
Opportunity
Food is political. But, under the politics are some universal
truths that reveal why continuing an expansive Bill creates
See Inst. of Med., Nat’l Res. Council of the Nat’l Acad., Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program: Examining the Evidence to Define the
Benefit Adequacy 44 (Julia A. Caswell & Ann L. Yaktine eds., National Academies
Press 2013).
28
See Rich Morin, The politics and demographics of food stamp recipients, Pew
Research Center (July 12, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/12/
the-politics-and-demographics-of-food-stamp-recipients/
(demonstrating
party
constituents’ participation in SNAP motivates support of program by that party’s
elected officials).
29
See Dorothy Samuels, There Was a Time When Ending Hunger Was a National
Goal for Republicans and Democrats, New York Times (May 20, 2013), https://www.
nytimes.com/2013/05/21/opinion/food-stamp-politics.html.
27
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opportunities for a better food system for all, if politicians and
stakeholders are willing to see it that way. First, America needs a
rural population to support agricultural production and to steward
natural resources. Second, America needs an urban population
to support commerce and to create broad economic activity.
The two domains – even considered in tension by Jefferson and
Hamilton30 – are not mutually exclusive or independently viable.
Thus, lawmakers who see the benefit in providing a safety net
to both farmers and eaters do their constituents a great service
because they adopt a food system approach. Of course, the size of
the safety nets and market controls will likely always be fodder
for vociferous debate, but delinking nutrition titles from farm
supports does little to advance that debate in a principled manner.
Food system thinking is critical because food is critical to
economic, human, and environmental health. Food is obviously a
human need. Food production is also key driver of environmental
and human health. For example, agriculture contributes
significantly to water pollution and air quality.31 Similarly, links
between eating patterns and environmental health are emergent
principals for developing nutritional guidance.32 Additionally,
human health conditions such as obesity, diabetes, and heart
disease are linked to diet.33 Finally, food production and processing
creates important economic activity.34 In different regions of
the country and across different demographics, production and
See Wulf, supra note 1, at 82-84 (discussing the philosophical differences between
the two and analyzing how those differences manifest in political approaches to
federalism and Constitutional powers).
31
See Javier Mateo-Sagasta et al., Food and Agric. Org of the U.N., Int’l
Water Mgmt. Inst., Water Pollution from Agriculture: A Global Review
1 (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7754e.pdf; see Agriculture: Agriculture and Air
Quality, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/agriculture/agriculture-agriculture-and-airquality (last updated Mar. 23, 2018).
32
See Margaret Sova McCabe, Eating for the Environment: The Potential of Dietary
Guidelines to Achieve Better Health and Environmental Health Outcomes, 47 Envtl.
L. 741, 755-59 (2017).
33
See, e.g., Alice Lichtenstein et al., Diet and Lifestyle Recommendations Revision
2006: A Scientific Statement From the American Heart Association Nutrition
Committee, 114 Circulation 82 (2006).
34
See Comm. for the Econ. Dev. of the Conference Bd., Economic Contribution
of the Food and Beverage Industry 6, 28-30 (2017), https://www.ced.org/pdf/
30

2018]

Cooperation or Compromise?

9

consumption needs vary. And, while the Bill has long served to
connect disparate parts of the food system, its lack of intentional
systems design does little to build a permanent bridge among
them.
When I began thinking about the effect of omnibus
legislation on the Bill in 2008, it did not strike me that the
procedural tool was beneficial to a better food system. In fact,
it seemed to me that many years of logrolling had done little to
advance the food system. And, Marion Nestle identifies why:
“there is no overarching agenda.”35 To be sure, there are agendas
and plenty of lawmakers, lobbyists, and special interests who
check as many items on their agendas as possible as they trade,
shape, and compromise. But, what if there were an explicit,
transparent unifying, overarching agenda? Then, the collection
of disparate programs is articulated through that agenda and the
benefits, synergies, and opportunities to leverage rural and urban
contributions to a functional food system is more possible. The
pieces of a unified agenda already exist –
o American food policy rests on the fundamental goal of
providing abundant, affordable food to all of its people.36
o Urban areas rely on the rural population for food
production.37
o Rural areas produce raw materials and there must be
adequate infrastructure in those areas to support the rural
population.38
o All Americans should have access to a food safety net that
permits them to access nutritious food. Good nutrition is
also fundamental, but more controversial.
o Agricultural production methods have profound impacts
on environmental health, including top soil, water quality,
Economic_Contribution_of_the_Food_and_Beverage_Industry.pdf.
35
Nestle Interview, supra note 25.

Cong. Research Serv., An Overview of USDA Rural Development
Programs 21 (2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160210_
RL31837_d27aabf3a20b5e31f4203c3c7307e6ce1cdd6649.pdf.
36

37
38

See id. at 1.
See id. at 26.
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and air quality39 and producers may need incentives to
sustainably steward the environment.
There are other ideas that are likely more controversial,
but given that they have been raised in the public discourse over
the last two Bill cycles, they are included here. They should at
least be recognized as representative of significant voter interest
by legislators.
• Producing food that is affordable, healthy, environmentally
sustainable, and economically viable is the common goal
of federal farm and nutrition policy.
• The food system should include, and will benefit from,
a variety of producers – from large mono-cropping
operations to diverse family farms. Access to capital and
to farm supports should be equitable and designed to
promote farming viability across all sectors of production.
• Farm and food law and policy should align with
environmental and public health goals.
• Though there may be disagreements concerning the
amount and method of supporting farm and food programs,
their importance to the overall security and well-being of
the American people transcends partisanship.
There is no formal requirement that Congress articulate
the values that inform any legislation. However, given the
unique traditions of the Bill and the profound influence it has on
all citizens, the Congressional Committees and the leadership
responsible for them would make a significant contribution
to American food law and policy if they undertook this task.
Without a more transparent, bi-partisan agenda the Bill will
likely be vulnerable to contentious political wrangling that does
little to advance a food system that supports farmers and eaters in
achieving economic, environmental, and human health.
Conclusion
See Mateo-Sagasta et al., supra note 31; see Agriculture: Agriculture and Air
Quality, supra note 31.
39
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The Farm Bill is the mechanism for setting American
food law and policy. Since 1938, the use of omnibus legislation
has been used to effectively secure compromise amongst
disparate economic (and political) interests. However, as political
discourse becomes more divisive and Congress less functional
in the use of its legislative power,40 the Farm Bill process would
benefit from a greater articulation of the overarching values that
inform American farming and food lawmaking. Without such an
organizing principle, the organic compromise that is inherent to
omnibus legislation will likely be lost resulting in either failed
Farm Bills or further polarization around food issues. Such
polarization does little to serve farmers or eaters and also inhibits
our ability to create economic and policy conditions that support
a functional, healthy, and prosperous food system.

Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the
Separation of Powers 1 (Yale University Press 2017) (“Observers call Congress ‘the
broken branch’ and lament that, ‘[g]ripped by stalemate, America’s chief lawmaking
body can barely muster the ability to make law.’”) (quoting Michael J. Teter, Gridlock,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 2217, 2217).
40

The Fate of Industrial Hemp in the 2018 Farm Bill – Will
Our Collective Ambivalence Finally Be Resolved?
Marne Coit
I. Introduction
As a nation, we are at a crossroads in the regulation of
industrial hemp, and the 2018 Farm Bill is the time to decide
which path we will choose. Congress has an opportunity to clear
the path for farmers in the United States (“US”) to participate in
this burgeoning market. With an estimated 25,000 uses, industrial
hemp is one of those rare crops that has both food and agricultural
uses.1 There is undoubtedly a market for hemp products.2 The
Hemp Industries Association (“HIA”) estimates that US retail
sales of hemp-based products was $688 million in 2016 – up from
$573 million in 2015.3 By 2020 the industry is estimated to grow
to $1.8 billion.4
Considering the projected market growth, one could
conclude that growing industrial hemp has a lot of potential
for farmers in the US.5 However, the biggest impediment to
farmers doing so is the current state of the law that regulates this
crop.6 There is a discrepancy between what Congress seemingly
Logan Yonavjak, Industrial Hemp: A Win-Win For The Economy And The
Environment, Forbes (May 29, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ashoka/2013/05/29/industrial-hemp-a-win-win-for-the-economy-and-theenvironment/2/#67b029736f9a.
2
See id.
3
Harvest New York, Industrial Hemp From Seed To Market 6 (Cornell
University 2017), http://allegany.cce.cornell.edu/resources/industrial-hempfrom-seed-to-market.
4
Market Size: Hemp Industry Sales Grow To $688 Million in 2016, Hemp
Business Journal (2017), https://www.hempbizjournal.com/market-sizehemp-industry-sales-grow-to-688-million-in-2016/.
5
Yonayjak, supra note 1.
6
See H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2642/text?overview=closed); 21 C.F.R. § 1308 (1970),
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/cfr/1308/1308_11.htm.
1
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mandated in the 2014 farm bill and the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s (“DEA”) interpretation of the language of the
Controlled Substances Act, a statute from 1970.7
Under the 2014 Farm Bill, Congress seemingly paved
the way for industrial hemp to once again be grown in the US,
as it granted authority for states to create industrial hemp pilot
programs.8 However, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) of 1970
still precludes farmers from fully participating in these programs.9
The DEA claims that it has authority to regulate all species of
Cannabis sativa under the CSA, and does not distinguish between
marijuana and industrial hemp.10
In the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill, Congress has the
opportunity to clarify that the definition of marijuana does not
include industrial hemp, and by doing so simultaneously clarify
(and limit) the scope of DEA’s authority. In order for farmers,
processors, and retailers to move forward, Congress must take this
action, and, therefore, restrict DEA’s jurisdiction to marijuana.
This is the only path forward for a thriving industrial hemp
industry in the US.
II. Background
For context, there has been an increasing demand for
industrial hemp products in recent years11. However, industrial
hemp is not a new crop in the US. From the 1800s through the
early 1900s it was grown widely, and was used in a variety of
everyday products such as fabrics, twine, and paper.12 During

See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.
Renee Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Hemp as Agricultural Commodity
1 (2017).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Market Size: Hemp Industry Sales Grow to 688 Million in 2016, Hemp Bus. J.,
https://www.hempbizjournal.com/market-size-hemp-industry-sales-grow-to688-million-in-2016/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Hemp Industry
Sales Grow].
12
Johnson, supra note 8, at 11.
7
8
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this time period, it was treated the same as other commonly
grown crops.13 For example, the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) published crop reports, compiled statistics,
and provided assistance to hemp producers with production and
distribution.14
Peak production of industrial hemp in the US was about
1943, when approximately 150 million pounds were produced.15
Due to a combination of changes in both the law and societal
attitudes,16 production dropped after this time, until 1958 when
the last known crop of industrial hemp was grown in the US.17
As stated earlier, though, there is a resurgence of interest in
this crop.18 Market growth in the retail sector is increasing, which
means increased opportunities for producers, manufacturers, and
retailers.19 However, industry growth is hampered by the current
confusing and conflicted state of the law.
III. State of the Law – Historical
The heart of the problem is how industrial hemp is defined
– and who is defining it. In order to understand the present day
complexities of the law, it is important to understand the historical
context.
As stated above, up until the mid-1900s, industrial
hemp was commonly grown in the US.20 In 1937, Congress
passed the Marijuana Tax Act. 21 This was the first legislative
attempt to regulate marijuana in the US, and came about, in
part, because of shifting societal attitudes regarding drugs and
drug use.22 Although it did not prohibit production outright, it
Id.
Id.
15
Id. at 12.
16
Id.
17
Johnson, supra note 8, at 12.
18
See Hemp Industry Sales Grow, supra note 11.
19
Id.
20
Johnson, supra note 8, at 12.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 11-12.
13
14
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did make production much more difficult.23 The Marijuana Tax
Act prohibited individual possession and sale of marijuana.24
It permitted medicinal use, but under this law it became highly
regulated.25 In addition to requiring extensive documentation,
it also imposed a tax if marijuana was bought, sold, imported,
cultivated, or prescribed.26
It is very important to note that the Marijuana Tax Act
specifically regulated marijuana.27 It recognized a distinction
between marijuana and industrial hemp, and it did not prohibit
the production of industrial hemp.28 In fact, during World War II,
the federal government encouraged production of hemp for fiber
and oil.29
In 1970, there was a significant shift in the law when
the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) was passed.30 Under
the CSA, certain plants and drugs were placed under federal
jurisdiction.31 Specifically, the DEA was given jurisdiction over
Cannabis sativa.32 The critical piece here – and what has created
complexities through the present day – is that the CSA does not
specifically distinguish between marijuana and industrial hemp.33
The impact of not distinguishing between these two varieties is
what causes the most issues for producers, manufacturers, and
retailers today.34
Under the CSA, drugs are placed into what is known as
“schedules” based on a combination of acceptable medical use
Id.
Id.
25
Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
31
See id.
32
See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-513
33
Johnson, supra note 8, at 32
34
Id. at 31-32.
23

24
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and abuse potential.35 Marijuana has been identified as a Schedule
I drug,36 which means that it is considered to be in the tier with the
most dangerous drugs, and has a high potential for abuse and no
currently accepted medical use.37 Technically, the CSA does not
prohibit the production of industrial hemp outright, but it does
implement strict controls.38 For example, if one were to import or
grow cannabis seed, one must register with the DEA and obtain a
permit to do so.39
Notably, the CSA states that “[t]he term ‘marihuana’
means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing
or not; the seeds thereof;…and every compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds
or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such
plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the
seeds of such plant…or the sterilized seed of such plant which
is incapable of germination” (emphasis added).40
The language in the above definition is not clear and has
led to arguments about whether industrial hemp is excluded. If
this were the case, then it leads to the conclusion that marijuana
is regulated by the DEA, but that industrial hemp is not. For
example, hulled hemp seeds, or hemp seed hearts, are sold as a
food product.41 Hemp seed in this form is considered to be nonviable, or incapable of germination.42 Because it cannot germinate,
one might argue that it fits into the exemption of the definition of
marijuana above. However, the DEA maintains that the definition
in the CSA includes all categories of Cannabis sativa, which they
Drug Scheduling, Drug Enf’t Admin., https://www.dea.gov/druginfo/
ds.shtml. (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
36
21 U.S.C. §812(c)(10) (2012).
37
21 U.S.C. §812(b).
38
Johnson, supra note 8, at 12
39
Id. at 17.
40
21 U.S.C. § 802(16).
41
See Hemp Seed Hearts, Organic, NOW Health, https://www.nowfoods.com/
natural-foods/hemp-seed-hearts-organic (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
42
Hulled Hemp Seeds, Hempseed.Ca, http://www.hempseed.ca/hulled-hempseed/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
35
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argue gives them jurisdiction to regulate industrial hemp.43
IV. State of the Law – Present Day
As mentioned above, the DEA has been acting under the
presumption that industrial hemp and marijuana are essentially
the same, and that they have authority to regulate both. The
reason that the scope of DEA’s authority is now coming under
increased scrutiny is because of a provision in the 2014 Farm
Bill. Under §7606, Congress specifically granted authority to
universities and state departments of agriculture to grow or
cultivate industrial hemp if it is done for the purposes of research
under an agricultural pilot program.44 These pilot programs can
be developed to study the growth, cultivation, or marketing of
industrial hemp.45 The details for how the pilot programs are run is
left up to the individual states, as the law gives states the authority
to enact regulations in this area.46 The statute does specify that
such programs may only be created in states that allow industrial
hemp to be grown.47
What is particularly significant about this provision in
the farm bill is the definition of industrial hemp that is provided.
Under this statute industrial hemp, for the purposes of these state
pilot programs, is defined as any part of the Cannabis sativa L.
plant, whether the plant is growing or not, as long as the THC
concentration is 0.3% or below.48
In and of itself, this provides a clear distinction between
what is to be considered marijuana – THC concentration above
0.3%, and industrial hemp – THC concentration of 0.3% or
Notice, Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, 81 Fed. Reg. 156,
53,395, 53,395-53,396 (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2016/08/12/2016-19146/statement-of-principles-on-industrialhemp [hereinafter Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp].
44
State Industrial Hemp Statutes, Nat’ Conference of State Legislatures (Dec.
13, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/
state-industrial-hemp-statutes.aspx.
45
H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
46
Id.
47
See id.
48
Id.
43
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below.49 However, this law does not exist on its own, but rather
co-exists with, and has the same legal weight as, the CSA.50 And
so it creates the appearance of a misalignment or conflict between
these two laws.
What Congress failed to do when enacting this law was
to specifically amend the definition of marijuana under the CSA
to exclude industrial hemp. Instead of creating a straightforward
path for those who want to produce or process industrial hemp, in
reality, it has created confusion and uncertainty. While states have
autonomy, to a certain extent, to create their own industrial hemp
programs,51 the DEA continues to define industrial hemp in such
a way as to be within their jurisdiction.
This creates some unusual results. First, it means that
not all producers are able to participate in this market. It only
provides opportunities for producers who live in states that have
since created industrial hemp pilot programs.52 For those who
do live in states with pilot programs, they are still subject to
restrictions within those programs.53 For example, most programs
require some type of licensure for producers and manufacturers,
and producers may be required to supply certain data to the state
programs.54
There are additional limitations to growing industrial hemp
that do not exist with other crops. If one wants to grow industrial
hemp under a state pilot project, one is still required to register
with DEA, because it is considered to be a Schedule I drug.55 This
creates the odd reality for farmers of having to register with the
Johnson, supra note 8, at 1-2.
H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
51
Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395.
52
State Industrial Hemp Statutes, supra note 44. As of the time of this writing, at
least 34 states had passed legislation related to industrial hemp. Id.
53
See id. Specific requirements vary by state; details of individual state programs
are beyond the scope of this essay. Id.
54
See id.
55
See State Industrial Hemp Statutes, supra note 44. Under some state programs,
the state department of agriculture will be the entity that registers with the DEA. Id.
For example, this is the case under the state industrial hemp pilot program in North
Carolina. See e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-568.53(1).
49

50
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DEA to grow a crop that is seemingly legal. There are few other
crops that require producers to jump through as many regulatory
hoops in order to obtain seed and be permitted to grow them.
It has also created complications for farmers who want to
purchase seed to plant industrial hemp. Under the CSA, industrial
hemp plants and seeds cannot be transported across state lines;
this applies to driving the seed or plants across state lines, as
well as mailing or shipping seed.56 So, for example, if a producer
lives in a state with a pilot program such as North Carolina and
wants to purchase seed from Colorado (also a state with a pilot
program), and is stopped in a state in between, the producer could
potentially be charged with possession of a controlled substance
under criminal law.57
The result is potential fines and/or a prison sentence under
both state and federal law.58 This seems like a harsh result for a
producer who is trying to obtain seed to plant a crop.59
In August of 2016 the DEA, USDA and Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) issued the Statement of Principles on
Industrial Hemp in an attempt to clarify the positions of the three
federal regulatory agencies that are most involved in regulating
industrial hemp.60 The purpose was to inform the public so that
people could participate in state pilot programs and still be in
compliance with federal law.61
Notably, the guidance document specifically states that
“Section 7606 did not remove industrial hemp from the controlled
substances list. Therefore, Federal law continues to restrict hemp21 U.S.C. § 822
See id.
58
See Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., Drug Offenses: Maximum Fines and
Terms of Imprisonment for Violation of the Federal Controlled Substances
Act and Related Laws i, 8, n. 25 (2015)
59
See e.g., Hemp seeds bound for Colorado seized at U.S.-Canada border, CBS News
(June 19, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hemp-seeds-bound-for-coloradoseized-at-u-s-canada-border/ (demonstrating instances when the DEA has tried to
block the sale of industrial hemp seed). In response, Congress passed an appropriation
law that restricted federal agencies, including the DEA, from interfering in activities
that are permitted under the 2014 Farm Bill. Johnson, supra note 8, at 1.
60
Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395.
61
Id.
56
57
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related activities, to the extent that those activities have not been
legalized under section 7606.”62 In addition, it also explains that
the provision in the farm bill “did not eliminate the requirement
under the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act that
the importation of viable cannabis seeds must be carried out by
person registered with the DEA to do so.”63
Perhaps most telling was the statement that section
7606 of the farm bill “left open many questions regarding the
continuing application of Federal drug control statutes to the
growth, cultivation, manufacture, and distribution of industrial
hemp products, as well as the extent to which growth by private
parties and sale of industrial hemp products are permissible.”64
Indeed, the farm bill did seem to open many questions, as
discussed above. Unfortunately, the Statement of Principles did
not do much to resolve them. We are still left in a reality in which
a crop is seemingly legal, yet is hampered by the restrictions
placed upon it by criminal drug laws.
The DEA has taken actions that seem to be at odds
with the language and intent of section 7606. For example, in
December of 2016, the DEA published a final rule stating that a
new drug code would be used for extracts of marihuana.65 The
term “marihuana extract” is defined as “an extract containing one
or more cannabinoids that has been derived from any plant of the
genus Cannabis…”66 The agency stated that these extracts would
remain listed as Schedule I drugs, and that anyone who handled
them would be required to register with the DEA accordingly.67
This is notable because it would impact a significant portion of
the industrial hemp industry that is focused on producing and/
or retailing cannabidiol (“CBD”).68 CBD is a non-psychoactive
Id.
Johnson, supra note 8, at 35.
64
Statement of Principles on Industrial Hemp, supra note 43, at 53,395.
65
Establishment of a New Drug Code for Marihuana Extract, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,194,
90,194 (Dec. 14, 2016) (to be codified 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 90,195-90,196.
68
Id. at 90,195.
62

63
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compound that can be derived from industrial hemp, and can be
used as a dietary supplement.69 The DEA’s rule stating that these
extracts would fall under their jurisdiction and be classified as
Schedule I drugs seemed to contradict the farm bill provision.
Although the agency did provide further clarification in March
of 2017,70 this situation is evidence of the need for greater
clarification across the board about the DEA’s role in regulating
industrial hemp and hemp products.71
V. Next Steps
The current legal status of industrial hemp leaves the
industry in limbo. Congress has the authority to remedy this.
Perhaps the most straightforward approach is to provide a fix in
the upcoming 2018 Farm Bill. First, Congress can expressly state
that the industrial hemp pilot programs are permanent. Section
7606 on its face does not seem to sunset;72 however, there is also
no express language stating that it is a permanent program. In
fact, the language specifically refers to the state programs as being
“pilot programs”, seemingly indicating a non-permanent nature.73
In addition, Congress can specifically clarify and amend
the definition of marijuana under the CSA to exclude industrial
hemp. This would have the effect of clearing up any current
discrepancies between the language of the current farm bill and
DEA’s interpretation of the language of the CSA. In so doing,
Congress could take the additional step of clarifying the scope of
Renee Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Potential Use of Industrial Hemp
in Cannabidiol Products 1 (2016), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/assets/crs/IF10391.pdf.
70
Clarification of the New Drug Code (7350) for Marijuana Extract, Diversion
Control Div. Of The U.S. Dep’t Of Justice (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.deadiversion.
usdoj.gov/schedules/marijuana/index.html.
71
See Larry K. Houck & Riëtte van Laack, Hemp Industries Association Seeks
Contempt Against DEA; Alleges Violation of 2004 Hemp Order, Hyman, Phelps &
McNamara, P.C.: FDA L. Blog (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2017/02/
hemp-industries-association-seeks-contempt-against-dea-alleges-violation-of-2004hemp-order/; see Colleen Keahey, Hemp Industries Association Sues DEA Over
Illegal Attempt to Regulate Hemp Foods as Schedule I Drugs, Hemp Industries
Association (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.thehia.org/HIAhemppressreleases/4594319.
72
See H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted).
73
Johnson, supra note 8, at 13-14.
69
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DEA’s authority by drawing a bright line between marijuana and
industrial hemp.
To go one step further, after removing the regulation
of industrial hemp from the DEA’s authority, Congress could
expressly preempt this area of law. This would eliminate the state
programs altogether and level the playing field by permitting all
producers and processors the opportunity to enter this market if
they choose, regardless of what state they reside in.
Congress could also choose to pass separate, freestanding
legislation that would essentially serve the same function as
above. Such legislation has been introduced, but so far has not
been passed into law. For example, the Industrial Hemp Farming
Act was introduced in the House of Representatives in July of
2017.74 The purpose of the bill was to amend the CSA to exclude
industrial hemp from the term marihuana.75
VI. Conclusion
Congress provided the opportunity for states to create
industrial hemp pilot programs in the last farm bill. This
demonstrates a clear intent to have industrial hemp be a legitimate,
legal crop. And societal norms seem to have shifted in favor
of allowing this crop to be grown for food and other uses, as is
evidenced by the steadily increasing market in industrial hemp.
However, the current state of the law creates confusion about
the legality of industrial hemp and leaves a potentially profitable
industry in limbo. It is understandably difficult for potential
producers and manufacturers to engage in this industry under the
current state of the law. Congress took a step in the right direction
by allowing for the industrial hemp pilot programs and providing
a means (although still limiting) for states to move forward. Now
Congress must take the next step and remove the remaining legal
and regulatory obstacles so that producers, manufactures and
retailers can move forward confidently with their businesses. The
Industrial Hemp Farming Act of 2017, H.R. 3530, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.
congress.gov/115/bills/hr3530/BILLS-115hr3530ih.pdf.
75
Id.
74
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next step is not necessarily complicated, but it is one that Congress
needs to take action on. It is time to remove any ambiguity and
move forward.

Building Indian Country’s Future through Food, Agriculture,
Infrastructure, and Economic Development in the 2018 Farm
Bill
By Janie Simms Hipp,* Colby D. Duren,** and Erin Parker***
Introduction
Agriculture is, and has always been, important to
Indian Country. According to the data collected by the National
Agricultural Statistics Service (“NASS”) for the most recent
Census of Agriculture, there are over 71,9471 American Indian
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and Alaska Native (“AIAN”) Farmers and Ranchers,2 working
on more than 57 million acres of land, with a market value of
products producing reaching over $3.3 billion—including $1.4
billion in crops and $1.8 billion in livestock and poultry.3 Indian
Country operations are twice the size of non-Native operations,
but with half the income and involvement in federal farm security
programs.4 These numbers tell us not only what contributions
Indian Country already makes to American agriculture, but also
speak to the potential for future opportunities if current operations
were expanded, and contemporary federal policy adjusted in a
way that facilitates Tribes and individual AIAN operators to more
fully take advantage of U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
programming. Food and agriculture production could be a huge
economic driver for Tribes, the entirety of Indian Country, and
the rural communities in which their communities are found.
Production could equal the revenue generated by gaming and
create opportunities for Tribes that will never benefit from gaming
because of their isolated location.
In order to realize this potential, we must re-calibrate
USDA programs to capitalize on current successes in Indian
Country agriculture and agribusiness and expand those
opportunities throughout Indian Country, including feeding the
people living in our most rural and remote places. Agriculture and
agribusiness can create jobs and stabilize economies for Native
in Agricultural & Food Law from the University of Arkansas.
1
U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary
and State Data Volume 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51 65 (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/
usv1.pdf.
2
Experts in this area suggest the total number of AIAN operators is undercounted
by as much as half; focused attention and outreach in Tribal communities results in
more accurate reporting. See William Iwig et al., Multi-Cultural Outreach to Ethnic
Farmers for the 2007 Census of Agriculture, U.S. Dept. of Agric., https://unstats.
un.org/unsd/statcom/statcom_09/seminars/innovation/Innovation%20Seminar/USAAgriCensus-Abstract.pdf.
3
U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights: American
Indian Farmers 1 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_
Resources/Highlights/American_Indian_Farmers/Highlights_American_Indian_
Farmers.pdf.
4
See id.
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people who have deep connections to the land on which they live,
to farming and ranching, and to the foods they produce every day.
In addition, Tribal governments and Tribal communities have
always been and are continuing to be the providers of essential
governmental services in countless rural, remote, and isolated
communities throughout the United States.
This essay focuses on several key provisions and themes
that could have the greatest impact to support and grow agriculture
and agribusiness in Indian Country if implemented in the 2018
Farm Bill reauthorization.
Acknowledgement and Parity for Tribal
Governments Throughout the Farm Bill
One of the most substantial steps forward that can be
taken in the 2018 Farm Bill is for Congress to permanently
acknowledge the status and role of Tribal governments and Tribal
Departments of Agriculture in setting and shaping agricultural
policy. Similar to their State counterparts, Tribal Departments
of Agriculture are created by their Tribal governments and are
charged with administration of agriculture and food systems,
yet Tribal Departments of Agriculture have not been recognized
in the law with the clear authority to interface with all agencies
within USDA and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs at
USDA. Recognizing Tribal governments, Tribal Departments
of Agriculture, and Tribal law in the same manner as similar
authorities defer to States, State Departments of Agriculture, and
State law is a critical step towards improving USDA program
delivery throughout Indian Country. This simple action would
fully realize the existing trust responsibility and treaty obligations
the federal government has to Tribal Nations, and would support
the self-governance and self-determination that stabilize Tribal
communities and accelerate the ability of Tribes to meet their
economic, food, infrastructure, and health needs.
Most USDA programs have not begun to be seriously
utilized by Tribes because, for the most part, the acknowledgement
of Tribal governmental authority has not been clearly embraced
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by USDA. Including “Tribal governments” in the existing
intergovernmental approaches, through which many of the USDA
programs are delivered, will acknowledge Tribal governments’
inherent sovereignty and importance to rural America and will
expand the reach of programs, create jobs, and build more food
businesses in Indian Country.
Tribal Government Management of All Nutrition and
Food Assistance Programs
In this Farm Bill, Congress must allow Tribal governments
to directly manage all federal nutrition and food assistance
programs, especially the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”), and improve the ability for Tribes to
manage and include traditional and Native grown foods in the
Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (“FDPIR”)
food packages. Tribal governments are best positioned to serve
food insecure citizens within their own communities making
direct communication, outreach, nutrition education, and feeding
program delivery more streamlined. Not only can this lead to
greater program efficiency and customer service, it can also
present Tribes with the opportunity to tailor these programs to
suit their communities and build more robust food systems.
Tribal citizens have high usage rates of all federal feeding
and nutrition programs. In some rural and remote reservation
communities, nearly 25 percent of all community citizens are taking
part in the feeding programs,5 and in other communities those
numbers can climb as high as 60 to 80 percent.6 These participation
rates remain high because of the relative unemployment rates of
individuals in the communities that are directly caused by the
lack of employment options,7 poor transportation to jobs and food
U.S. Dept. of Agric. Food and Nutrition Serv., Addressing Child Hunger
and Obesity in Indian Country: Report to Congress Summary 1 (2012), https://
fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/IndianCountrySum.pdf.
6
Native Farm Bill Coalition, December 18, 2017 Webinar, Seeds of Health (Dec. 18,
2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/webinars/.
7
Kenneth Finegold et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Background Report on the
Use and Impact of Food Assistance Programs on Indian Reservations 1 (2005),
5
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sources/retail facilities,8 the age and population characteristics
of the individuals in the communities, and the prevalence of
chronic health problems, among other issues.9 Because the rate of
obesity, diabetes, chronic heart diseases, cancer, and rated health
problems is so high in so many communities in Indian Country,10
participation rates in the feeding programs, when coupled with the
prevalence of persistent poverty, create a fragile system of food
security and food access across Indian Country. Yet, most feeding
program participants live on the lands that could feed them, but,
instead, grow foods that are destined for far away markets.
A consistent, comprehensive, and Tribal government-led
approach tailored to the needs of Indian Country is paramount.
Linking or “coupling” the feeding programs to the food production
that occurs on Tribal lands will do two things simultaneously.
First, it will ensure that, over time, the use of feeding programs
in Indian Country could decline, and, in some regions, could
disappear altogether because of the ability to link with local food
production to meet the needs of tribal communities. Second, it will
ensure that food produced on Indian lands are focused on three
simultaneous goals: (1) retaining enough food products that Tribal
citizens will be fed by food produced locally or regionally; (2)
ensuring that fresher foods are available to Tribal citizens needing
access to feeding programs; and (3) ensuring the stabilization of
food businesses because the foods are being used to feed people
who lack food access and, at the same time, offering a consistent,
albeit federal, market or anchor contract that gives food producers
the economic stability to continue access to additional markets off
tribal lands.
However, key issues remain that are critical to the future
of the feeding programs, and how those programs are delivered
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/42906/411133-BackgroundReport-on-the-Use-and-Impact-of-Food-Assistance-Programs-on-IndianReservations.PDF.
8
Id. at 10.
9
Id. at 9.
10
Id. at 14.
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to or serve Indian Country citizens and these must be addressed
in the 2018 Farm Bill. In a report authorized by the 2014 Farm
Bill, USDA reviewed the feasibility of Tribal administration of
federal food assistance programs. Nearly all Tribes participating
and more than 90 percent of all respondents expressed interest in
administering federal nutrition assistance programs as an exercise
of sovereignty and to provide direct service to Tribal citizens in
need of assistance.11 These respondents felt the ability to provide
flexibility in the management of nutritional quality of the food
provided and culturally appropriate programming and service
delivery were also critical.12
While there are many additional infrastructure needs
identified to achieve these interrelated goals of management of
feeding programs, the report states that USDA, and its Food and
Nutrition Service (“FNS”), does not have the requisite “638like authority” that explicitly provides Congressional support
for executing contracts between federal agencies and Tribes to
coordinate the management of specific federal programs.13 This
can be achieved by introducing legislative language modeled
after the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,14 as amended, or by providing treatment
as a state/parity for Tribes to manage these programs in the Farm
Bill.
Tribal governments must directly manage all the nutrition
and feeding programs, because they are best able to ensure that
food security needs in their reservation, rural, and very remote
communities are met. They are also more capable of directly
linking agribusiness food production to the long-term vision of
removing people from feeding program participation and into
Garasky, Steven et al., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv.,
Feasibility of Tribal Administration of Federal Nutrition Assistance
Programs – Final Report 68 (2016) https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/TribalAdministration.pdf.
12
Id. at vii.
13
See id. at 52, n. 68.
14
See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2012)).
11
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the local job market, which can and should include a strong and
viable agribusiness economic development approach. For Tribal
governments, marrying the food security needs of the people with
food job opportunities at the Tribal level promotes both enhanced
food security and economic diversification in Indian Country.
Improve Credit Access in Indian Country and
Support Authority for Farm Service Agency and the Farm
Credit System
Due to the capital-intense nature of farming, ranching,
and agribusiness in general, many titles have long been important
parts of the Farm Bill, including: credit, commodity, conservation,
and crop insurance. Farming, ranching, and agribusiness are highrisk enterprises, and are linked to production systems that have
unique regulatory requirements and challenges. Good times for
agriculture can very quickly be followed by bad times. Having
access to a lending entity willing to understand these financial
realities is critical. During turbulent times, Indian Country is
always hit as hard or harder than most other areas of the country,
because of the remote and isolated nature of our farms, ranches,
and agribusinesses and the reality that in most reservation
communities a “credit desert” exists alongside food deserts.
First, our important partners in lending in rural areas, like
those in the Farm Credit System (“FCS”), must have no questions
concerning their authority to lend in Indian Country. Due to the
nature of landholding and land ownership in Indian Country,
which is a matter controlled by federal law, some clarification of
the authority to lend is to help provide additional certainty for the
FCS in lending within Indian Country. Tribal governments, tribal
producers, and groups of producers must often organize their
business engagement in ways not required of non-Tribal entities
and governments due to unique issues associated with federal
Indian law; making sure that they are able to borrow under FCS
laws and regulations is important.
Additionally, the improvements the Farm Service Agency
(“FSA”) has made in the extension of credit to farmers and
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ranchers in Indian Country in the post-Keepseagle era must
continue, but separate programs that allow for unique training
and technical assistance concerning financial issues and loan
servicing for tribal producers must also be considered. Access to
credit through FSA and Rural Development (“RD”) must not be
hampered by outdated program rules that do not match our credit
needs. Further, we must make sure that the program officers at
RD and FSA have deep awareness of the way in which Tribal
governments, Tribal agribusinesses, and Tribal producers do
business, and ensure they are not constrained by an additional
regulatory burden nor shut out of lending opportunities available
to all producers.
Many smaller or beginning producers who are not yet
ready for FSA or FCS lending relationships utilize the services
of local, smaller retail banking entities, community development
financial institutions (or “CDFI”s), credit unions, or use other
means of acquiring needed capital. Native CDFIs must be
included in all FSA and Rural Development lending authorities
in order to leverage access to credit for Indian Country producers
and Tribal governments. Ensuring that Native-owned banks can
easily interface with FSA, RD, and FCS lending institutions on
agribusiness and agriculture infrastructure business opportunities
will further support credit access and economic growth in Indian
Country.
Ensure the Commodity, Conservation, Forestry, and
Crop Insurance Farm Bill Titles Support Indian Country
and Native Producers
The Commodity, Conservation, and Crop Insurance
Titles of the Farm Bill all work together to provide not only
farm security for producers, they also support the health of our
Tribal lands. These programs must be updated to consider the
unique jurisdictional and agribusiness/product needs of Tribal
governments and Tribal producers.
First and foremost, many Tribal governments and
Tribal farming, ranching, and food businesses produce covered
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commodity crops of wheat, corn, and soybeans, and are deeply
engaged in livestock operations impacted by the Commodity
Title. We must ensure equitable access to these programs for
Tribal producers, including ensuring federal or Tribally chartered
corporations, especially those created under Tribal law, Section
17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,15 or Section 3 of the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936,16 are explicitly eligible for
programs such as the commodity disaster assistance programs.
Additionally, the definition of “livestock” must be amended to
include commonly raised livestock like “reindeer,” “caribou,”
“elk,” “horses,” or other animals raised or harvested in Tribal
communities. All of these animals must be recognized as livestock
and their owners must be eligible for full protection and program
participation Department-wide.
Since the Conservation Title programs are often the
gateway to participate in other USDA programs, it is vital that
Tribal governments and producers can access all program
authorities and funding. Wherever there is a reference to “state”,
“local”, or “regional” agricultural producers, the term “tribal”
should be inserted into that section to ensure that any inadvertent
failure to list Tribal governments, Tribal producers, or Tribal
organizations does not preclude them from participating or relegate
them to a lesser importance or priority within the relevant section.
This also includes making sure any reference to “state law” in the
Conservation Title says “state law or tribal law” to acknowledge
the conservation laws and codes our Tribal governments pass and
enforce each day with regard to the lands over which they have
jurisdiction. This change also needs to be extended to the Forestry
Title programs, especially by adding “Tribes” to title of the State
and Private Forestry program, and including Tribes explicitly in
the Good Neighbor Authority” cooperative agreement program.
Further, the Farm Bill must allow for greater Tribal participation
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 988, Sec. 17 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5124 (2012)).
16
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967, Sec. 3 (1936) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5203 (2012)).
15
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in Tribal Forest Protection Act of 200417 (“TFPA”) projects by
authorizing the application of “638” contracting authority to
TFPA projects on Forest Service lands at USDA or Bureau of
Land Management lands at the U.S. Department of the Interior.
Crop insurance is an important tool of risk management
and the products in place now must be examined to ensure
they are suitable for Tribal food production systems. The Risk
Management Agency (“RMA”) must conduct a study to ascertain
the efficacy and applicability of the current crop insurance
products as they relate to Indian Country agriculture production.
If that study reveals that either the specific crop insurance products
or the general guidance documents of RMA do not adequately
consider unique tribal production issues, a separate administrative
guidance or notice should be issued to solve these concerns, and
RMA should pursue unique crop insurance products and crop
insurance administration systems. The goal must be to increase
the utilization and remove any inadvertent barriers to access crop
insurance products in Indian Country. Finally, USDA must engage
Native-owned insurance companies and Native CDFIs and other
entities to encourage the offering of crop insurance products in
Indian Country. While many Tribes and Tribal producers maintain
crop insurance, the current crop insurance research, product
development, and policy sales areas are not developed for, and do
not adequately reach, Tribal producers.
Apply the Substantially Underserved Trust Area
designation to all Rural Development and USDA Funding
Authorities
The Substantially Underserved Trust Area (“SUTA”)
designation authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill18 helps USDA’s
Rural Utility Service (“RUS”) offer low interest rates; waive nonduplication, matching, and credit support requirements; extend
Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 Pub. L. No. 108-278 (2004) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3115a (2012)).
18
See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat.
1196.
17
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loan repayment terms; and provide the highest funding priority
for SUTA projects.19 Currently, SUTA is only applied to a small
segment of utilities infrastructure programs,20 but more explicit
instruction must be provided to allow the Secretary to exercise
this discretion more broadly.
This change will help ensure more equitable access to
Rural Development (“RD”) programs and authorities in these
substantially underserved areas, and can be used to provide muchneeded support to Tribal citizens operating businesses and living in
rural communities. The change would, among other things, allow
the waiver of matching requirements for projects funded through
RD, which can be a significant barrier to applicant participation
in RD business and infrastructure projects where remoteness
and related lack of tax base is a problem. In the determination
of eligibility and repayment ability, local school district social
demographics should be utilized instead of county-wide data.
A broader application of SUTA will recognize the unique and
essential Tribal infrastructure needs and will help build rural
America, as many tribal governments are the backbone of the
rural infrastructure now and those trends appear to be unrelenting.
Establish a Permanent Rural Development Tribal
Technical Service and Assistance Office
In additional to the SUTA provision above, establishing
a permanent office providing technical service and assistance
across all RD funding authorities, via a cooperative agreement
with USDA, would help with two major issues of access to RD
programs in Indian Country. First, the complexities of lending
and infrastructure establishment in Indian Country--tied to
the nature of the trust land base--call for the establishment of
such an office that can prepare and monitor lessons learned,
Substantially Underserved Trust Area (SUTA): Overview, U.S. Dept. of Agric.,
https://www.rd.usda.gov/about-rd/initiatives/substantially-underserved-trust-areasuta (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
20
Native Farm Bill Coalition, Indian Country Priorities and Opportunities
Title VI: Rural Development 2 (2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/Title-VI-Rural-Development.pdf.
19

2018]

Building Indian Country’s Future

35

establish user-friendly application systems, and assist staff at
the tribal or business level in preparing applications. This is a
function the federal government cannot readily undertake. Such
assistance would also provide needed insight to federal staff in
the ongoing execution of their roles by providing a single pointof-contact for all concerned. Second, the trust responsibility of
the federal government to tribes supports the need to establish
such assistance interventions. This would model some current
RD practices, particularly in the infrastructure arena, where field
staff assist agency staff and the applicant in analyzing financial
viability, key engineering specifications, and related technical
requirements for more complex infrastructure projects.
Equal Access to Research, Education, and Extension
Funding for Tribal Colleges and Universities and the
Federally Recognized Tribes Extension Program
All entities working within research, extension, and
education in Indian Country, including Tribal Colleges and
Universities (“TCU”s) and the Federally Recognized Tribes
Extension Program (“FRTEP”) must have the same access to
research, education, and extension funding as all other entities.
Further, FRTEP must maintain its unique program authorities and
be protected from over-subscription by those who have access
to other program funding like the 1862, 1890, and 1994 landgrant institutions and TCUs. FRTEP was created by Congress to
address the needs of those Tribes not served by Tribal colleges.21
The funding for both extension for TCUs and FRTEP is very
low.22 Entities serving Indian Country must be entitled to the
same level of eligibility and access to National Institute of Food
and Agriculture (“NIFA”) funding as all other entities. Educating
the next generation of producers, scientists, technical specialists,
See Federally-Recognized Tribes Extension Program, Nat’l Inst. of Food and
Agric., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/federally-recognized-tribes-extension-grantprogram (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
22
See Native Farm Bill Coalition, Indian Country and Opportunities for the
2018 Farm Bill, Title VII: Research 2 (2017), http://seedsofnativehealth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Title-VII-Research.pdf.
21
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business managers, engineers, lawyers, and related professionals
who advise and support the agriculture and food sectors is
vital and making sure that Native youth aspire to those career
paths is important to the survival of Tribal communities and to
creating viable occupations that support food and agriculture
sectors in Indian Country. We are in an intergenerational shift in
agriculture.23 and Indian Country is no different. Our farmers are
older and our young people are hungry for a meaningful career.
With 12,000 Native students in FFA as of 2016,24 we know many
AIAN young people want that career to be in agriculture.
Agriculture research, education, and extension programs
are critical to our food, health, and self-sufficiency. Agriculture
research is important because it monitors and explores old and
new knowledge regarding plant and animal health, explores
the impact of science to solve food problems, tackles societal
issues related to health, and ensures our food supplies are sound
and resilient. Accessing research, building our own research
systems within TCUs, and supporting educational institutions
and faculty within Tribal communities is essential to stabilizing
agriculture production and communities. Focusing on the
importance of traditional knowledge and exploring its use in
modern communities is best done at Tribal-owned and managed
institutions. Extending knowledge and research outcomes into
communities and onto tribal farms, ranches, and food businesses
is critical to their growth and stabilization.
We must address these issues in a thoughtful and
comprehensive manner; however, FRTEP cannot be opened up
in such a way that it becomes available to larger institutions with
no relationship to Tribes and Tribal communities and that already
have access to thirty thousand students or more and billionSee Jennifer Mitchell, A Young Generation Sees Greener Pastures in Agriculture,
NPR (Jan. 3, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/03/374629580/a-young-generationsees-greener-pastures-in-agriculture.
24
Wayne Maloney, Native American FFA Members Discuss the Future of Agriculture
with USDA Officials, U.S. Dept. of Agric. (July.23, 2013), https://www.usda.gov/
media/blog/2013/07/23/native-american-ffa-members-discuss-future-agricultureusda-officials.
23
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dollar endowment funds. FRTEP funding must be returned to a
process that preserves the programs in place while continuing to
grow. TCUs have a very low and totally inadequate funding level
for extension services and research. Even with low funding levels,
TCUs do an incredibly important job within their communities
and need to be respected and fully eligible for all of the funding
authorities within the Research Title of the Farm Bill and research
programs at USDA. Stabilizing both programs while growing
both programs should be the goal; pitting programs against one
another will not improve the situation. Opening the full portfolio
at NIFA to equitable access for Tribal-serving institutions is
necessary.
Finally, we need data. A farmer, rancher, or food business
has better productivity if they have good records and data access.
We can use mobile technology in new ways with a new generation
of farmers and ranchers, but we must make sure Tribes have
greatly improved access to that technology as well. E-connectivity
and rural broadband is incredibly important for all rural America
and for Tribes—this access was among the first recommendations
made to support prosperity for all rural America by the USDA
Interagency Task Force of Agriculture and Rural Prosperity.25
Their report to the President noted that e-connectivity is “a tool
that enables increased productivity for farms, factories, forests,
mining, and small businesses.”26 TCUs and FRTEP agents must
be a part of the technological revolution in farming and ranching
and agribusiness growth and be afforded access to improved
research, education, extension funding.
Conclusion
The next Farm Bill presents an incredible opportunity
to address the broad needs of a changing food and agriculture
sector alongside the needs of our rural and remote communities
U.S. Dept. of Agric., Report to the President of the United States from the
Task Force on Agriculture and Rural Prosperity 18 (2017), https://www.usda.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/rural-prosperity-report.pdf.
26
Id. at 17.
25
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around the country. To take full advantage of the opportunities
that Indian Country has in agriculture and agribusiness, as well
as enhancing food sovereignty and securing the health of our
people and communities, Tribal governments must be seen as
equal governmental partners in delivering and accessing Farm
Bill programs.
By adjusting, developing, and improving the Farm Bill’s
programs, we can build upon the great work already happening
in Tribal communities surrounding food and agriculture. We
can improve and expand our infrastructure. We can develop our
Tribal food systems. We can provide the means for our agriculture
businesses to thrive. We can continue to address and improve the
health of our people. We can feed our communities in vibrant
Native food systems with foods raised and grown by Tribal
people. But equally important, the country can acknowledge
the role Tribes have always played in our nation’s food security
and we can now become better partners in food security, food
production, and the agriculture sector. Improving the Farm Bill
for Indian Country will help bolster the important work ahead for
us all.

A Farm Bill to Help Farmers Weather Climate Change
Peter H. Lehner* and Nathan A. Rosenberg**
Climate change affects farmers and ranchers more than
almost any other sector. Agriculture depends on consistent
weather patterns, and the more frequent droughts, floods, heat
waves, pest attacks, and other impacts of climate change make an
often uncertain activity even more so. A farm bill that focuses on
the true long-terms interests of farmers would help producers slow
climate change, while also helping them better prepare for the
inevitable coming weather changes. Fortunately, many practices
that help producers reduce their contribution to climate change
also enhance their farms’ resilience to higher temperatures and
more extreme weather. The farm bill should prioritize adoption
of these climate-friendly practices. It’s time to decarbonize the
farm bill.
While this is a radical—or at least politically charged—
idea in the United States, other countries are beginning to treat
agriculture as a major source of emissions1—and as a major
pathway for reducing net emissions. Alongside the negotiations
over the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2016, hundreds
of countries, regional groups, and others joined in an initiative
called “4/1000” to increase soil carbon stocks by 0.4 percent
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Adjunct professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The authors thank
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1
See, e.g., Eva Wollenberg et al., Reducing Emissions from Agriculture to Meet the
2°C Target, 22 Global Change Biology 3859, 3860 (2016). Under the 2015 Paris
Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, each
country sets their own emission targets, while also planning and reporting their
contribution. Id. So far at least 119 countries have pledged to reduce their agricultural
greenhouse gas emissions in their statements of Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (“INDC”s). Id.
*
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every year.2 This could be enough to offset about 30 percent of
global anthropogenic emissions.3
The measures necessary to increase soil carbon stocks
would also reduce nonpoint source water pollution and soil erosion,
while increasing agricultural productivity, soil water carrying
capacity, and drought resilience.4 With the reauthorization of the
farm bill every five years, and perhaps as soon as 2018, the U.S.
has an opportunity to incentivize practices that benefit producers
as well as society more broadly. This essay offers suggestions on
how the farm bill can be reformed to accomplish this. Although
it’s unlikely the 2018 farm bill will address climate change, it’s
not too early to lay the foundation for 2023 and beyond.
Moving beyond the 1938 Farm Bill
The structure and priorities of the farm bill still owe much
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.5 The 1938 Farm Bill
compensated farmers for “soil conservation,” but, as observers at
the time noted, the conservation component was largely a legal
fiction, intended to ensure that the legislation, which primarily
benefited large-scale commodity producers,6 passed constitutional
Budiman Minasny, Soil Carbon per 4 Mille, 292 Geoderma 59, 82 (2017).
Id.; Contra A.J. VandenBygaart, Letter to the Editor, Comments on Soil Carbon 4
per Mille, 309 Geoderma 113, 113-14 (2018) (arguing that Minasny et al. overstate soil
carbon sequestration’s ability to mitigate climate change).
4
Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon in Soils of Agro-Ecosystems, 36 Food Pol’y
S33, S36 (2011); Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon and Increasing Productivity by
Conservation Agriculture, 70 J. Soil & Water Conservation 55A, 55A, 58A-59A
(2015).
5
Wayne D. Rasmussen, New Deal Agricultural Policies after Fifty Years, 68 Minn.
L. Rev. 353, 358-359 (1984); Douglas R. Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American
Farmer in the Twentieth Century 151 (2002); Devan A. McGranahan et al., A
Historical Primer on the US Farm Bill: Supply Management and Conservation Policy,
68 J. Soil & Water Conservation 67A, 69A (2013).
6
See, e.g., Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South In the 1950s 41-42
(Univ. of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press 2000); Charles Kenneth Roberts,
The Farm Security Administration and Rural Rehabilitation in the South
ix, 29 (Univ. of Tennessee Press 2015); Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More:
Southern Agriculture 1865-1980 143 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1984) (discussing
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which provided the model for the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). The 1938 law also strengthened the influence
of the conservative American Farm Bureau Federation. David Brody, On the Failure
of U.S. Radical Politics: A Farmer-Labor Analysis, 22 Indus. Rel. 156 (1983).
2
3
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muster.7 Subsequent farm bills have followed this pattern, using
conservation as a means to support large-scale, capital-intensive
agriculture, but rarely treating it as end in itself. This has resulted
in a farm safety net that places the interests of agribusiness over
farmers and conservation programs that often do not do enough to
strengthen the environment or rural communities.
This history must help guide the decarbonization of the
farm bill. Some agricultural practices may, in the short-term, help
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but in the long-run shore up
an industrial model of agriculture that is ultimately less climatefriendly.8 Moreover, a successful, climate-friendly farm bill would
not only include programs designed to reduce emissions and
increase soil health, but it would also work to change the political
dynamics of farm communities. Without building a robust base of
support in rural America by targeting benefits at a wide range of
people—rather than a small group of very large, often corporate
farms—any climate-friendly programs will soon face co-option
or dissolution.
Both the farm safety net and conservation programs must
be designed with these long-term goals in mind. Some proposals
to make conservation and research programs more “flexible” and
financially secure by increasing the private sector’s involvement,9

Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 129 (3d ed. 1977);
Paul W. Ward, The AAA Puts on False Whiskers, The Nation, Jan. 22, 1936, at 93
(describing the rush to pass legislation basing farm benefits on the pretext of ‘soil
conservation’ rather than ‘crop control’ in order to escape judicial veto). See United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (finding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
unconstitutional because regulated and controlled agricultural production, invading
the reserved rights of the states).
8
See, e.g., Open Letter from Civil Society on the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart
Agriculture, Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns (July 2014), http://www.
climatesmartagconcerns.info/english.html; Ben Lilliston, The Clever Ambiguity
of Climate Smart Agriculture, Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.iatp.org/blog/201512/the-clever-ambiguity-of-climate-smart-agriculture.
9
See, e.g., Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of
2017, S. 1966, 115th Cong. (2017) (granting private entities more control over how
conservation funds are spent); Callie Eideberg, How Congress Can Help Farmers
Stay Profitable and Resilient, Envtl. Def. Fund (Feb. 27, 2017), http://blogs.edf.
org/growingreturns/2017/02/27/how-congress-can-help-farmers-stay-profitable-andresilient/ (proposing to strengthen farm bill conservation programs through private
sector investment and collaboration).
7
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for example, while advertised as a win-win for farmers and the
environment,10 would in fact harm both.11 Many of the largest
sources of private funding have very different interests than
environmental stewardship or rural communities. Thus, ranking
research funding applications higher if the applicants secure
corporate matches would in the long-run advance the interests
of agribusiness over those of independent farmers and the
environment.
Fortunately, it may be politically advantageous to
decarbonize the farm bill with a long-term focus, prioritizing the
public interest with the input of rural communities and a diverse
range of farmers. Agribusiness is increasingly concentrated: Just
four companies sold over 85 percent of the beef in the U.S.;12 five
companies slaughter almost 70 percent of the swine;13 with recent
mergers, just three companies control over 60 percent of agrochemical and seed sales internationally.14 This concentration, as
well as the concentration of payments under federal farm programs,
15
creates tensions in farm country,16 and thus a political opening.
See, e.g., Callie Eideberg, The Next Farm Bill Can Jump Start Conservation.
Here’s How., Envtl. Def. Fund (Oct. 24, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/
growingreturns/2017/10/24/farm-bill-rcpp-conservation-innovation/ (describing the
Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of 2017 as “a win-win
for farmers and the environment.”).
11
See generally Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially
Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 426 (2017)
(discussing the pitfalls of relying on ‘win-win solutions’ as a means of environmental
protection).
12
Kristina Johnson & Samuel Fromartz, NAFTA’s ‘Broken Promises’: These Farmers
Say They Got the Raw End of the Trade Deal, NPR (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.
org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/07/541671747/nafta-s-broken-promises-these-farmerssay-they-got-the-raw-end-of-trade-deal.
13
The Agribusiness Accountability Initiative, Hogging the Market: How
Powerful Meat Packers are Changing our Food System and what We Can Do
About It 2, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AAI_Issue_Brief_4.pdf.
14
Merge-Santo: New Threat to Food Sovereignty, ETC Grp. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://
www.etcgroup.org/content/merge-santo-new-threat-food-sovereignty.
15
The largest 7 percent of producers owns 60 percent of the harvested cropland,
receives almost half of all government farm payments, and takes in almost 90 percent
of all net farm income. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture
94, 98, 100 tbl. 65 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_
Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf (Calculated by the authors using data
from the Census of Agriculture).
16
See, e.g., Ctr. for Rural Affairs, May/June 2013 Study among Rural/Small10

2018]

Farm Bill to Help Farmers Weather Climate Change

43

Advancing carbon-sequestering policies could prove popular
in many rural areas if those policies were designed to benefit a
broader range of farmers than current programs, improve water
quality and local landscapes, and help reverse land consolidation.
Reforming farm bill programs
The farm bill is a massive omnibus bill. Its most recent
iteration, the Agricultural Act of 2014, ran to 357 pages, amended
16 previous farm bills, and authorized almost a trillion dollars
of spending.17 Because the bill is typically so large, we do not
attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to decarbonizing it.18
Instead we focus on six critical steps that Congress should take
to make future farm bills better for rural communities and the
climate.
Town Americans 12 (2013) http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Poll-of-Rural-Voters-Toplinesby-Income.pdf. A 2013 survey of 804 registered voters in rural America found that 68
percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “[t]oo much of federal farm
subsidies go to the largest farms, hurting smaller family farms.” See id. Nationally,
agribusiness companies are among the least popular corporations; Harris Poll’s annual
poll of the 100 most visible corporations in the United States, for example, ranked
Monsanto as having the fourth worst reputation. Harris Poll: Corporate Reputation
Politically Polarized as Companies Wrestle with Taking a Stand for Their Values,
Cision PR News Wire (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
harris-poll-corporate-reputation-politically-polarized-as-companies-wrestle-withtaking-a-stand-for-their-values-300404867.html. A 2017 survey of 1,506 registered
voters nationwide also found that 90 percent of voters had either “very serious
concerns” or “somewhat serious concerns” about the potential merger of Monsanto
and Bayer. Memorandum from Public Policy Polling to Interested Parties, 90 Percent
of Voters Nationwide Concerned about Potential Merger of Monsanto and Bayer;
Overwhelming Majority Say Merger Will Result in Harm to Consumers, Farmers
(June 14, 2017), https://1bps6437gg8c169i0y1drtgz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/legacy/National_Monsanto_Memo_6.9.17_002.pdf.
17
Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to
Frank D. Lucas, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/
costestimate/hr2642lucasltr00.pdf.
18
See generally Peter Lehner & Nathan Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to CarbonNeutral Agriculture, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. 10845 (2017) (comprehensive approach
to decarbonizing farm programs). The Farm Bill Law Enterprise (“FBLE”) and
the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition (“NSAC”) are also independently
releasing comprehensive sets of recommendations designed to make the farm bill
more sustainable and equitable. See generally Broad Leib et al., Farm Bill Law
Enterprise, Diversified Agricultural Economies (2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/FBLE_Diversified-Agricultural-Economies_Final.
pdf; Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, An Agenda for the 2018 Farm Bill
(2017),
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NSAC-2018Farm-Bill-Platform-FINAL.pdf.
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1. Expand research and extension service on climatefriendly practices.
Over the last decade, public spending on agricultural
research has dropped by almost one-third19 and less than two percent
of the remaining funding is devoted to diversified systems,20 which
offer the greatest climate and environmental benefits.21 Given the
critical need both for greater study and demonstration of many
climate-friendly practices, Congress should restore sufficient
funding to U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) research
programs and require that at least half of the department’s research
expenditures support climate-friendly practices or systems.
Similarly, extension services have proven remarkably
effective at disseminating and perpetuating new agricultural
practices.22 Yet funding is way down and there is inadequate focus
on climate-friendly practices such as the use of cover crops, prairie
grass strips, perennial crops, and buffer zones along streams and
lakes. Congress should both restore funding for extension to at
least $900 million annually, and, perhaps building on the existing
(for now) Climate Hubs, devote the additional funding to support
practices that will both increase soil carbon stocks and improve
farm resilience to extreme weather. 23

Matthew Clancy et al., U.S. Agricultural R&D in an Era of Falling Public Funding,
U.S. Dep’t of Agric, Econ. Res. Serv. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
amber-waves/2016/november/us-agricultural-rd-in-an-era-of-falling-public-funding/.
20
Marcia DeLonge et al., Investing in the Transition to Sustainable Agriculture, 55
Envtl. Sci. & Pol’y 266, 267 (2016).
21
See id.
22
See, e.g., Irwin Feller, Technology Transfer, Public Policy, and the Cooperative
Extension Service—OMB Imbroglio, 6 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 307, 307 (1987)
(“The Cooperative Extension Service has come to represent the best of both an
articulated but decentralized political arrangement and of a technology transfer
system.”); George McDowell, Engaged Universities: Lessons from the Land Grant
Universities and Extension, 585 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 31, 35-36 (2003).
23
Congress should also provide permanent baseline funding for the USDA National
Agroforestry Center, while increasing its budget to at least $10 million. It was
originally appropriated $5 million by Congress in the 1990 Farm Bill; however it
typically receives about $1 million, despite agroforestry’s demonstrated potential
to rapidly increase carbon sequestration. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and
Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–624, §1243, 104 Stat. 3546 (1990).
19

2018]

Farm Bill to Help Farmers Weather Climate Change

45

2. Enforce conservation limitations—and place new ones
on payment size
In order to remain eligible for a number of important
federal farm programs, farmers are prohibited from producing
agricultural products on highly erodible land without a conservation
plan,24 or from doing so on unconverted wetlands under any
circumstances.25 These requirements, known as “conservation
compliance,” apply to the crop insurance program, each of the
conservation programs, and many smaller programs. They offer
potentially important climate benefits because conventional
farming on highly erodible land and wetlands results in significant
greenhouse gas emissions.26
These requirements must be strengthened, however, to
ensure that government funds protect—rather than undermine—
soil and water quality and that farmers implementing sound
stewardship practices are not placed at a disadvantage. Congress
should require operators and landowners to plan and implement
conservation systems for all land planted with annual crops in
order to be eligible for farm program benefits and crop insurance
subsidies.27 These conservation systems must help protect carbon
stocks by ensuring that soil erosion on annually planted cropland
does not exceed the soil loss tolerance level—the maximum annual
rate of soil erosion possible without causing a decline in long-term
16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3812 (2014).
16 U.S.C. § 3821. Wetlands drained or filled before December 23, 1985 are not
protected. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A).
26
Wetlands are estimated to emit between 405 and 1215 metric tons of CO2 eq. per acre
when converted to agricultural land. Richard Plevin et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Biofuels’ Indirect Land Use Change Are Uncertain But May Be Much Greater
than Previously Estimated, 44 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 8015, 8018 (2010), https://pubs.
acs.org/doi/ipdf/10.1021/es101946t.
27
See generally Food & Farm Act, H.R. 4425, 115th Cong. §§ 201-206 (2017)
(proposing to extend conservation plan requirements to all cropland planted with row
crops, not just highly erodible land as under the current law); Nat’l Sustainable
Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 32-33, 44-45, 84 (discussing the importance
of comprehensive conservation plans for effective stewardship); Envtl. Working
Grp., Less Farm Pollution, More Clean Water: An Agenda for Conservation
in the 2018 Farm Bill 2 (2017), https://cdn3.ewg.org/sites/default/files/u352/
EWG_Report_Conservation_C06.pdf?_ga=2.167498046.187388472.15250436031751440026.1525043603, (advocating for extending conservation plan requirements
to all annually tilled land).
24
25
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productivity;28 address gully erosion, which is responsible for
up to 40 percent of soil loss in the United States;29 and maintain
waterway buffers to reduce runoff and nitrous oxide emissions.30
These steps will greatly improve soil and water quality locally
and throughout the country, resulting, among other benefits, in
significantly reduced climate impacts.
The USDA Inspector General has also found that the
department has failed to consistently enforce current conservation
requirements.31 Congress should adequately fund conservation
compliance enforcement and increase USDA’s technical
assistance capacity to ensure that providers know how to comply.32
Finally, Congress should require USDA to report compliance and
enforcement data to Congress, allowing policymakers and the
public to evaluate USDA’s enforcement efforts.33
Just as USDA programs should, at a minimum, preserve
environmentally sensitive land, they should also protect small- and
medium-scale farms, which provide a number of services to rural
See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to maintain soil
erosion levels at or below the soil loss tolerance level); Nat’l Sustainable Agric.
Coalition, supra note 18, at 36 (urging Congress to require conservation plans for
highly erodible land to achieve soil erosion levels at or below the soil tolerance level);
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27 (recommending that Congress integrate the soil
tolerance level into conservation plans).
29
See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to address
ephemeral gully erosion); Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note 18, at 37
(discussing USDA’s inadequate efforts to reduce gully erosion and proposing reforms);
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27, at 3 (recommending that conservation plans
prevent gully erosion).
30
See generally H.R. 4425 (requiring 50 feet of perennial vegetation between annually
tilled land and intermittent or perennial waterways); Envtl. Working Grp., supra
note 27 (proposing that the 2018 Farm Bill require conservation plans to include 50
feet of perennial vegetation between annually tilled land and waterways).
31
The report also found that the agency’s auditing process had completely bypassed at
least 10 states in 2015, apparently in error. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Monitoring
of Highly Erodible Lands and Wetland Conservation Violations, Audit Rep.
50601-0005-31 3 (2016), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-0005-31.pdf;
see also Laurie Ristino & Gabriela Steier, Losing Ground: A Clarion Call for Food
System Reform to Ensure a Food Secure Future, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 59, 96-102
(2016) (discussing flaws in conservation compliance enforcement).
32
See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27 (detailing possible improvements in
enforcement and compliance within the conservation compliance regime).
33
Both FBLE and NSAC also recommend mandated collection and reporting of
conservation compliance data. See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27; Nat’l
Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 36.
28
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communities,34 reduce wealth inequality,35 and have been found
to be disproportionately likely to adopt sustainable practices.36
Currently, however, USDA programs disproportionately favor
large-scale producers and help drive land consolidation. The
top 7 percent of producers, for example, received almost half of
all government farm payments in 2012.37 While some programs
currently cap payments, many, including crop insurance, do not,
and existing caps are too high. Congress should place a cap on
payments across all farm safety net and conservation programs
at $150,000 or lower, and use the resulting savings to increase
support for sustainable small- and medium-sized farms.
3. Require crop insurance providers to base premiums on
soil health
In an era when the public is growing increasingly
skeptical of industrial agriculture and farm subsidies, crop
insurance has become a politically palatable way for the federal
government to subsidize large-scale operations. The program is
portrayed as, and often perceived to be, a safety net for farmers
in the event of catastrophic crop failure. While about 16 percent
of federal crop insurance contracts are limited to this type of
protection, the vast majority, 84 percent, also include revenue
protections.38 These revenue-based policies guarantee enrolled
farmers a certain level of income regardless of market prices or
their crop productivity.39 Further, crop insurance premiums are
themselves highly subsidized. A 2016 analysis of crop insurance
See Peter Rosset, The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in
the Context of Global Trade Negotiations, 43 Development 77, 81 (2000); see generally
Linda Lobao & Curtis W. Stofferahn, The Community Effects of Industrialized
Farming: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws, 25
Agric. & Human Values 219 (2008) (focusing on the consequences of farmland
consolidation and industrialized agriculture for rural communities).
35
See Rosset, supra note 34, at 78-79.
36
Id. at 80-81; Lobao & Stofferahn, supra note 34, at 226-28.
37
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 15, at 94, 100 tbl. 65.
38
Dennis Shields, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Crop Insurance: Background 2
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40532.pdf.
39
Id.
34
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policies, for example, found that farmers realized an annual
average return of 120 percent on their policies between 2000
and 2014.40 These extraordinarily high crop insurance premium
subsidies have increased agricultural emissions by incentivizing
agricultural production on marginal land, while also increasing
land consolidation.41
Crop insurance should do the opposite. Rather than
encouraging cultivation of marginal lands, which is financially
risky, and discouraging climate-friendly practices such as cover
crops, Congress should create financial incentives for practices
that will make the system more secure. It should make soil
health—of which soil carbon content is a key factor—a criterion
in determining insurance premiums, rewarding those who act as
good stewards of the land. This would discourage planting on poor
quality land (which is often the most ecologically important) and
create financial incentives for practices that both reduce climate
change and improve resilience to droughts, floods, and the like,
thus reducing the very risks that the program seeks to address.
All this would, in turn, reduce federal expenditures.42 Congress
should also ensure that USDA and researchers have access to
soil health data, allowing them to quantify the impact of different
sustainability practices on soil health.43
4. Turn the Conservation Reserve Program into a true
land retirement program
The Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”) pays farmers
for taking environmentally sensitive land out of production for 10Bruce A. Babcock, Envtl. Working Grp., Crop Insurance: A Lottery That’s
a Sure Bet 3 (2016), https://static.ewg.org/reports/2016/federal_crop_insurance_
lottery/EWG_CropInsuranceLottery.pdf?_ga=2.90653337.2042648376.1516647185417038531.1514752376.
41
See, e.g., Daniel Sumner & Carl Zulauf, Council on Food, Agric. & Res. Econ.,
Economic & Environmental Effects of Agricultural Insurance Programs
(2012), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/156622/2/Sumner-Zulauf_Final.pdf.
42
See Joshua D. Woodard & Leslie J. Verteramo-Chiu, Efficiency Impacts of Utilizing
Soil Data in the Pricing of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 99 Amer. J. Agric.
Econ. 757, 758 (2017).
43
Id. at 769.
40
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15 years.44 Out of the three main conservation programs, Congress
gave it the largest allocation in the 2014 bill, resulting in roughly
$1.8 billion annually.45 USDA estimated that CRP sequestered
over 43 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions in
2014, mitigating about 7 percent of agriculture’s greenhouse gas
emissions that year.46 This is misleading, however, since many
producers bring their CRP acres back into production after their
contracts expire, quickly releasing any carbon stored during the
contract’s term. A 2016 study found that expired CRP land was
10 times more likely to be converted into crop production than to
be shifted into other set-aside conservation programs.47 Between
2007 and 2014, for example, an estimated 15.8 million acres
previously protected by CRP—at a cost of $7.3 billion—were
returned to agricultural production.48 Researchers have also found
that some farmers compensate for the loss of production on CRP
lands by converting marginal land to crop production.49
Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Service Agency,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/
conservation-reserve-program/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
45
See Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs 26
(2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2015-03-usda.pdf
[hereinafter CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget
Office, CBO’s March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs 26 (2016), https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2016-03-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s
March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s June
2017 Baseline for Farm Programs 28 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
recurringdata/51317-2017-06-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s June 2017 Baseline for
Farm Programs].
46
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Year 20162018 Update 25, 28, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
AboutFSA/fsa-strategic-plan-2016-2018.pdf.
47
Philip E. Morefield et al., Grasslands, Wetlands, and Agriculture: The Fate of Land
from the Conservation Reserve Program in the Midwestern United States, 11 Envtl.
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2016).
48
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note at 27 at 7.
49
See JunJie Wu, Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Program, 82 J. Agric.
Economics 979, 990 (2000) (finding that for each 100 acres of land enrolled in CRP,
another 20 acres were put into production); David A. Fleming, Slippage Effects of
Land Based Policies: Evaluating the Conservation Reserve Program Using Satellite
Imagery, 93 Papers Regional Sci. S167, S176 (2013) (observing varying rates of
slippage according to land cover using satellite data); Nancy Leathers & Lisa M.B.
Harrington, Effectiveness of Conservation Reserve Programs and Land “Slippage” in
Southwestern Kansas, 52 Professional Geographer 83, 83-93 (2004) (finding that
slippage greatly reduce CRP’s effectiveness in Kansas). Contra Michael J. Roberts
& Shawn Bucholtz, Slippage in The Conservation Reserve Program or Spurious
44
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In order to effectively reduce agricultural emissions,
Congress should restructure CRP in two ways. First, satellite
imagery and other modern technology should be used to identify
the most sensitive lands (such as former wetlands or stream beds),
which should then be prioritized. Second, the CRP should provide
farmers with either permanent easements or 30-year easements
that are linked to permanent set-asides, effectively expanding the
current Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (“ACEP”).50
Farmers who complete a 30-year easement contract, for example,
could be given an incentive to sign a permanent contract to
keep the land from being cultivated. This would change CRP
to a program that both supplements the incomes of farmers and
provides sustained water quality and climate benefits.
		 5. End EQIP subsidies for industrial operations
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (“EQIP”)
offers farmers funding and technical assistance for developing
and implementing single conservation practices.51
In recent years, Congress has provided EQIP with
approximately $1.4 billion annually.52 More than a quarter of
EQIP payments went to support waste storage facilities in largescale animal production facilities (legally termed “concentrated
animal feeding operations” or “CAFO”s) and irrigation systems.
Doing so has the effect of subsidizing large-scale, environmentally
degrading practices.53
Correlation? A Comment, 87 Amer. J. Agric. Economics 244, 250 (2005) (finding no
evidence of slippage using an alternative model).
50
USDA currently offers farmers long-term and permanent easements through ACEP,
but funding for its component initiatives has been cut substantially in recent years and
the program now receives between 8 to 15 percent of CRP’s funding annually. See
Cong. Budget Office, supra note 45.
51
Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural
Resources Conservation Service, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/
main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
52
See, e.g., Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
53
See, e.g., Andrew Martin, In The Farm Bill, A Creature from the Black Lagoon,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/business/13feed.
html (suggesting that the program’s name should be changed to the “Factory Farm
Incentive Program”); Tom Laskaway, Stop The Environmental Subsidy for Factory
Farms, Grist (Apr. 17, 2009), http://grist.org/article/stop-the-environmental-subsidy-
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When Congress created EQIP in 1996, it required that
at least 50 percent of the program’s total funding go toward
livestock operations.54 However, it excluded large confined
livestock operations,55 and limited payments to a maximum of
$50,000 in most cases,56 ensuring that EQIP funds would benefit
smaller operations. In the 2002 Farm Bill, Congress eliminated the
restriction against large confined livestock operations and raised
the payment cap to $450,000,57 where it currently stands.58 As a
result, waste storage facilities for CAFOs received a larger share
of payments—over $100 million—than any other single practice
supported by EQIP.59 Since CAFOs depend on the production
of vast amounts of grain—the production of which causes
significant air and water pollution—and concentrate manure
in ways that create further air and water pollution, supporting
CAFOs effectively subsidizes a greenhouse gas-intensive form
of animal production that also undermines rural economies and
animal welfare.60
The largest share of EQIP payments—$181 million
in 201661—however, goes to a bundle of practices designed
to improve irrigation systems, such as the installation of new

for-factory-farms/; CAFOs and Cover Crops: A Closer Look at 2015 EQIP Dollars,
Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal. Blog (Nov. 20, 2015), http://sustainableagriculture.
net/blog/fy15-general-eqip-update/.
54
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
§1241(2), 110 Stat. 996-97 (1996).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§
1240B-1240G, 116 Stat. 254-57 (2002).
58
The cap was lowered to $300,000 in the 2008 Farm Bill, but was ultimately raised
back to $450,000 in the 2014. Farm Bill. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 2508, 122 Stat. 923, 1063 (2008); Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub.
L. 113-79, §2206, 128 Stat. 649, 730 (2014) (amending § 1240G).
59
Melissa Bailey & Kathleen Merrigan, Rating Sustainability: An Opinion Survey
of National Conservation Practices Funded Through the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program, 65 J. Soil & Water Conservation 21A, 23A (2010).
60
Carrie Hribar, Nat’l Assoc. of Local Boards of Health, Understanding
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their Impact on Communities
7-10 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf.
61
Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., supra note 18, at 52.
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irrigation pipelines or reservoirs.62 Instead of using EQIP funding
just to improve the efficiency of irrigation, however, farmers
often use their savings to expand irrigated crop production,
switch to more water-intensive crops, or both.63 This leads to land
conversion, a major source of greenhouse gas emissions.64
Farmers deserve support for installing environmentally
friendly infrastructure, but EQIP must be better tailored. Congress
should prohibit funding for new and expanding CAFOs. It should
also contractually bar operators receiving EQIP payments for
water conservation from expanding irrigated crop production.
The resulting savings should be redirected to practices used
in sustainable systems, ensuring long-term benefits to the
environment and climate.
6. Focus the Conservation Stewardship Program on
environmental benefits
The Conservation Stewardship Program (“CSP”) is an
incentive-based working lands program, designed to make active
farms more environmentally friendly.65 Farmers participating
See Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) practice suite payments in
the United States, 1997-2015, Envtl. Working Grp., https://conservation.ewg.org/
eqip_practice_suite.php?fips=00000&regionname=theUnitedStates (last visited Apr.
29, 2018) (between 1997 and 2015 over $1.6 billion went to fund irrigation systems
through EQIP).
63
See generally Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velazquez, Water Conservation in
Irrigation Can Increase Water Use, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. Am. 18215
(2008); Lisa Pfeiffer & C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, Does Efficient Irrigation Technology Lead
to Reduced Groundwater Extraction? Empirical Evidence, 67 J. Evnt’l Econ. Mgmt.
189 (2014).
64
See Emily Cassidy, Envtl. Working Grp., Ethanol’s Broken Promise: Using
Less Corn Ethanol Reduces Greenhouse Gas Emissions 4 (Nils Bruzelius ed.
2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/105/47/18215.full.pdf. The Environmental
Working Group, for instance, estimates that the conversion of wetlands to farmland
between 2008 and 2012 resulted in greenhouse gas emissions totaling 25 to 74
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually. Id. Others have studied the
conversion of native grasslands to farmland, in large part to supply corn to ethanol
plants, and similarly found significant soil carbon losses. Tyler Lark et al., Cropland
Expansion Outpaces Agricultural and Biofuel Policies in the United States, 10 Envtl.
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2015).
65
EQIP, in contrast, is a cost-share working lands conservation program. CSP may
be merged with EQIP in the upcoming farm bill, however, a similar performancebased payment program will likely remain in some form. Conservation Stewardship
Program (CSP), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service,
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/oh/programs/financial/csp/
(last
62
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in CSP enroll their entire operation in a contract to plan and
adopt comprehensive conservation measures. While CSP has the
smallest budget of the three main conservation programs—it has
received about $1.1 billion annually since the last farm bill66—
CSP is the largest USDA conservation program on an acreage
basis.67 Unfortunately, recent changes to CSP have deemphasized
environmental considerations in USDA’s application and payment
determinations.
Congress should require that CSP payments encourage
practices with the most environmental and climate benefits. Now,
payments for many CSP practices that increase crop diversity
and soil health, such as Resource Conserving Crop Rotations
(“RCCR”s) and Soil Health Crop Rotations, are actually lower
than payments for standard enhancements.68 Congress should
strengthen the CSP sustainability standards for participation;
increase the importance of environmental benefits in the
application process; and raise payment rates for practices that
provide the greatest climate benefits.
Transforming the farm bill
Agricultural land, which covers more than 60 percent of
the continental United States, 69 is capable of producing a number
of public goods in addition to agricultural commodities, including
environmental goods, such as biodiversity, water quality,
and climate stability, and social goods such as rural vitality,
animal welfare, and food security.70 The farm bill should move
beyond its traditional focus on the production of agricultural
visited Apr. 28, 2018).
66
See Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
67
Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), supra note 65.
68
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service, Payment
Schedule Handbook, Part C § 600.13(F) (2016), https://directives.sc.egov.usda.gov/
OpenNonWebContent.aspx?content=40186.wba.
69
Cynthia Nickerson et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Major Uses
of Land in the United States, 2007 4 (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/44625/11159_eib89_2_.pdf?v=41055.
70
Francesco Vanni, Agriculture and Public Goods: The Role of Collective Action
119 (Springer 2014).
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commodities and treat agriculture’s other public goods with equal
consideration.71 In addition to the specific changes recommended
above, Congress should develop a robust program to pay farmers
for these important stewardship services.
The federal government currently incentivizes farms to
grow crops that are used, in a highly inefficient manner, to produce
corn ethanol, sweeteners, and highly processed food products.72
Why not encourage farms to produce what the country needs
more of? Congress should develop a program to pay farmers
for permanent carbon sequestration, which measures would also
protect water quality and quantity. The farm safety net should
not just enrich the largest farms, but protect the environment,
mitigate climate change, grow healthy food, and strengthen rural
communities. Decarbonizing the farm bill would not only help
stabilize our climate, but would also transform rural America into
a healthier, more sustainable, and equitable place.

This would not necessarily result in a decline in production or an increase in land
use, although funding for research in agroecological methods would need to be
increased in order to maintain productivity.
72
While the production of these commodity crops may be efficient when measured
by inputs (such as labor) or yield, their use is grossly inefficient when human needs,
such as nutritious food, are considered. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 10853.
A 2013 study found that 67 percent of calories and 80 percent of protein in crops
produced in the United States are diverted to animal feed. Emily Cassidy et al.,
Redefining Agricultural Yields: From Tonnes to People Nourished Per Hectare, 8
Envtl. Res. Letters 1, 4 (2013). An additional 6 percent of both calories and protein
of U.S. crops were diverted to a biofuel production—a share that has likely increased
significantly since the enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standard. Id. Finally, an
estimated 75 percent of the average American’s diet comes from processed or ultraprocessed foods, which are low in nutritional quality. Jennifer Poti et al., Is the Degree
of Food Processing and Convenience Linked With the Nutritional Quality of Foods
Purchased by US Households, 101 Am. J. Clinical Nutrition 1251, 1251 (2015).
Some researchers have started to refer to this diet as a “commodity-based diet” due
to its reliance on commodity crop production. See David Ludwig, Commentary,
Technology, Diet, and the Burden of Chronic Disease, 305 JAMA 1352, 1352 (2011).
71
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Insuring a Future for Small Farms
Mary Beth Miller* & D. Lee Miller**
Introduction
All farmers face systemic risk from bad weather and
the vagaries of the market.1 Farmers with small, diversified
operations must also contend with treacheries as unique as the
farms they threaten. As a beginning farmer and coordinator of a
farm incubator in North Carolina, you see and hear these stories
all the time. An independent slaughter facility serving 600 small
poultry farmers shuts down three weeks before the national
celebration of poultry that is Thanksgiving.2 An ice storm cancels
a bustling weekend farmers market after produce has been picked,
washed, and packed, and then collapses a high tunnel holding the
next month’s harvest.3 Coyotes destroy one third of a heritagebreed turkey flock in a single night.4 A soil-borne fungus prevents
planting and renders a field barren for six years.
Whole-Farm Revenue Protection (“WFRP”), a pilot
Lomax Farm Coordinator at the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association, and Coowner of Blue Merle Farm in North Carolina
**
Clinical Fellow at the Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic. The authors
wish to thank the editors for their excellent work. Opinions do not necessarily reflect
those of the Carolina Farm Stewardship Association or the Harvard Law School Food
Law and Policy Clinic.
1
See generally Mario J. Miranda & Joseph W. Glauber, Systemic Risk, Reinsurance,
and the Failure of Crop Insurance Markets, 79 Am. J. of Agric. Econ. 206
(1997), http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ642/Babcock/Miranda-Glauber_
SystemicRisk.pdf.
2
See, e.g., North Carolina Poultry Processor Closing; Farmers in Bind, U.S.
News (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north-carolina/
articles/2017-11-03/north-carolina-poultry-processor-closing-farmers-in-bind.
3
See, e.g., Debbie Roos, Farmers Don’t Get Snow Days! This Winter a Challenging
One for Area Farmers, N.C. State Univ., https://growingsmallfarms.ces.ncsu.
edu/2014/02/farmers-dont-get-snow-days-this-winter-a-challenging-one-for-areafarmers/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
4
See, e.g., Jeannette Beranger et al., How to Raise Heritage Turkeys on Pasture:
Protecting Heritage Turkeys from Predators, The Livestock Conservancy 73, 73
(2007), https://livestockconservancy.org/images/uploads/docs/ALBCturkey-8.pdf.
*
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program created by the 2014 Farm Bill and administered by
USDA’s Risk Management Agency (“RMA”), enables farmers to
protect against financial ruin after events like these.57 With a few
tweaks, WFRP could become an even stronger safety net against
weather extremes and natural disasters, as well as the market
and supply-chain disruptions that endanger small, diversified
operations. As WFRP expands its reach, it would enable more
small, diversified farms to access credit and find the security to
invest in expansion. Congress has an opportunity to make needed
reforms in WFRP in the upcoming farm bill, and they have a good
reason to follow through: as small, diversified farms flourish, they
bring economic, social, and environmental benefits that justify
the public investment in their financial security.
WFRP has only been available since 2015, and few
scholarly papers have considered the role of whole-farm
policies in catalyzing small farm viability.6 Section I of this
essay highlights why small, diversified farms deserve public
support and how whole-farm revenue policies can fill a need by
providing insurance tailored to these farms. Section II provides
an overview of the first three years of WFRP. Section III explores
four concrete opportunities for Congress to improve upon WFRP
through the next farm bill by increasing program awareness and
education, aligning incentives for agents to write whole-farm
policies, mitigating and reversing conflicts between coverage and
Whole Farm Revenue Protection for Diversified Farms, Nat’l Sustainable Agric.
Coal.,
http://sustainableagriculture.net/publications/grassrootsguide/credit-cropinsurance/whole-farm-revenue-protection-for-diversified-farms/ (last visited Apr. 18,
2018).
6
Several studies have examined the potential to replace existing commodity and crop
insurance programs with a whole-farm revenue approach. However, these studies are
limited to scenarios where producers have significant program base acreage, making
whole-farm coverage less advantageous relative to status quo. Area-based whole-farm
designs help reduce adverse selection and moral hazard while reducing recordkeeping
burdens, but do little to benefit producers for whom product differentiation and crop
diversity are key to their marketability. See Lekhnath Chalise et al., Developing AreaTriggered Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance, 42 J. of Agric. and Resource Econ.
27, 28 (2017), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/252753/files/JARE_Jan2017__3_
Chalise_27-44.pdf; see J. Marc Raulston et al., Agric. & Food Policy Center
Texas A&M University Dep’t of Agric. Econ., The Farm Level Impacts of
Replacing Current Farm Programs with a Whole Farm Revenue Program 1,2
(2011), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/98785/files/SAEA2011%20Raulston.pdf.
5
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conservation activities, and simplifying program access for small
farms. The section ends by outlining how WFRP could be used
as a basis for more ambitious public support for small, diversified
farms.
I. Support for Small, Diversified Farms
Like most definitions in agriculture, what should qualify
as a “small” farm necessarily varies among geographic areas and
production systems. USDA’s definition of a farm with $350,000 or
less in gross annual sales provides enough of a reference point for
the purposes of this essay. By this count, the average small farm
controls 231 acres.7 Within this universe of small farms, those
that earn between $10-250k in gross sales account for slightly
more than one third of all farms in the United States.8
Like “small”, USDA has a definition of “diversified”,9
although what we mean by diversified farms is better illustrated
by examples from our home state of North Carolina. At Four
Leaf Farm, Tim and Helga MacAller grow specialty fruits and
vegetables, ornamental plants, and microgreens intensively on
two acres, cultivating well over fifty varieties of plants in a single
year. 10 Over seventeen years, they have built a thriving business
that provides fresh, organically grown food to the community and
employs aspiring young farmers throughout the year.11 Jillian and
Ross Mickens of Open Door Farm got their start on a farm incubator

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights, Family Farms
1
(2015)
https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/
Highlights/NASS%20Family%20Farmer/Family_Farms_Highlights.pdf.
8
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Economic Class of Farms by
Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold and Government Payments:
2012 and 2007, https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/
Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_003_003.pdf.
9
For the purposes of the WFRP program that is the subject of this essay, diversification
is measured by counting the number of distinct commodities a farm producers. To be
included, the commodity must account for a percent of total revenue equal to the
operations total revenue, divided by the number of commodities grown, divided again
by 3. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Whole Farm Revenue Protection
2 (2017), https://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/rme/wfrpfactsheet.pdf.
10
See Four Leaf Farm, http://www.fourleaffarm.org/, (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
11
Id.
7
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six years ago, with almost no prior agricultural experience. 12
After three seasons at the incubator, they purchased land where
they now grow vegetables, cut flowers, and microgreens.13 Daniel
Dayton runs Old Milburnie Farm, specializing in mushrooms,
seasonal vegetables, and pasture-raised pork and poultry on ten
acres, where he regularly hosts community dinners.14
Embedded in these operations, and the many other small,
diversified farms throughout the country, are a set of economic,
social, and environmental benefits that farm policy, as enacted by
the farm bill, should go out of its way to support. For example,
small farm size is linked to a stronger middle class, reduced
unemployment, greater socioeconomic stability, and higher rates
of civic engagement.15 Small, diversified farms account for 46
percent of all direct-to-consumer sales through farmers markets,
roadside stands, or community-supported agriculture (“CSA”)
programs.16 In other words, small farms have a disproportionate
role in driving local food economies, which shorten the supply
chain and put a greater share of each food dollar in the farmers’
pockets.17 This money is often reinvested in local business by way
of seed, equipment, livestock, and feed purchases,18 creating a
“multiplier” effect where each dollar spent generates more value

See Our Story, Open Door Farm, https://www.opendoorfarmnc.com/about.html,
(last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
13
Id.
14
See Old Milburnie Farm, http://www.oldmilburniefarm.com/, (last visited Apr. 18,
2018).
15
See Union of Concerned Scientists, Growing Economies: Connecting
Local Farmers and Large-Scale Food Buyers to Create Jobs and Revitalize
America’s Heartland 1, 1-2 (2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/
attach/2016/01/ucs-growing-economies-2016.pdf; see Thomas A. Lyson et al., Scale
of Agricultural Production, Civic Engagement, and Community Welfare, 80 Soc.
Forces 311, 311 (2001).
16
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights, Small Farms
2 (2016), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Fact_
Sheets/Farm_Numbers/small_farm.pdf.
17
Jeffrey K. O’Hara, Market Forces: Creating Jobs Through Public Investment
in Local and Regional Food Systems, Union of Concerned Scientists 17
(2011), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/food_and_
agriculture/market-forces-report.pdf.
18
Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 18, at 2.
12
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as it moves through the local economy.19 The upshot is tremendous
opportunity for rural economic development through the vehicle
of small, diversified farms. And as the average American farmer
approaches retirement age,20 a new generation of growers is
taking root on small farms. 97 percent of all beginning farmers21
run “small” farms.22
Small and diversified go hand in hand. Compared to
larger operations, small farms are more likely to implement
environmentally sustainable agronomic systems23 and maintain
diversified production that promotes biodiversity.24 At the Elma
C. Lomax Incubator Farm in Concord, NC, we train small
farmers how to rotate multiple plant varieties and choose diseaseresistant cultivars; incorporate cover crops in field management
and minimize synthetic inputs; use season extension techniques
and high tunnels; and diversify revenue streams with niche
specialty crops, among many other things. These practices add
to biodiversity, soil health, ecosystem stability, and a farmer’s
capacity to adapt to unexpected weather and changes in consumer

See generally David Swenson, Leopold Ctr for Sustainable Agric., Selected
measures of the economic values of increased fruit and vegetable production
and consumption in the upper Midwest 16 (2010), https://www.leopold.iastate.
edu/files/pubs-and-papers/2010-03-selected-measures-economic-values-increasedfruit-and-vegetable-production-and-consumption-upper-mid.pdf.
20
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender
Profiles, United States Farms with Women Principal Operators Compared
with All Farms 1, 2, 4 (2015), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/
Online_Resources/Race,_Ethnicity_and_Gender_Profiles/cpd99000.pdf.
21
See Beginning Farmer and Rancher Loans, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.
fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/farm-loan-programs/beginning-farmersand-ranchers-loans/index (last visited Apr. 18, 2018) (defining “beginning
farmer” as those who have operated a farm or ranch for fewer than 10 years); The
Federal Crop Insurance Act reserves Beginning Farmers benefits to those with five or
fewer crop years. 7 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(3).
22
Beginning Farmers and Age Distribution of Farmers, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ.
Research Serv. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/
beginning-disadvantaged-farmers/beginning-farmers-and-age-distribution-offarmers/.
23
Gerard D’Souza & John Ikerd, Small Farms and Sustainable Development: Is Small
More Sustainable?, 28 J. of Agric. & Applied Econ. 73, 76-77 (1996).
24
Kristina Belfrage et al., Effects of Farm Size and On-Farm Landscape
Heterogeneity on Biodiversity—Case Study of Twelve Farms in a Swedish Landscape,
39 Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems 170, 177-179, 183 (2015).
19
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demand, which in turn, improve resilience and mitigate risk.25
Diversified farms are more resilient farms, economically and
ecologically.26
The Role of Insurance
For all their benefits, the characteristics of small, diversified
farms that make them reliable producers of public goods also
make them difficult to insure through traditional yield or revenue
policies. Commodity-specific policies do not effectively serve the
needs of operations growing many different crops.27 A diversified
farmer would need to insure each crop separately—a headache
on its own—and would not capture the benefit of mitigating
risk through diversification.28 Many small, diversified farms,
like those profiled above, sell into multiple markets at different
price points.29 For them, traditional insurance cannot effectively
manage either yield or price risk.
Yet small, diversified farms need insurance. Because
small farms operate on even tighter margins than the industry as a
whole, moderate to severe losses can cause a farmer to default on
her operating loans or mortgage, fail to cover personal expenses,
or ultimately file for bankruptcy.30 This creates a double bind
for small farms. Many banks require proof of insurance before
approving a loan,31 but crop insurance has been difficult or
Gail Feenstra et al., What is Sustainable Agriculture?, U.C. Davis, Agric.
Sustainability Inst., Sustainable Agric. Res. and Educ. Program, http://asi.
ucdavis.edu/programs/sarep/about/what-is-sustainable-agriculture (last visited Apr.
18, 2018).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Erik. J. Donoghue et al., Econ. Res. Serv., Does risk matter for farm
businesses? The Effect Of Crop Insurance On Production And Diversification
7 (2005), https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19397/1/sp05od02.pdf.
29
See Becky Krystal, Farmers market prices tend to be higher in the city: Why?, The
Washington Post (June 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/
farmers-market-prices-tend-to-be-higher-in-the-city-why/2016/06/16/27233ea6-2f4b11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3a811522beb6. 30
Robert Hoppe, Profit Margin Increases with Farm Size, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Res. Serv. (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/
januaryfebruary/profit-margin-increases-with-farm-size/.
31
See Anna Johnson & Glen Ready, Center for Rural Affairs, New Option for
25
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impossible to access without scale. Perhaps the greatest promise of
an insurance product for small, diversified farms is that it expands
access to credit, thereby increasing solvency and opening credit
lines for further investment. Enter WFRP.
II. Whole Farm Revenue Protection
WFRP is a pilot program developed by RMA to meet
the 2014 Farm Bill’s inclusion of a revenue protection policy
for diversified farms.32 Congress specified that the whole farm
program include both a diversification incentive33 and marketreadiness provision.34 When policies were first made available for
2015, Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack touted that WFRP “gives
farmers more flexibility, promotes crop diversity, and helps
support the production of healthy fruits and vegetables.”35
To achieve this broader access, WFRP provides coverage
for many types of farm operations that other federal insurance
programs ignore. In so doing, it provides a template that future
farm bills can build upon. The current iteration of WFRP already
improves upon previous whole farm revenue programs, Adjusted
Gross Revenue (“AGR”) and AGR-Lite, which had been around
since the late 1990s.36 Researchers credit the underutilization
of AGR and AGR-Lite to its limited geographical availability,
program complexity and, above all, insufficient coverage rates
that protected a maximum of 80 percent of expected revenues. 37
Farm Risk Management: Whole Farm Revenue Protection Usage in Nebraska
2 (2017), https://www.cfra.org/sites/www.cfra.org/files/publications/WFRP%20
Report.pdf.
32
See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1522(c)(19)).
33
Id. at § 1522(c)(19)(C).
34
Id.
35
New Pilot Program Offers Coverage for Fruits and Vegetables, Organic and
Diversified Farms, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (May 21, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/
portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2014/05/0100.xml.
36
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Adjusted Gross Revenue 1
(2014), https://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/rme/agr2014.pdf ; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk
Mgmt. Agency, Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite 1 (2014), https://www.rma.usda.
gov/pubs/rme/agr-lite.pdf.
37
Dennis A. Shields, Cong. Research Serv., R43494, Crop Insurance Provisions
in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79) 8 (2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-
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WFRP begins to address the shortcomings of AGR
and AGR-Lite by increasing coverage levels up to 85 percent
and removing payment rate limits, meaning that producers are
indemnified for 100 percent of covered losses.38 The marketreadiness provision covers some of the labor-intensive postproduction expenses—e.g., packing, packaging, washing, and
labeling—necessary to bring crops out of the field.39 Finally,
WFRP increases the premium subsidy up to 80 percent.40
Whole-farm policies, 2014-201741
Crop
Year

2014
2015
2016
2017

Policy Policies Total
Sold
Liabilities
(millions)
AGR + 840
$525
ARG-L
WFRP 1,126
$1,146
WFRP 2,228
$2,332
WFRP 2,845
$2,866

Total
Premium
(millions)
$20
$53
$119
$145

Federal
Indemnities Loss Ratio
Subsidy
(millions)
(millions)
$11
$55
2.87 (AGR);
2.71 (AGR-L)
$38
$69
1.30
$84
$165
1.39
$103
$33*
.23*

*Indemnity and loss ratio data will fluctuate until the
claim filing window closes.
When WFRP was first offered in 2015, it covered 1200

content/uploads/assets/crs/R43494.pdf.
38
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 12, at 2.
39
See id. at 3.
40
Frequently Asked Questions: Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) Plan, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.rma.usda.gov/
help/faq/wfrp2018.html.
41
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
Commodity Year Statistics for 2014 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/
sob/current_week/insplan2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
Commodity Year Statistics for 2015 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/
sob/current_week/insplan2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
Commodity Year Statistics for 2016 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/
current_week/insplan2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 Federal Crop Insurance]; U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Commodity
Year Statistics for 2017 (2018), https://www3.rma.usda.gov/apps/sob/current_week/
insplan2017.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Federal Crop Insurance].
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farms, insuring over a billion dollars in production value, more
than twice the coverage of the AGR programs it replaced.42
Program participation more than doubled over the following two
years and in 2017, insured revenue reached almost $3 billion.43
Over its first two years, the loss ratio fell by half compared to
AGR policies, meaning that WFRP comes much closer to RMA’s
mandate to provide insurance at rates that are actuarially sound.44
Early Administrative Refinements
As WFRP entered its second crop year in 2016, RMA
updated the policy in an effort to improve access and coverage.45
First, RMA made WFRP universally available.46 AGR and AGRLite used a checkerboard approach that excluded large swathes
of the Midwest, South, and Plains, and in its first year WFRP
excluded five states and some counties in states where policies
were available.47 WFRP is now available in every state and every
county.48
Second, RMA took a first step toward increasing access
for beginning farmers by modestly adjusting production history
requirements that excluded farmers who could not produce such
histories because they began farming recently.49 The program
also enrolls new farmers who take over 90 percent of an existing
operation, 50 which recognizes the importance of supporting
producers during the growing wave of intergenerational farm
See 2015 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 44.
See 2017 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 46
44
See 2015 Federal Crop Insurance, supra note 44; see 2016 Federal Crop Insurance,
supra note 45.
45
Historic Changes to Whole Farm Revenue Protection, Rural Advancement
Foundation International (Aug. 27, 2015), http://rafiusa.org/blog/rma-announceshistoric-changes-to-whole-farm-revenue-protection/.
46
See id.
47
See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., Farming for the Future:
A Sustainable Agriculture Agenda for the 2012 Food &
Farm
Bill
28
(2012),
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/
uploads/2008/08/2012_3_21NSACFarmBillPlatform.pdf.
48
U.S. Dep’t of Agric, supra note 12, at 1.
49
See id. at 2.
50
Historic Changes to Whole Farm Revenue Protection, supra note 52.
42
43
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transitions. Finally, beginning farmers and ranchers receive an
automatic 10 percent increase in premium subsidy levels.51
III. Farm Bill Opportunities
Despite impressive growth to date WFRP remains broadly
underutilized.52 The remainder of this essay proposes farm bill
reforms that would improve WFRP to meet the needs of small,
diversified operations. Targeting this tranche of farms, WFRP
could easily surpass the benchmarks set in its first years. In turn,
expanding WFRP participation would strengthen the risk pool,
help achieve and maintain actuarial soundness, and manifest trust
among farmers and insurance providers that the program is here
to stay. Growth in program participation, we believe, is the best
long-term solution to overcome institutional barriers. Once agents
and underwriters see WFRP as a permanent program, a virtuous
cycle of investment in agent training and specialized software
will attract still broader participation.53
First, however, Congress should demonstrate its support
through reforms to WFRP that increase program awareness,
encourage agents to write whole-farm policies, mitigate and
reverse conflicts between coverage and conservation activities,
and simplify program access for small farms.
Immediate Opportunity: Expand and improve WFRP
education and outreach.
Farmers and their advisers lack awareness and information
on WFRP, contributing to its broad underutilization.54 Risk
management education is nothing new, and Congress has
established and funded efforts to provide education on risk
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Fed. Crop Insurance Corp., Whole-Farm Revenue
Protection Pilot Handbook: 2016 and Succeeding Crop Years 39 (2016), http://
www.rma.usda.gov/handbooks/18000/2016/16_18160-1h.pdf.
52
See Johnson & Ready, supra note 35, at 5.
53
Id. at 10.
54
See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., An Agenda for the 2018 Farm Bill 43
(2017),http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NSAC-2018Farm-Bill-Platform-FINAL.pdf.
51
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management strategies generally, and crop insurance specifically,
through the National Institute of Food and Agriculture’s Risk
Management Education (“RME”) program55 and RMA’s
Risk Management Education Partnerships (“RME”) and
Risk Management Education in Targeted States (“RMETS”)
programs.56
Each program makes grants to both public and private
entities that provide education and outreach on risk management,
including several recent projects that specifically target WFRP.57
However, in 2016 their combined budgets totaled only $13.7
million. The next farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress
to increas its investment in risk management education through
these existing programs, and to direct that NIFA and RMA should
prioritize projects that focus on whole farm risk management
strategies. Beyond increased funding, Congress should ensure
that there is adequate reporting and evaluation built into each
funded project so that the most successful educational materials
and outreach strategies can be identified and replicated in future
years.
Immediate Opportunity: Create a simplified policy for
small farms.
Farmer advocates identify the complexity and number
of WFRP documentation requirements as a significant barrier
preventing broader participation.58 Documentation includes:
extensive revenue history forms to write the policy, three interim
reports submitted during the growing season, and a variety of
worksheets.59 For small farms, this additional recordkeeping
can consume more time than the benefit of carrying insurance.60
7 U.S.C. § 1524 (2012).
7 U.S.C. § 1522.
57
See, e.g., , Risk Management Education Partnership Program, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency https://www.rma.usda.gov/aboutrma/agreements/
awards/2017/2017partnerships.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
58
See, e.g., Johnson & Ready, supra note 35, at 10.
59
See Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., supra note 61, at 78.
60
See RAFI Producer Survey on Whole Farm Revenue Protection, Rural
55

56
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Congress can address this barrier by creating a simplified WFRP
policy for small farms.
There is recent precedent for such a move in the Microloan
program. Introduced in 2013, and expanded in the 2014 Farm
Bill,61 the Microloan Program streamlines the application process
required for larger loan programs.62 For example, farmers may
demonstrate farming experience and production history using
more flexible means.63 The next farm bill should include a similar
mandate that RMA develop a WFRP policy for small farms.
Congressman Rick Nolan (D-MN) recently introduced a marker
bill that would create a streamlined WFRP policy for farms
insuring under $1 million in annual revenue.64
Immediate Opportunity: Remove barriers and incentivize
adoption of resource-conserving practices.
A farmer’s coverage should not be threatened by the use of
resource-conserving agronomic practices, which inherently lower
on-farm risks especially over time. In order to meet the terms
of their insurance contract, farmers must follow “good farming
practices.” Because these practices include, inter alia, strict
planting and harvest deadlines, they can retard or even prevent
adoption of conservation practices like cover cropping.65 The
Advancement Found. Int’l. (July 1, 2015), http://rafiusa.org/blog/rafi-producersurvey-on-whole-farm-revenue-protection/.
61
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, § 5106(a), 128 Stat. 649, 837-38 (2014)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1943(c)).
62
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Expands Microloans to Help Farmers
Purchase Farmland and Improve Property (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.usda.gov/
media/press-releases/2016/01/19/usda-expands-microloans-help-farmers-purchasefarmland-and-improve.
63
Sarah Tulman et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., USDA
Microloans for Farmers: Participation Patterns and Effects of Outreach
1 (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/81871/err222_summary.
pdf?v= 42761.
64
See Crop Insurance Modernization Act of 2018, H.R. 4865, 115th Cong. § 2(e)
(2018).
65
Gabrielle Roesch-McNally et al., The trouble with cover crops: Farmers’
experiences with overcoming barriers to adoption, Renewable Agric. and Food
Systems 1, 9 (2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/
content/view/732DAC57E92E1C9EFC5A451F7EAF454A/S1742170517000096a.pdf/
trouble_with_cover_crops_farmers_experiences_with_overcoming_barriers_to_
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farm bill should specify that all NRCS-approved conservation
activities are considered “good farming practices” and prohibit
the insurance industry’s practice of using contract “terms and
conditions” to undermine this safe harbor,66 ensuring that practices
like cover cropping never threaten coverage.67
Although such a safe harbor for conservation activities
mitigates some existing challenges, Congress should take
additional action requiring RMA to make WFRP’s diversification
incentives more robust. One such proposal by the Farm Bill Law
Enterprise would reserve the highest subsidy rates for farmers
who adopt advanced conservation practice bundles or resourceconserving crop rotations, as determined by NRCS.68 Another
approach, proposed by NRDC, would create a pilot program
tying subsidy rates to practices shown to improve soil health and
mitigate climate risks.69
Immediate Opportunity: Create WFRP evangelists by
improving insurance agent compensation.
All federal crop insurance policies, whole-farm or
otherwise, are sold by independent crop insurance agents and
assigned to RMA-approved private insurance companies.70 The
adoption.pdf.
66
See Peter Lehner & Nathan A. Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral
Agriculture, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10845, 10876 n.223 (2017).
67
The Crop Insurance Modernization Act, supra note 73. The Act would implement
this change by amending Section 508 of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, codified at 7
U.S.C. § 1508. See Nathaniel Levy, Improving Soil Health Through Crop Insurance,
Farm Bill Law Enterprise (Apr. 13, 2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.org/2018/04/13/
improving-soil-health-crop-insurance/.
68
See Emily Broad Leib et al., Farm Bill Law Enterprise, Diversified
Agricultural Economies 17 (2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/FBLE_Diversified-Agricultural-Economies_Final.pdf.
69
See Claire O’Connor, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Soil Matters: How the
Federal Crop Insurance Program Should Be Reformed to Encourage Low
Risk Farming Methods with High Reward Environmental Outcomes 3 (2013),
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/soil-matters-IP.pdf.
70
See Bruce Babcock, The Politics and Economics of the U.S. Crop Insurance
Program, in Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Res., The Intended and Unintended Effects
of U.S. Agricultural and Biotechnology Policies 83-112, at 107-09 (Joshua
S. Graff Zivin & Jeffrey M. Perloff eds., University of Chicago Press 2012), http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c12109.pdf. There is strong evidence that this dynamic makes
independent crop insurance agents, rather than crop insurance company owners, the
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insurance companies bid for agents’ books of business, and each
insurance company receives revenue from underwriting gains
and administrative and operating (“A&O”) subsidies in relation
to the value of the policies assigned.71 Thus, agent compensation
ultimately depends on the value of the policies they write.
Due to their complexity, it takes more time to write WFRP
policies than other crop insurance policies, creating opportunity
costs for agents who could be writing simpler policies with
higher values.72 As a result, agents are less likely to seek out or
create opportunities to sell them.73 Congress should correct this
prejudice against WFRP by requiring RMA to develop alternative
compensation schemes for agents who write whole-farm policies,
for example by setting a flat commission per policy or by paying
agents based on the time spent writing the policy.
A Vision for WFRP
As we consider immediate reforms, it is worth sparing a
moment to consider what a farm bill could do with a program
like WFRP if it were truly dedicated to the long-term success of
small, diversified farms. We envision a program that is altogether
removed from RMA and the private crop insurance companies it
uses to deliver its products. The characteristics that make small,
diversified farms unique, resilient, and valuable public assets—
commitment to environmental stewardship and biodiversity,
reliance on local economies and food systems, a young and
diverse workforce—are the same traits that cause these farms to
be unintelligible or simply ignored by traditional credit agencies
and crop insurance companies. The government pays an enormous
price to outsource crop insurance program delivery, while the
insurance industry captures about one third of total federal crop
residual beneficiaries in the crop insurance industry.
71
Id. at 86.
72
See Memorandum from the Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal. to Leiann Nelson,
Senior Underwriter, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Risk Mgmt. Agency (April 25, 2015),
http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NSAC-WFRPRecommendations-Final.docx.
73
See id.
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insurance outlays.74 Yet this expense has failed to buy adequate
delivery for small farms. As we note above, private actors lack
robust incentives to service small farms with complex operations.
A “public option,” administered and delivered through FSA,
addresses all the issues we have identified and many others.
FSA is a logical choice for a revenue guarantee program
for small farms. FSA already serves small farms through points of
contact that include microloans, the Non-Insured Crop Disaster
Assistance (“NAP”), and outreach through efforts like the
“Bridges to Opportunity” program.75 There are over 2,100 FSA
offices nationwide including in nearly every rural county,76 and
farmers are connected to FSA from the time they first acquire
a farm number at their local FSA office. A whole-farm program
administered by FSA disentangles farmers’ needs from insurance
agent incentives, strengthens working relationships between
farmers and FSA, and it puts FSA into a position of insuring the
livelihoods of those who are willing to sustain rural communities
while investing in local soil and water quality through conservation
practices. For small farmers, FSA could be more than the “Lender
of Last Resort,” but the “Insurer of First Opportunity.”
Conclusion
Our farmers are aging and we need a new generation that
not only takes their place, but that is ready to meet the public’s
demand for nutritious and local foods grown in healthy soil.
We need a farm bill that updates the social contract between
farmer and eater, and that embraces the opportunities that small,
diversified farms offer to farmers and their communities. When
we invest in small, diversified farms, we invest in the promise
Joseph W. Glauber, Taxpayers for Common Sense, Crop Insurance and
Private Sector Delivery: Reassessing the Public-Private Partnership 1 (2016),
http://www.taxpayer.net/images/uploads/downloads/Crop_Insurance_and_Private_
Sector_Delivery_1.pdf.
75
USDA’s Farm Service Agency Expands Bridges to Opportunity Nationwide, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/newsroom/news-releases/2017/nr_20170111_rel_0006.
76
Id.
74
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of jobs that cannot be exported, stewardship of local natural
resources, revitalization of rural communities and shortening the
distance food travels. The next farm bill, and the ones that follow
in the years to come, have an opportunity to improve and build on
the Whole Farm Revenue Protection program so that it becomes
a pillar of small farms throughout the country.

Proactive Policies: Building the Farm Bill of the Future
Through New Collaborations and Perspectives
Jennifer Zwagerman
Consumers and agricultural producers have been linked
in the Farm Bill for over 70 years, in various and evolving
ways. While the Farm Bill has evolved and grown over the years,
with numerous new programs added through subsequent farm bills
and additional legislation, there is no denying that with its broad
scope of programs impacting agriculture and nutrition, producers
and consumers remain absolutely connected in today’s Farm Bill
as well.1 However, this comprehensive, broad-based piece of
legislation that impacts not just every American, but has a much
more global impact, is contentious and involves much debate and
political fighting each time it comes up for renewal.2 I believe
more can be done to bridge the many divides that occur when it
comes to the Farm Bill, starting with a change in process and in
mindset that will build more broad-based coalitions of support
beyond the traditional agricultural block, while also helping
remove some of the contentious debate that occurs every renewal
cycle. A more broad-based view of the purpose and scope of the
Farm Bill will also more accurately reflect the changing scope of
agriculture, where agriculture means much more than just food
production, and help agriculture and its many partners focus on
long-term, sustainable solutions to issues that are intricately tied
to agriculture, food, the environment, rural development, and
more.
See Tom Vilsack, The 2018 farm bill is so much more than farming — here’s how it
impacts all Americans, Business Insider (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.
com/heres-how-the-2018-farm-bill-impacts-all-americans-2018-1.
2
See Jeremy Bernfeld, Out of Public Eye, A Bitter Farm Bill Fights, Harvest Public
Media (July 11, 2014), http://harvestpublicmedia.org/post/out-public-eye-bitter-farmbill-fights.
1
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Consumers and Producers, and the Rural/Urban

The origins of what we call the “Farm Bill” date back to
the 1930s and the Great Depression, part of FDR’s New Deal,
with a goal of helping farmers by boosting crop prices.3 Despite
a generally strong economy, the 1920s were not good to farmers
and the farm economy, and the Great Depression made a bad
situation even worse for agricultural producers.4
One way the 1933 legislation supported prices was by
paying farmers to limit production.5 This bill, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, provided the payments for non-production,
allowed the government to purchase excess grain from producers,
and provided for financing options, among other things.6 This
was an emergency declaration, stated to “cease to be in effect
whenever the President finds and proclaims that the national
economic emergency in relation to agriculture has ended.”7
For the purpose of this essay, the importance of this law
lies in some of its goals: parity and avoiding a disparate impact
on consumers. In the 1933 Farm Bill, parity was defined as “an
equality of exchange relationship between agriculture and industry
or between persons living on farms and persons not farms.”8 The
1993 Act also stated an “intent to protect the consumers’ interest
by readjusting farm production to a level that would not increase
Michael X. Heiligenstein, A Brief History of the Farm Bill, Saturday Evening Post
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/04/17/culture/politics/abrief-history-of-the-farm-bill.html.
4
Id.
5
See e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/farmbills/1933.pdf;
Heiligenstein, supra note 3.
6
See e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., History of Agricultural PriceSupport and Adjustment Programs, 1939-84 3 (1984), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/41988/50849_aib485.pdf?v=42079; Agricultural Adjustment
Act; Sara Menker, Grains in Mali: More than Meets the Media, Linked In (July 26,
2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/grains-mali-more-than-meets-media-saramenker.
7
Agricultural Adjustment Act §13.
8
U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., History of Agricultural Price-Support
and Adjustment Programs, 1939-84 3 (1984), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/41988/50849_aib485.pdf?v=42079.
3
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the percentage of consumers’ retail expenditures” above the
amount used as the financial baseline goal.9 In short, the goal was
to provide support to farmers, as the country saw value in a strong
agricultural industry, while also ensuring that an improving farm
economy and crop prices would not have an overly negative
impact on consumers.10
The Farm Bill today continues, in many ways, to
reflect those same goals, albeit on a much broader and larger
scale. Programs have expanded to include not just those
directed towards commodity support, but conservation, trade,
nutrition, rural development, energy, and more.11 The Farm Bill
is legislation that has tremendous impact, is vital to supporting
strong agricultural and rural communities, and ensures millions of
Americans have access to food.12 This legislation has unrealized
potential to do great things, but it has to start with expanding the
public’s perception of agricultural production and its role in our
society.
In order for the Farm Bill to grow, to modernize, and
to reflect the current state of our country and needs, it is more
important than ever that new coalitions of support be created to
develop and support the Farm Bill. These coalitions need to more
strongly reflect all voices, move beyond the “us vs them/urban vs
rural” mentality, and reflect the changing environment and needs
of the current economy and population. In doing so, I believe we
will see not only stronger legislation addressing environmental,
rural, nutritional, agricultural, and scientific needs, but find a path
that will provide for a more collaborative and less contentious
path moving forward.

Id. at 4.
What is the Farm Bill? Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., http://
sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/campaigns/fbcampaign/what-is-the-farm-bill/
(last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
11
See Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649, https://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr2642enr/pdf/BILLS-113hr2642enr.pdf.
12
See Vilsack, supra note 1.
9

10
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Changing Rural Economies and US Population Divides
At the time of the first Farm Bill, in the 1930s, rural
Americans and those involved in agriculture made up a higher
percent of the population that what we see today.13 When the U.S.
began collecting farm census data in 1920, the population was
approximately 105.7 million, and the farm population was just
over 30.2% of the total population.14 As of 2016, less than 2%
of the population was directly involved in agriculture,15 and only
14% of the population resides in rural parts of the country (with
continued downward population trends).16 However, agriculture
is 6% of the overall economy and 10% of US employment
overall.17 I do not expect that the number of farms will grow in
the near future (the last USDA Census of Agriculture reported
approximately 2.1 million farms in 2012, down from 2.2 million
in 2007);18 I do expect that agricultural-related employment
will increase. Examples of growth areas include wind and solar
energy, which are tightly connected to agriculture and continue
to expand, even as we see industries like biofuel slow.19 There
See U.S. Census Bureau, Urban and Rural Population 1900-1990 (1995),
https://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpop0090.txt
(identifying
downward trends in rural population as a percentage of total population over time).
14
Farm Population Lowest Since 1850’s, N.Y. Times (July 20, 1988), http://www.
nytimes.com/1988/07/20/us/farm-population-lowest-since-1850-s.html.
15
Employment Projections: Employment by major industry sector, U.S. Dept. of
Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stat., https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_201.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018).
16
U.S. Dept. of Agric, Rural America at a Glance, 2017 Edition 1 (2017) https://
www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/85740/eib-182.pdf?v=43054.
17
Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res.
Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-theessentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy.aspx (last updated Oct.18, 2017).
18
U.S. Dept. of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture, Highlights: Farms &
Farmland 1 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_
Resources/Highlights/Farms_and_Farmland/Highlights_Farms_and_Farmland.pdf.
19
See Daniel Cusick, Wind and Solar Growth Outpace Gas, Scientific American
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wind-and-solargrowth-outpace-gas/; Renewable Energy and Agriculture: A Natural Fit, Union
of Concerned Scientists, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energysolutions/increase-renewables/renewable-energy-and.html#.WtAe6YjwbIU
(last
visited Apr. 12, 2018) (providing four fact sheets on renewable energy and the natural
synergy with agricultural and rural America); Daniel Cusick, Farmers Find a New
Cash Crop: Renewable Energy , Scientific American (Nov. 26, 2014), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/farmers-find-new-cash-crop-renewable13

76

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

is also growth, with the potential for much more, in the sciences
and agricultural-related technology, as we seek means to
address concerns such as climate change, water quality, and soil
health.20 Agriculture as a whole is an industry that matters for so
many reasons and to different people for different reasons, yet
Americans are increasingly removed from rural American and
agricultural production,21 leading to many misunderstandings and
misconceptions about the impact of agriculture on our everyday
lives. One of the most direct effects is the fact that Americans pay
a lower percentage of household income on food than the rest of
the developed world, in some cases much, much less.22 That is
due, at least in part, to our agricultural policies such as those in
the Farm Bill.
However, the importance of agriculture to those not
directly connected has waned over the years. Only 14% of the
U.S. population resides in rural areas, despite almost 75% of

energy/; Michael Essery, Global Biofuels to Rise to 67 Billion Gallons in 2022 as
Next-Generation Technologies Take Over, LuxResearch (Feb. 14 2017), http://www.
luxresearchinc.com/news-and-events/press-releases/read/global-biofuels-rise-67billion-gallons-2022-next-generation.
20
See Organisation for Economic Development, Agriculture and Climate
Change 1 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/tad/sustainable-agriculture/agricultureclimate-change-september-2015.pdf (discussing use of technical solutions to help
mitigate role of agriculture in climate change); David Austin & Molly K. Macauley,
Cutting Through Environmental Issues: Technology as a Double-Edged Sword,
Brookings Institute (Dec. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cuttingthrough-environmental-issues-technology-as-a-double-edged-sword/ (highlighting
technology as a tool, but also a concern, when it comes to addressing environmental
challenges related to climate and water quality, among others); Katharine Garvin,
Wilton Park, Conference Report: Global Food Security: The Roles of
Science and Technology 1 (Oct. 2012), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/Global%20food%20security%20the%20role%20of%20science%20
and%20technology.pdf (identifying need to develop new and adopt emerging
technologies that address many of the concerns related to food security worldwide).
21
See Mike Maciag, America’s Rural-Urban Divide is Growing, Governing (Apr. 28,
2013), http://www.governing.com/gov-americas-rural-urban-divide-is-growing.html.
22
See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Percent of consumer expenditures
spent on food, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco that were consumed at home,
by selected countries (2016); https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/DataFiles/50606/
table97_2016.xlsx?v=43019 (providing map highlighting expenditures by country);
Alex Gray, Which Countries Spend the Most on Food? This Map Will Show You,
World Economic Forum (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/
this-map-shows-how-much-each-country-spends-on-food/.
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the U.S. land base considered rural.23 The urban/rural divide is
also seen in the composition of the elected officials who draft
and debate the Farm Bill, with over 80% of our elected officials
not representing rural parts of the country.24 When some of the
more modern battles over the Farm Bill began, nutrition support
programs (formerly called food stamps) were combined with the
more traditional agricultural support programs, making the bill
more appealing to a broader audience.25 Over time, though, that
coalition of support has been waning, leading to prolonged battles
each renewal cycle,26 and I believe a process that has kept the
Farm Bill from evolving in a way that more directly reflects and
meets both our current and future needs in the agricultural sector.   
That is not to say that there are not changes to the Farm
Bill with each cycle. Some years those changes have been more
profound than others.27 I believe that, overall, the Farm Bill has
maintained its status quo over the years in terms of the core types
of programs and support, despite the addition of new or pilot
programs or making changes to existing programs or payment
types. It also demonstrates the strength of the coalitions that seek
to help define two of the key aspects of the Farm Bill: commodity
support (including direct support and crop insurance) and nutrition

U.S. Dept. of Agric., supra note 16.
Christopher Doering, As More Move to the City, Does Rural America Still Matter?,
USA Today (Jan 13, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/12/
rural-decline-congress/1827407/.
25
See Philip Brasher, Lesson #4: Linking Farm, Food Programs is Crucial to Farm
Bill Passage, AgriPulse (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8996lesson-4-linking-farm-food-programs-is-crucial-to-farm-bill-success;
see
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Short History of SNAP, U.S.
Dept. of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/shorthistory-snap (last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
26
See e.g., Sara Wyant, Lesson #1, Every Farm Bill is Unique, The Last One Was a
Doozy, AgriPulse (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8894-lesson1-every-farm-bill-is-unique-the-last-one-was-a-doozy.
27
See e.g., Ralph M. Chite, Congressional Res. Serv., The 2014 Farm Bill (P.L.
113-79): Summary and Side-by-Side i (2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/R43076.pdf (highlighting significant changes to traditional
commodity support payment programs); see generally Neil D. Hamilton, The 2014
Farm Bill: Lessons in Patience, Politics and Persuasion, 19 Drake J. Agric. L 1, 1-37
(2014) (identifying key elements and changes in the 2014 Farm Bill).
23

24
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programs.28
It is in many ways necessary to keep the status quo though
to maintain a core coalition of legislative support.29 Despite
changes on the surface of the law, certain new initiatives,
and various attempts to modernize it, I believe the Farm Bill
remains more reactive than proactive. It reacts to current market
conditions and needs, and it primarily reacts to the current state of
the industry and world.30 While the Farm Bill is an important part
of agricultural policy that provides support to many individual
and organizations, it could do so much more by helping shape
the future of the industry instead of focusing on the current state
of the industry. A shift in focus, in long-term goals, and in the
coalitions of legislators and organizations that help shape the
Farm Bill, would provide an opportunity to draft a Farm Bill
that would proactively lead and shape our food and agricultural
industries for the future.
We must start from the premise that there is value in
building and supporting a strong agricultural economy within
the United States. However, we need to make sure that the
programs and policies in effect to do so also support the rest of
our food, environmental, and energy needs. Agriculture is not
an insular industry. We need to ensure that farmers producing
our food supply have forms of support to ensure our industry
thrives. However, we also need to ensure that the agricultural
See Agricultural Act of 2014: Highlights and Implications, U.S. Dept. of Agric.,
Econ. Res. Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/agricultural-act-of-2014-highlights-andimplications/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2018) (noting that crop commodity payments and
nutrition make up the main expenditures of the current Farm Bill); Stephanie Mercier,
The Making of a Farm Bill, 31 Choices 1, 4 (2016), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/244572/2/cmsarticle_527.pdf (discussing in part the formation of coalitions
to support key elements of the Farm Bill).
29
See id. at 2, 4.
30
See generally Sara Wyant, Lesson #1, Every Farm Bill is Unique, The Last One
Was a Doozy, AgriPulse (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8894lesson-1-every-farm-bill-is-unique-the-last-one-was-a-doozy
(noting that during
the contentious debate surrounding the 2014 Farm Bill, net farm income peaked and
legislators looked to the current environment and farm economy where prices, and
spending, were high, stating that “From a political lens, some lawmakers said farmers
were making too much money and didn’t need any more help from the government.
And many commercial farmers and ranchers weren’t terribly interested in what the
government, or more specifically, the farm bill, could do for them”).
28
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support is done in a way that complements and supports other
U.S. policy priorities and interests, including public health and
environmental concerns.31 If we do not separate agriculture from
other interests, but instead think of them as a complementary
and dependent pieces of a larger puzzle, can we start to ease
some of the contention and divides when it comes to the Farm
Bill? Perhaps we can then realize that the agricultural industry
of the future is more than just commodity production, and that
for agriculture to succeed, it needs to be deeply intertwined with
environmental, energy, research, and rural interests. This can
be done, with goals such as fighting climate change,32 building
stronger rural communities,33 improving nutrition and access to
healthy foods,34 and in particular, harnessing the focus on STEM
initiatives to support public research providing tools and solutions
that will allow agriculture to thrive in the future both domestically
and abroad.35
By developing a more holistic Farm Bill, and by building
new coalitions with equal voices and input from numerous areas,
See generally Network for Public Heath, Issue Brief: How the Farm Bill
Affects Public Health 1 (2011), https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/76kz89/
Farm-Bill-and-Public-Health-FINAL.pdf (noting four key areas “in which the Farm
Bill affects health: nutrition, environmental health, emergency preparedness and
community health” and identifying areas of opportunity for improvement).
32
See Todd Edwards & Matt Russell, Earth Friendly Agriculture for Soil, Water,
and Climate: A Multijurisdictional Cooperative Approach; 21 Drake J. Agric. L.
325, 339-40 (2016) (discussing how the Farm Bill could be used to create a market
for environmental services, similar to that being done to create a market for farm
products in the energy sector).
33
See U.S. Dept. of Agric., Report to the President of the United States from
the Task Force on Agriculture and Rural Prosperity 2-3 (2018), https://www.
usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/rural-prosperity-report.pdf (identifying over
100 recommendations for the federal government to consider in order to help improve
life in rural America, centered around e-connectivity, economic development,
innovation and technology, workforce, and quality of life).
34
See Center for Science in the Public Interest, Nutrition Policies for 2018
Farm Bill 1 (2017), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/2018-farmnutrition-bill.pdf (PDF download available on webpage) (stating “recommendations
to address hunger while improving nutrition and health, and to increase access to
affordable, nutritious food, particularly for vulnerable populations” from numerous
organizations).
35
See Joyce E. Parker & David J. Wagner, From the USDA: Educating the Next
Generation: Funding Opportunities in Food, Agricultural, Natural Resources, and
Social Sciences Education, 15 CBE – Life Sciences Education 1, 1 (2016), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5008903/pdf/fe5.pdf.
31
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there is also the potential to lessen, if not remove, the legislative
strife that occurs every Farm Bill cycle.36 The more that private
and public industries and individuals can work together to get
behind proactive and innovative policies, the more likely our
politicians are to listen and provide support.
Shifting power of the consumer
As we talk about building new coalitions and a broad base
of support (and understanding) for future Farm Bills, we cannot
overlook the role and power of the consumer in this process.
Consumers are increasingly exhibiting power over the
agricultural sector.37 You can often hear examples in the news,
from increased demand to know how food is produced and
where it originates,38 to recently causing several of the world’s
leading food manufacturers to make major changes in agricultural
inputs and ingredients.39 Food manufacturers are showing an
increasing inclination to respond to consumers when it comes to
certain demands and concerns, and this has a direct impact on
agricultural producers. If more and more major food companies
decide to source sugar from non-GE sources, the market for
See Hamilton, supra note 27, at 2-5 (discussing the hotly debated, and delayed,
process that went into crafting and passing the 2014 Farm Bill).
37
See Label Insight, 2016 Label Insight Food Revolution Study, How
Consumer Demand for Transparency is Shaping the Food Industry 2
(2016), https://www.labelinsight.com/hubfs/Label_Insight-Food-Revolution-Study.
pdf?hsCtaTracking=fc71fa82-7e0b-4b05-b2b4-de1ade992d33%7C95a8befc-d0cc4b8b-8102-529d937eb427.
38
Id.; see e.g., Center for Food Integrity, Press Release, Most Consumers
Say They Lack Access to Information about Food: How Can the Food
Industry Satisfy Their Appetites? 1, 1-2 (2016), http://www.foodintegrity.org.
s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Consumers-Say-They-Lack-Accessto-Information-About-Food-CFI.pdf; see e.g., Isaac Fletcher, Food Producers:
Consumers Demand Transparency, FoodOnline (June 6, 2014), https://www.
foodonline.com/doc/food-producers-consumers-demand-transparency-0001.
39
Dannon Announces Breakthrough Sweeping Commitment for Sustainable
Agriculture, More Natural Ingredients and Greater Transparency, Dannon (Apr.
27, 2016), http://www.dannon.com/the-dannon-pledge-on-sustainable-agriculturenaturality-and-transparency/; Tom Meersman, Hershey Dumps Sugar Beets Because
of GM Concerns, Star Tribune (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/
hershey-dumps-sugar-beets-because-of-gm-concerns/363498311/; Jane Lindholm,
Some Food Companies are Quietly Dumping GMO Ingredients, Nat’l Pub. Radio
(July 22, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/07/22/333725880/somefood-producers-are-quietly-dumping-gmo-ingredients.
36
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genetically-engineered sugar beets will be severely impacted.
Farmers may seek alternative seed sources, but could find that
there are not sufficient supplies of non-GE seeds available, or that
those available may not respond as well to our current climate and
volatile weather patterns. Consumers, with a demand for non-GE,
non-organic products initiated this action which trickles down not
only to the producer, but to the many industries and entities that
are depending on that crop throughout the growing cycle: input
suppliers, processing companies, the rural communities and towns
where these entities are located, and the many employees that
live and work in these communities. We cannot have a discussion
about food and agricultural industry power dynamics and policy
initiatives without including the consumer as a voice.
Conclusion
As a colleague of mine told me, “Agriculture solves
human problems.” Agriculture has the potential to solve many of
our human problems, only one of which is how we feed a growing
population. The more we think of the Farm Bill as a proactive
tool for solving developing problems and designing the food and
agricultural system of the future, and not just one supporting our
current systems and policies, the better chance we have to expand
and develop effective and efficient farm policies. If we continue
with the status quo, with the same coalitions, the same fights, and
ultimately, a newer version of essentially the same bill, that will
not happen.
Change is not easy, nor does it come fast. Revamping
our Farm Bill in a way to make it a proactive tool that can do
everything we ask of it to do in its many Titles will take time,
concerted effort, and the dedication and support of a broad group
of coalitions and organizations. In our current political climate,
I remain skeptical of any real success in this area. However, I
remain hopeful that coalition-building in the private sector may
start to occur and that rural and urban interests, environmental
and agricultural interests, and those seeking to ensure there is a
sufficient and nutritious food supply available to all, can start to
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build relationships.40 We need to move beyond our traditional
camps and the entrenched interests and instead build relationships
that can help build bridges, reduce misunderstandings and
misconceptions, encourage education and cooperation, and better
realize the potential of what food and agricultural policy, and the
Farm Bill in particular, can be.
If we want to develop a strong agricultural industry, one
built around strong rural communities and with policies in place
that support environmental, energy, and public health goals, then
it is time to come together. Agriculture is not an insular industry,
and in order for it to succeed, it needs to be a partner in all ways
with consumers and even opposing interest, to craft the Farm Bill
of the future. Starting small and having these conversations on
a local level, hoping to build upon them from there, is a good
first step. These are big hopes and big goals, but there is real
potential if we all come together in a constructive fashion to build
a sustainable agricultural system that truly meets the needs of the
country and the world, beyond all that it does now.

We are seeing many new voices emerge in the Farm Bill discussion and seek to have
influence, but a key step is encouraging collaboration and not competition among the
various groups, while ensuring groups with historically less impact on the process
are heard as well. See D. Lee Miller, A Seat at the Table: New Voices Urge Farm
Bill Reform, 127 Yale L.J. F. 395, 409 (2017) (discussing role of coalition of food
law and policy professionals in advocating for Farm Bill reform); see Our Mission,
Plate of the Union, http://www.plateoftheunion.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 12,
2018) (announcing a new collaborative campaign for Farm Bill advocacy between a
series of partners). See also, Susan Schneider, Food Farming and Sustainability:
Readings in Agricultural Law 18 (2d ed. 2016) (stating that “development of
agricultural laws and overall farm policy have traditionally been left to those involved
in the industry…In recent years, however, a variety of voices outside of the agricultural
industry have increasingly sought a place at the table in agricultural policy debates
… [and are] often critical of not only agricultural policies but food policies as well.”).
40

The SNAP Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Debate: Restricting
Purchases to Improve Health Outcomes of Low-Income
Americans
Nicole E. Negowetti*
Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)1
is a highly effective government program that reduces poverty
and improves food security for millions of our country’s most
vulnerable families. SNAP is the nation’s most important and
largest anti-hunger and anti-poverty food and nutrition benefits
program.2 It is the nation’s “first line of defense” against hunger
and serves as the foundation of America’s nutrition safety net.3
It aims to address food insecurity and improve food access by
increasing the food purchasing power of low-income households.4
SNAP assists low-income households to meet their food needs by
providing cash benefits via a debit card that can only be spent on
food. Households may not use SNAP benefits to purchase alcohol,
tobacco, household supplies, pet food, vitamins, medicines, food
to be eaten in the store, or prepared foods.5 Approximately 42
million Americans—or 13 percent of the population—depend on
these benefits to purchase food.6 Nearly 40 percent of all SNAP
Clinical Instructor, Harvard Law School Food Law and Policy Clinic
7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012).
2
Id. (Subtitle A of the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized appropriations for SNAP through
fiscal year 2018).
3
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Building a Healthy America: A Profile of the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 1 (2012), https://fns-prod.
azureedge.net/sites/default/files/BuildingHealthyAmerica.pdf.
4
Id.
5
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): What Can SNAP Buy?, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible-fooditems (last updated Nov. 17, 2017).
6
Maria Godoy & Allison Aubrey, Trump Wants Families On Food Stamps To Get
Jobs. The Majority Already Work, NPR: The Salt (May 24, 2017), https://www.npr.
*
1
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recipients live in households with earnings and half of SNAP
recipients are children.7
SNAP is reauthorized pursuant to the farm bill and
is jointly administered by the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and states.8 Congress changed the
program’s name from “Food Stamps Program” to “SNAP” in
2008, declaring that SNAP’s purpose is to “permit low-income
households to obtain a more nutritious diet,” to raise their “levels
of nutrition,” and alleviate “hunger and malnutrition.”9 The goal
of providing eligible households with an “opportunity to obtain a
more nutritious diet” was also emphasized in the text of the law
establishing the program.10 Despite these declarations, there are
no nutrition standards accompanying the redemption of SNAP
benefits.11 This has fueled a debate about whether the program
should actually provide nutrition assistance, or whether it should
simply provide supplemental income for food purchases.12
When SNAP was first implemented in 1939, the program
was designed to address calorie insufficiency and was also intended
to reduce agricultural surpluses.13 Eight decades later, nutritionrelated health challenges have changed significantly. In the U.S.
approximately one third of adults are obese.14 The prevalence of
org/sections/thesalt/2017/05/24/529831472/trump-wants-families-on-food-stampsto-get-jobs-the-majority-already-work; Policy Basics: The Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, https://www.cbpp.
org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistanceprogram-snap (last updated Feb. 13, 2018).
7
Brian Barth, How Would Trump’s Food Stamp Cuts Hurt Americans? Let Us Count
the Ways, Modern Farmer (July 13, 2017), https://modernfarmer.com/2017/07/
trump-snap-benefit-cuts/.
8
7 U.S.C. § 2011 (Subtitle A of the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized appropriations for
SNAP through fiscal year 2018).
9
Id.
10
7 U.S.C. § 2013(a).
11
Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Jamie F. Chriqui, The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program: Analysis of Program Administration and Food Law Definitions, 49 Am. J.
Prev. Med. 428, 428 (2015).
12
Id.
13
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): A Short History of SNAP, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-historysnap (last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
14
Adult Obesity Facts, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.
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diabetes continues to climb, with 30.3 million Americans suffering
from the disease, and approximately 84.1 million adults have
prediabetes.15 There is an undeniable link between rising rates
of obesity and rising medical spending. Medical costs associated
with obesity (which largely fall on Medicare and Medicaid) are
estimated to be at least $147 billion per year.16
A. Poverty and Health: the Paradox of Food Insecurity
and Obesity
The U.S. now faces a food insecurity-obesity
paradox, where many individuals suffer from both conditions
simultaneously.17 The problem is now a lack of access to affordable,
healthy food, rather than calorie deficits. In the United States, 15.6
million households—comprising about 12.3 percent of the U.S.
population18—experience food insecurity, defined as “difficulty
at some time during the year providing enough food for all their
members due to a lack of resources.”19 Low-income individuals
are likely able to obtain enough calories but these calories may
come from cheap foods that are calorically dense and nutritionally
poor.20 A USDA study using data from the National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) showed that SNAP
participants were more likely than income-eligible and higher
cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2018).
15
Statistics About Diabetes: Overall Numbers, Diabetes and Prediabetes, American
Diabetes Ass’n, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/statistics/?referrer=https://
www.google.com/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2018).
16
See Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity:
Payer and Service-Specific Estimates, 28 Health Affairs w822, w822 (2009).
17
See Food Research & Action Center, Understanding the Connections: Food
Security and Obesity 1 (2015), http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/frac_brief_
understanding_the_connections.pdf.
18
Key Statistics & Graphics: Food Security Status of U.S. Households in 2016, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/foodnutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx
(last updated Oct. 4, 2017).
19
Alisha Coleman-Jensen et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv.,
Household Food Security in the United States in 2015 i (2016), https://www.
ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/79761/err-215.pdf?v=42636.
20
Alice S. Ammerman et al., Behavioral Economics and the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program: Making the Healthy Choice the Easy Choice, 52 Am. J. Prev.
Med. S145, S145 (2017).
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income nonparticipants to be obese (40 percent versus 32 percent
and 30 percent, respectively).21 Although there is mixed evidence
about a causal relationship between obesity and food insecurity,22
there is agreement that food insecurity and diet-related diseases
co-occur in communities, families, and individuals.23 Because
both food insecurity and obesity are consequences of economic
and social disadvantage, it not surprising that these conditions
coexist.24
Several theories have been offered to explain the paradox
of food insecurity and obesity. Some argue that food insecurity
and obesity are independent consequences of poverty and the
resulting lack of access to enough nutritious food or stresses of
poverty and that obesity among food insecure and low-income
people occurs in part because they are subject to the same
challenging cultural changes as other Americans (e.g., more
sedentary lifestyles,25 increased portion sizes), and also because
they face unique challenges in adopting and maintaining healthful
behaviors.26 Low-income families may spend their limited food
budget on high-calorie, low-quality products. 27 They may also
experience variation in food availability, causing them to overU.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., Diet Quality Of Americans By
Snap Participation Status: Data From The National Health And Nutrition
Examination Survey, 2007-2010 – Summary 1 (2015), https://fns-prod.azureedge.
net/sites/default/files/ops/NHANES-SNAP07-10-Summary.pdf.
22
See Marlene B. Schwartz, Moving Beyond the Debate, 52 Am. J. Prev. Med. S199,
S201 (2017) (noting that because it is a difficult empirical question, there is considerable
debate in the scientific literature about the strength of evidence demonstrating whether
SNAP participants are at higher risk of poor diet than the general population).
23
Id. at S199.
24
Food Research & Action Center, supra note 17, at 1.
25
Id. at 4. (“There is emerging evidence that food insecurity is associated with less
physical activity (a risk factor for obesity) and greater perceived barriers to physical
activity (e.g., too tired to be physically active). In addition, many studies find that
low-income populations engage in less physical activity and are less physically fit
than their higher income peers. This is not surprising, given that many environmental
barriers, such as lack of attractive and safe places to be physically active, to physical
activity exist in low-income communities.”).
26
Id. at 3.
27
David S. Ludwig et al, Opportunities to Reduce Childhood Hunger and Obesity
Restructuring the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (the Food Stamp
Program), 308 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2567, 2567 (2012).
21
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consume food at the beginning of the month after receiving
SNAP benefits and then to go without adequate food at the end of
the month when benefits have run out. 28
In addition to higher rates of obesity, low-income people
face heightened risk of diet-related chronic diseases that directly
relate to poor dietary choices—approximately 70 percent higher
prevalence of diabetes and 19 percent higher prevalence of
hypertension, compared with the highest-income population.29
These health disparities have precipitated a national conversation
about how the government can harmonize its efforts to improve
nutrition with those to reduce food insecurity. 30 This essay
examines the debate surrounding a longstanding and controversial
proposal to improve the health of SNAP recipients—restricting
the purchase of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) with SNAP
benefits. This article first provides a brief history of proposals to
restrict SNAP purchases to improve nutrition.
I. A brief history of proposals to restrict SSB
Although proposals to restrict SNAP purchases have
received considerable attention over the past several years,31 the
idea of restricting SNAP is not new. Policymakers at the federal
and state governments have proposed restrictions multiple
times since the program began. Changes to SNAP would need
to be authorized or mandated by the federal government and
implemented by states or localities.32 Congress can require
the USDA to either pilot a program,33 or engage in notice and
comment rulemaking to amend SNAP guidelines, perhaps to
reflect nutrition science and public health concerns.34
Id.
Susan M. Levin et al., A Proposal for Improvements in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, Am. J. Prev. Med. S186, S186 (2017).
30
Schwartz, supra note 22, at S199.
31
See id.
32
See Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 432.
33
See id.
34
Id. Congress required the USDA to open rulemaking to revise the Women, Infants
and Children (WIC) Program food package. See Women, Infants and Children (WIC)
28
29
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State agencies administering SNAP have requested waivers
of the USDA to implement pilot programs restricting the purchase
of certain unhealthy foods. In 2004, Minnesota’s Department of
Human Services petitioned the USDA for permission to exclude
soft drinks and candy from the foods eligible for purchase with
SNAP.35 In 2007, the USDA explained its rationale for rejecting
the waiver in a position paper, Implications of Restricting the
Use of Food Stamp Benefits, asserting that “there are serious
problems with the rationale, feasibility and potential effectiveness
of” prohibitions on types of foods that could be purchased with
SNAP.36 In 2010, New York State submitted a proposal to the
USDA to administer a demonstration project in New York City
that would restrict SSBs from SNAP to test whether a restriction
would lead to changes in consumption of sweetened beverages
and other food groups among SNAP recipients, as well as whether
a restriction could be implemented.37 The USDA has consistently
denied all requests for waivers.38 Most recently, the USDA denied
Maine’s second request for a restriction on the purchase of candy
and SSBs with SNAP.39

Background: Revisions to the WIC Food Package, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food &
Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/background-revisions-wic-foodpackage (last updated Feb. 14, 2018).
35
Letter from Ollice Holden, Regional Administrator, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
to Maria Gomez, Assistant Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human
Services (May 4, 2004), https://www.heartland.org/_template-assets/documents/
publications/15364.pdf.
36
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., Implications Of Restricting
The Use Of Food Stamp Benefits – Summary 1 (2007), https://fns-prod.azureedge.
net/sites/default/files/FSPFoodRestrictions.pdf.
37
N.Y. State Office of Temp. & Disability Assistance, A Proposal to Create a
Demonstration Project in New York City to Modify Allowable Purchases
Under the Federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 2 (2010),
https://www.empirecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/snap-proposal.pdf.
38
Marion Nestle, USDA Asks Maine for More Information—lot more—about its
SNAP Waiver Request, Food Politics (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.foodpolitics.
com/2017/04/usda-asks-maine-for-more-information-about-its-snap-waiver-requestlots-more/.
39
Eric Russell, Feds Tell Maine: You Can’t Ban Food Stamp Recipients From Buying
Sugary Drinks, Candy, Portland Press Herald (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/01/19/feds-again-reject-lepage-request-to-banfood-stamp-recipients-from-buying-sugary-drinks-candy/.
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State legislators in states including California,40 Illinois,41
Maine,42 and West Virginia43 have also proposed a range of bills
that would permit their states to seek a waiver from the USDA,
conduct a pilot program, or pass a resolution urging Congress to
remove certain foods from SNAP eligibility.44
Federal and local leaders have also called on Congress and
the USDA to allow pilot programs to restrict purchases with SNAP,
to no avail. In 2013, Senators Harkin and Coburn attempted to
amend the Farm Bill to allow SNAP demonstration projects in two
states to promote the purchase of healthier food.45 Mayors of 18
major cities across the United States, including Boston, Chicago,
Los Angeles, and New York similarly called on Congress to allow
the opportunity to “test and evaluate” restrictions on SSBs while
also incentivizing the purchase of healthier foods.46 When Harkin
and Coburn’s amendment failed to pass, the Senators urged the
USDA to engage in two demonstration projects on its own to limit
the use of SNAP benefits on foods that are over-consumed and
may increase risk of chronic disease.47 The USDA rejected this
request.48

S.B. 134, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (banning the purchase of calorically sweetened
beverages).
41
H.B. 0177, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (proposal to ban the purchase of carbonated
soft drinks, snack cakes, candies, chewing gum, flavored ice bars, fried, high-fat
chips with SNAP).
42
S. Res. 505, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013) (prohibiting the purchase of
foods not “consumed for human nourishment,” including soft drinks, iced tea, sodas,
fountain beverages, candy, confections, and prepared food).
43
S.B. 262, 2014 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (banning the purchase of soft drinks,
carbonated beverages, candy, cookies, crackers, ice cream with SNAP).
44
Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 430.
45
77 Cong. Rec. S3911 (2013).
46
Letter from Mayors of Baltimore et al. to Speaker Boehner and Minority Leader
Pelosi (June 18, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2013/snap_letter_to_
house_6_18_13.pdf.
47
Letter from Center from Science in the Public Interest to Thomas Vilsack, Secretary
of Agriculture (Aug. 1, 2013), https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/
organizations-letter-to-vilsack-8-1-13.pdf.
48
Pomeranz & Chriqui, supra note 11, at 439.
40
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II. Targeting SSBs to Improve Nutrition and Health
Unlike proposals from states and advocates calling for a
ban on a variety of “junk foods” (e.g., candy, chips, snack cakes,
etc.) with SNAP, a restriction of just SSBs is based on clear
evidence of the harms of added sugar and the potential impact to
improve public health. The USDA’s Dietary Guidelines note that
beverages, including soft drinks, fruit drinks, and energy drinks,
are the major source of added sugars in typical U.S. diets—almost
half of added sugars consumed by the U.S. population come from
sweetened beverages.49 Scientific evidence suggests that the
consumption of SSBs, can have profound and serious negative
effects on health, especially among children.50 As the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, (CDC) has recognized,
frequently drinking SSBs is associated with weight gain/obesity,
type 2 diabetes, heart disease, kidney diseases, non-alcoholic
liver disease, tooth decay and cavities, and gout.51 Reducing
the consumption of SSBs also follows the guidelines of leading
health agencies such as the World Health Organization, the
National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the Institute of Medicine, and the Surgeon General of
the United States.52 The USDA itself urges Americans to “drink
water instead of sugary drinks.”53 As the bipartisan National
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2015-2020 54-55 (8th
ed. 2015) https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_
Guidelines.pdf.
50
See, e.g., Lenny R. Vartanian et al., Effects of Soft Drink Consumption On Nutrition
And Health: A Systematic Review And Metaanalysis, 97 Am. J. Public Health
667, 667 (2007); Vasanti S. Malik & Frank B. Hu, Fructose And Cardiometabolic
Health: What The Evidence From Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Tells Us, 66 J. Am.
Coll. Cardiol. 1615, 1616 (2015); Vasanti S. Malik & Frank B. Hu, Sugar-Sweetened
Beverages And Health: Where Does The Evidence Stand? 94 Am. J. Clin. Nutr. 1161,
1162 (2011).
51
Get the Facts: Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Consumption, Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/nutrition/data-statistics/sugarsweetened-beverages-intake.html (last updated April 7, 2017).
52
Nat’l Comm’n on Hunger, Freedom from Hunger: An Achievable Goal for
the United States of America: Recommendations of the National Commission
on Hunger to Congress and the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
44 (2015).
53
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Find Your Healthy Eating Style & Maintain It for a
Lifetime (2016).
49

2018]

SNAP Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Debate

91

Commission on Hunger54 reasoned in supporting a restriction on
the purchase of SSB, SNAP benefits should help families meet
their nutritional needs, not contribute to negative health outcomes
through poor nutrition choices.55 “With its right hand, the federal
government funds nutrition education and wellness programs
to encourage healthy eating; but with its left hand, the federal
government funds SNAP participants’ purchase and consumption
of sweetened beverages.”56
SNAP is the only federal nutrition assistance program that
fails to regulate the quality of foods that can be purchased and is
the only one to subsidize the purchase of SSBs.57 This lack of focus
on nutrition in SNAP may simultaneously exacerbate hunger and
promote obesity.58 Sweetened beverages do not alleviate hunger
because they do not satiate 59 and they have minimal nutritional
value.60 To illustrate, if a child consumes 20 ounces of a sugary
drink, she will become hungrier more quickly than if she ate a
large apple and a large tablespoon of peanut butter, even though
both contain same number of calories.61 The addition of SSBs
merely adds excess calories and sugar, which contribute to
obesity, diabetes, and other chronic diseases.62 By putting SSBs
on the same economic basis as more-healthful choices, SNAP may
The bipartisan National Commission on Hunger, established to identify solutions to
hunger. Mariana Chilton & Robert Doar, Nat’l Comm’n on Hunger, Hearing
Series: Past, Present, and Future of SNAP 2 (2015). The 10-member Commission,
appointed by the House and Senate leadership, represented government, industry,
academia, and nonprofit organizations. See id.
55
Id. at 6.
56
Anne Barnhill, Impact and Ethics of Excluding Sweetened Beverages From The
SNAP Program, 101 Am. J. Pub. Health 2037, 2038 (2011).
57
Kelly Blondin, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Reform: A 21st Century
Policy Debate, J. Sci. Pol’y Governance (2014), http://www.sciencepolicyjournal.
org/uploads/5/4/3/4/5434385/__blodin_snap.pdf.
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Intake and Body Weight, 24 Int. J. Obesity Related Metabolic Disorders 7941 794
(2000).
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& Nutrition Serv., http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/menu/fmnv.htm (last updated Sept.
13, 2013).
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actually aggravate diet-related diseases.63 A nutrition assistance
program that permits the purchase of SSBs is blatantly ignoring
decades of research documenting the harm associated with these
products.64
While recent polls reveal that an overwhelming majority
of American voters of both parties favor restricting SNAP
benefits from being used to buy soda and candy,65 the issue has
polarized typical allies—anti-hunger and public health nutrition
groups.66 Arguments against a purchasing restriction in SNAP
can be divided into two main themes: whether a restriction can
successfully be implemented (i.e., whether it is feasible and likely
to be effective) and whether it should be enacted (i.e., whether it
is ethical to impose such a restriction). In the following sections,
key arguments under each theme are explained and responded to
in turn.
III. Could it be done? The Feasibility and Effectiveness
of a Restriction on SNAP
The USDA and groups who oppose a SSB restriction
in SNAP argue that such a policy would impose significant
administrative burdens on the USDA, states administering the
program, and retailers accepting SNAP benefits. In addition
to these concerns about the feasibility of implementing a SSB
Levin et al., supra note 29, at S191.
Vartanian et al., supra note 50, at 667, 671; Malik & Hu, supra note 50, at 1615-16.
65
Steven Kull, Program for Public Consulation, Americans on SNAP Benefits
6-7 (2017), http://vop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/SNAP_Report.pdf. The study
found that of the 7,000 voters polled, 73 percent were in favor for banning SNAP
recipients from using their benefits to buy soda. Id. Eighty-two percent of Republican
respondents and 67 percent of Democrats agreed with soda restrictions. Id.
66
Schwartz, supra note 22, at S200. For example, when New York City requested a
waiver from the USDA to conduct a pilot study to test the effect of restricting sugary
drinks from purchase using SNAP benefits, the Food Research & Action Center
published a report in opposition to changing SNAP. See Heather Hartline-Grafton
et al., Food Research & Action Center, A Review Of Strategies To Bolster
SNAP’s Role In Improving Nutrition As Well As Food Security 14 (2013),
http://frac.org/wp-content/uploads/SNAPstrategies_full-report.pdf. In contrast, the
Center for Science in the Public Interest organized a letter signed by more than 50
organizations and health experts to USDA Secretary Vilsack to allow pilot tests of
restricting SSBs from SNAP. Letter from Center from Science in the Public Interest
to Thomas Vilsack, supra note 47.
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restriction, some opponents of the policy have questioned
whether it would have any impact on consumption of SSBs or
health outcomes. Each argument is addressed below.
A. The Feasibility of Implementing a Ban on SSBs
One general argument against restricting certain foods
from SNAP is that it would require the USDA to rate or rank
foods on some type of nutrition scale, and second, it would need
to define the uncertain boundaries of “healthy” and “unhealthy”
foods.67 The USDA and others claim that doing so would be
problematic because such a ranking system does not exist68—
the Dietary Guidelines recommend overall eating patterns, not
specific foods.69 Another related concern is that this process will
open up the floodgates of food industry lobbying to ensure that
their products are not restricted, or alternatively, are incentivized.70
While these issues may be relevant to a proposal for banning all
“junk” food (over which debates could be had over the nutritional
value of some granola bars, pretzels, chips, etc.), the evidence is
quite established regarding the lack of nutritional value of SSBs.71
Another concern regarding feasibility of implementation
is that imposing restrictions in the SNAP program would burden
retailers. As a result, some retailers might stop accepting SNAP
which could limit access for households.72 SNAP represents a large
share of the national food budget and it seems unlikely that retailers
would be deterred from participating because of an additional

See Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 14.
Id.
69
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 49.
70
See Margaret Sessa-Hawkins, Congress Could Cut Soda and Candy from SNAP,
but Big Sugar is Pushing Back, Civil Eats (Aug. 28, 2017), https://civileats.
com/2017/08/28/congress-could-cut-soda-and-candy-from-snap-but-big-sugar-ispushing-back/ (discussing the push-back from the sugar industry to restrictions on
candy and soda in SNAP).
71
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 3-5.
72
See Jacob A. Klerman et al., Improving Nutrition by Limiting Choice in the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 52 Am. J. Prev. Med. S171, S175-76
(2017).
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restriction.73 EBT systems are already capable of implementing
restrictions. When the NY waiver was proposed, retailers were
consulted about the ease or difficulty of implementing such a
SSB restriction.74 Those with EBT systems indicated that it could
be done fairly easily because restrictions are already in place for
other purchases, such as alcohol or nonfood items.75 In addition,
retailers who accept SNAP must already adhere to certain
stocking requirements.76 The 2014 Farm Bill amended the Food
and Nutrition Act of 2008 to increase the requirement that certain
SNAP authorized retail food stores have available on a continual
basis at least three varieties of items in each of four staple food
categories, to a mandatory minimum of seven varieties—meat,
poultry or fish; bread or cereals; vegetables or fruits; and dairy
products.77
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC) serves as another example of the
feasibility of implementing nutrition standards in a public nutrition
assistance program.78 WIC provides federal grants to states for
supplemental foods, health care referrals, and nutrition education
Id. at 176.
Angela Rachidi, American Enterprise Institute, The Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Time to Test a Sweetened Beverage
Restriction, Statement before the House Committee on Agriculture On the
Pros and Cons of Restricting SNAP Purchases 8 (2017), https://agriculture.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/rachidi_testimony.pdf
75
Id.
76
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Regulatory Flexibility Analysis – Final
Rule: Enhancing Retailer Standards in SNAP: Changes to Depth of Stock
and Stocking Requirements Using New Farm Bill Definition 1, 10 (2016),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/RFA-Enhancing-RetailerStandards.pdf.
77
Enhancing Retailer Standards in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), 81 Fed. Reg. 90,675, 90,675 (Dec. 15, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts.
271 & 278).
78
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Finalizes Changes to the WIC Program,
Expanding Access to Healthy Fruits and Vegetables, Whole Grains, and LowFat Dairy for Women, Infants, and Children (Feb. 28, 2014), www.fns.usda.gov/
pressrelease/2014/003114. In addition, the USDA has improved the National School
Lunch and Breakfast Programs and the Child and Adult Care Food Program. School
Meals: Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition
Serv., www.fns.usda.gov/school-meals/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act (last updated
Oct. 5, 2017).
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for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding
postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five
who are found to be at nutritional risk.79 WIC participants receive
checks, vouchers, or an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card to
purchase specific nutritious foods each month to supplement their
diets.80 Eligible foods include infant cereal, eggs, milk, cheese,
peanut butter, dried and canned beans/peas, canned fish, soy-based
beverages, tofu, fruits and vegetables, baby foods, whole-wheat
bread.81 Unlike for SNAP, Congress directs the USDA to amend
the WIC food package “to reflect nutrition science, public health
concerns, and cultural eating patterns” at least every 10 years
“to reflect the most recent scientific knowledge.”82 In 2005, the
Institute of Medicine issued a report suggesting the USDA revise
the WIC food package to encourage a healthier diet and match
dietary guidance for infants and children.83 Based almost entirely
on these recommendations, the USDA issued proposed rules and
interim requirements that were finalized in 2014,84 strengthening
WIC nutritional requirements to increase the allotment of whole
grains, fruit, and vegetables; reduce juice; exclude white potatoes;
and replace whole milk with low-fat or nonfat milk.85 The
successful adoption of nutrition standards for WIC demonstrates
the feasibility of supporting a pilot to test whether the restriction
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition
Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/women-infants-and-children-wic (last updated
Feb. 14, 2018).
80
Women, Infants and Children (WIC): Frequently Asked Questions about WIC, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/frequentlyasked-questions-about-wic#5 (last updated Apr. 20, 2018).
81
Id.
82
42 U.S.C. § 1786 (2012) (section titled Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children).
83
Inst. of Med., WIC Food Packages: Time for a Change, National Academies
Press 71 (2005). It is noteworthy that neither the USDA nor the anti-hunger
organization Food Research & Action Center (FRAC) objected to revising the WIC
food package. Food Research & Action Center, New WIC Food Packages
Proposed: Preliminary Summary 2 (2006), www.dchunger.org/pdf/WIC%20
7Aug06.pdf.
84
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC):
Revisions in the WIC Food Packages, 71 Fed Reg. 44,784, 44,784 (Aug. 7, 2006) (to
be codified at 7 C.F.R. 246).
85
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of SSB could support SNAP’s goal of improving nutrition of lowincome Americans.
There is also precedent from previous farm bills to
fund projects that could improve health and nutrition of SNAP
recipients. The 2008 Farm Bill authorized $20 million for pilot
projects to evaluate health and nutrition promotion in SNAP to
determine if incentives provided to SNAP recipients at the pointof-sale increase the purchase of fruits, vegetables or other healthful
foods.86 The Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP), which operated from
2010 – 2013 demonstrated that providing incentives for fruits and
vegetables increases consumption among SNAP participants.87
A logical next step is for the 2018 Farm Bill to authorize a
randomized controlled trial paralleling the Healthy Incentives
Pilot trial, testing a ban on SSBs.88
HIC can serve as a model to test the SSB restriction.89 Just
as the HIP reprogrammed retailers’ EBT data systems to identify
and calculate incentives, the same could be done with a SSB
restriction.90 Pilot participants assigned to the restriction group
would receive special EBT cards and retailer EBT systems would
be programmed to not allow SSB purchases among those SNAP
households. Few retailers who participated in HIP identified
problems with their EBT systems or store operations.91 Similarly,
piloting a restriction on SNAP would not be overly burdensome on
retailers. A pilot similar to HIP is thus both feasible and likely to
provide a strong control study to demonstrate whether restrictions
on the purchase of SSBs with SNAP reduce consumption and

Healthy Incentives Program (HIP)—Basic Facts, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food &
Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/hip/healthy-incentives-pilot-hipbasic-facts (last updated Apr. 20, 2014).
87
Susan Bartlett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv.,
Evaluation of the Healthy Incentive Pilot (HIP): Final Report 202 (2014),
https://mafoodsystem.org/media/resources/pdfs/PilotFinalReport.pdf.
88
Sanjay Basu et al., Ending SNAP Subsidies For Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Could
Reduce Obesity and Type 2 Diabetes, 33 Health Affairs 1032, 1038 (2014).
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Rachidi, supra note 74, at 8.
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improve health. 92
B. Likelihood of Effectiveness
Some argue that restricting SSBs from SNAP will have
little to no effect on consumption of SSBs because the majority
of SNAP recipients can substitute their own funds to buy the
excluded product.93 If total household expenditure on unhealthful
foods was less than total household cash expenditure on food,
the household can purchase healthful foods with SNAP and
unhealthful foods with cash—with no change in total purchase
or intake of unhealthful foods.94 While SNAP benefits make up
a substantial share of the food budget in most SNAP households,
they are modest—approximately $4.50 per person per day.95
SNAP benefits do not necessarily provide the entire food budget,
nor are they expected to do so.96 Nearly all families supplement
their SNAP purchases with groceries purchased from their cash
income. 97 As reflected in its name, SNAP is intended to be a
supplemental program and consistent with the program’s intention,
the SNAP benefit formula is calculated with the assumption that
households spend 30 percentage of income on food.98 If SNAP
recipients continue to purchase SSBs, then it is unlikely that a
SSB restriction would actually change the nutrition profile of
food purchases or induce any behavioral changes.99
A related concern is that the exclusion of sweetened
beverages will cause SNAP participants to switch to other
Id.
Jessica E. Todd & Michele Ver Ploeg, Restricting Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
From SNAP Purchases Not Likely To Lower Consumption, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2015/
march/restricting-sugar-sweetened-beverages-from-snap-purchases-not-likely-tolower-consumption/.
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U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 5.
97
Id.
98
Klerman et al., supra note 72, at S172.
99
Id.
92
93

98

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

beverages, such as diet soda, that have no nutritional value––a
seemingly inefficient use of nutritional assistance funds.100 SNAP
recipients could use their benefits to purchase other unhealthy
foods, such as candy, chips, and cakes. It is also argued that a
SSB restriction without increased access to healthy foods could
be ineffective because low-income households purchase energydense foods because they are cheap and readily available source
of calories.101
Other opponents of a restriction note the lack of evidence
base demonstrating that a SSB restriction could improve diets
or reduce obesity. 102 In addition, food choices are affected by a
number of factors, including cost, taste, convenience, personal
preference, and availability.103 Restricting food choice would not
substantially change most of these factors.104
In response to these arguments, recent studies do show
promising results about the potential for a SSB restriction to
lead to reduced consumption of SSBs. A recent study examined
the effects of financial incentives for the purchase of fruits and
vegetables, restriction of the purchase of SSBs, candy, and
sweet baked goods, or both, on food purchases among lower
income adults.105 Restricting the use of food program benefits for
purchasing SSBs, sweet baked goods, and candy appeared to be
effective in reducing the purchase of SSBs and sweet baked goods.
The results suggest that interventions that limit SSB purchases
may be effective in decreasing spending for these foods, and
thus may contribute to improvements in dietary quality.106 Even
though some out of pocket funds were used in place of food
Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2039.
Hartline-Grafton et al., supra note 66, at 8.
102
Id. at 15.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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Simone A. French et al., Financial Incentives And Purchase Restrictions In A Food
Benefit Program Affect The Types Of Foods And Beverages Purchased: Results From
A Randomized Trial, 14 Int. J. Behavioral Nutrition & Physical Activity 1, 2
(2017).
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benefit funds to purchase restricted foods, results suggest that out
of pocket funds did not fully replace what otherwise may have
been spent on these types of foods.107 Certainly, further research is
warranted to explore the potential effects of a restriction on both
food purchases and dietary intake of all household members.108
That is precisely the reason to allow pilot programs.
Another study which used a combination of economic
and epidemiological modeling techniques, concluded that a
SSB restriction in SNAP is likely to significantly reduce obesity
prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence.109 The study combined
data from a nationally representative dietary survey and a
price database of nearly 20,000 children and adults in SNAP
to simulate proposed SSB restriction.110 These data reveal that
SNAP participants consume almost twice as many calories from
SSBs as they do from vegetables and fruit, but they are sensitive
to changes in SNAP benefits and food prices.111 The result of this
study suggest that the impact of a SSB restriction could be very
significant—obesity prevalence could decline by over 281,000
adults and 141,000 children under a SSB restriction policy.112
The researchers concluded that a policy to ban SSBs purchases
made with SNAP dollars is more likely to significantly reduce
obesity prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence than a policy
to subsidize vegetable and fruit purchases using SNAP dollars.113
In addition, a USDA study of the Summer Electronic
Benefit Transfer for Children Program published in 2016 supports
these conclusions about the likely impact of a restriction on SSBs.
The USDA study found that only a WIC– based model of food
Id. at 8.
Id.
109
Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1033, 1038. The largest effects in the model were
observed among adults ages 18–65 and among nonblack, non-Mexican ethnic
minorities such as other Latinos and Asians, although the effects remained significant
for children and white populations as well. Id. at 1036.
110
Id. at 1037.
111
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assistance, which restricted what could be purchased with benefits
(including SSBs), led to a reduction in SSB consumption among
families who participated.114 The SNAP-based model, which had
no restrictions, did not reduce SSB consumption.115
The effectiveness of a restriction on SSB purchases and
consumption is an empirical question that requires a pilot test
of the policy to answer. As the USDA itself has stated, “There
is no way to know – other than through carefully designed and
evaluated pilot tests – to what extent the proposed restriction
would have the desired effect of reducing purchases of foods with
limited nutritional value.”116
IV. Should it be Done? The Ethics of Restricting SNAP
Purchases
Those who oppose a restriction on SNAP purchases
assert several arguments related to the ethics of governmental
interference with a free market and personal purchasing decisions.
The sections below explain and respond to the two primary
assertions—that a SSB restriction unfairly and inequitably
limits the choices of SNAP recipients and that the restriction is
demeaning and stigmatizing.
A. Restricting Free Choice and Limiting Access
The SSB exclusion is considered inequitable because it
restricts the beverage options of SNAP recipients so that they have
less access to beverages of their choice than non-participants.117
The restriction is thus considered a strategy “aimed uniquely at
keeping poor people from the normal streams of decision-making
and commerce.”118 Put another way, a restriction on SSB is
Ann M. Collins et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Summer Electronic Benefit
Transfer for Children (SEBTC) Demonstration: Summary Report 55 (2016),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/ops/sebtcfinalreport.pdf.
115
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116
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117
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The Case of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 41 J. L. Med. & Ethics 301, 302 (2013).
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considered by some to be a patronizing attempt to “micromanage”
the lives of the poor.119 The message conveyed through the
restriction on SSB purchases with SNAP is that that poor people
make bad choices, therefore requiring government intervention
to manage their food choices whereas higher income persons do
not.120
Relatedly, critics of the SSB restriction assert that SNAP
participants and non-participants have similar intakes and
purchases of unhealthy foods.121 There is limited evidence that
SNAP participation increases SSB consumption beyond the risk
associated with poverty.122 Therefore, if SNAP benefits are not to
blame for additional purchases of SSBs, restricting only SNAP
purchases in this way is not justified.123
There is an ethical concern that the SSB ban unfairly targets
SNAP participants, without imposing a similar restriction across
other government programs, thereby singling out poor persons
for a problem experienced by the majority of Americans.124 Thus,
some critics have argued that the restriction on SSBs can pass
ethical muster only if it can be applied to all types of government
funds used to purchase beverages, including cafeterias in all
government buildings and all beverages purchased with federal
grant funds.125
To address the concerns about undermining the free choice
and autonomy of SNAP recipients with a SSB restriction, it is
necessary to note how our eating behavior and choices are more
constrained that we may imagine.126 Research studies demonstrate
Patrick McGeehan, U.S. Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy
Soda, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/banon-using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html.
120
Nancy Kass et al., Ethics and Obesity Prevention: Ethical Considerations In 3
Approaches To Reducing Consumption Of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 104 Am. J.
Pub. Health 787, 791 (2014); Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 302.
121
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how various features of the external food environment, such
as large portion sizes, availability and location of snack foods
and caloric beverages, function as psychological “cues” that
encourage “mindless” overconsumption.127 Furthermore, there
is evidence that salty and sugary foods disrupt our appetite
regulation, subverting the psychological and physiological
systems that regulate food intake.128 There is also evidence that
low-income youth and adults are exposed to disproportionately
more marketing and advertising for obesity-promoting products
that encourage the consumption of unhealthful foods such as fast
food and SSBs.129
It is thus difficult to claim that obesity prevention
policies, such as a restriction on the purchase of SSBs with SNAP,
would impose for the first time, a constraint on choice of what
to consume.130 This reality helps us to understand that a SSB
restriction is not based on an assumption that low-income people
are uniquely bad at making food choices, or that low-income
people are more easily manipulated by their environments.131
The influence of environmental cues on all people, regardless
of income levels, should force policymakers and advocates to
question whether “maximizing consumer food choice” is the
pinnacle of good policy.132 This is admittedly a complex ethical
issue; however, freedom of choice must be balanced with public
health goals.133 Of course, decisions about what or how much we
eat deserve protection, but it must be acknowledged that when
obesity prevention policies such as a SSB restriction in SNAP are
implemented, they would replace one set of influential external
stimuli with a different set, rather than exert influence on consumer

Id.
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129
Food Research & Action Center, supra note 17, at 4.
130
Kass et al., supra note 120, at 792.
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choices where none had previously existed.134
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the disparity
in consumer choice is not ethically decisive. The goal of SNAP is
to address a specific problem: the diet and nutrition of low-income
people.135 The disparity of overriding importance, when evaluating
the proposal to restrict SSBs, is the disparity in diet, nutrition,
and health between low-income and higher-income Americans.136
Thus, because low-income Americans have a disproportionately
higher prevalence of diet-related disease than other Americans,
SNAP policy changes may disproportionately benefit these
populations most affected by the health consequences of poor
nutrition.137 National data show that people with lower incomes
consume fewer fruits and vegetables and more SSBs compared
with higher income people.138 They also experience higher rates
of obesity and type 2 diabetes than higher-income groups.139
Such disparities were revealed in a recent review of 25
studies that examined the diets of SNAP participants, eligible
non-participants, and higher income individuals.140 Although
overall caloric intake and consumption of macronutrients and
micronutrients were similar between SNAP and income-eligible
non-participants, adult SNAP participants consumed a less healthy
diet than either comparison group. 141 Children whose families
participated in SNAP had similar nutrition quality to incomeeligible non-participants, but lower quality than higher-income

Kass et al., supra note 120, at 792.
Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2040.
136
Id.
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Basu et al., supra note 88, at 1032. It can also be said that the issue of whether
SNAP participants have worse nutrition or health than non-participants is irrelevant;
what is relevant is whether SNAP participants’ nutrition and health could be improved
with a SSB restriction. Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 305.
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French et al., supra note 105, at 1.
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children.142 While the findings comparing SSB consumption of
SNAP participants with eligible nonparticipants were mixed,
overall, the data suggest that SNAP participants consume more
SSBs than higher-income individuals, but similar amounts as
eligible non-participants.143 Results showed that SSBs accounted
for approximately 12 percent of total daily caloric intake of SNAP
participants, higher than that of SNAP-eligible nonparticipants (9
percent total daily intake) and SNAP-ineligible nonparticipants
(6 percent total daily intake).144
Another reason to restrict SNAP purchases is economic.
As a federally funded program, taxpayers pay for SSBs twice:
once at the point of sale through the SNAP program and later
as health care expenditures for treatment of diet-related diseases
through Medicaid and Medicare, and indirect economic costs
from future lost work productivity attributable to obesity, type
2 diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.145 SNAP pays for an
estimated $4 billion in soft drinks per year, or about 20 million
servings each day.146 The costs of medical spending attributable
to obesity is estimated at $147 billion per year.147 Of this amount,
$61.8 billion is financed by Medicare and Medicaid.148 Put this
way, SSBs have enormous costs to public health and spending.
In summary, where the goal of unfettered consumer choice
is at odds with the goal of promoting health and good nutrition,
it is ethically justifiable to modestly limit the consumer choice to
improve the nutrition and health of SNAP participants, just as it is
ethically justifiable to limit choice of unhealthy products in other
settings such as schools, day care centers, hospitals, and places
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of employment.149 Such limitations are already incorporated into
SNAP—an assistance program to buy food, not to generally
maximize consumer choice. 150
B. Stigmatization of SNAP Recipients
The USDA151 and opponents to a restriction on SNAP
purchases have expressed concerns that such a policy would
stigmatize low-income families.152 There is a related concern
about the message such a policy conveys to society about the
poor.153 As stated by Joel Berg, former Executive Director of
New York City Coalition against Hunger, such proposals to
restrict SNAP purchases are “based on the false assumption that
poor people were somehow ignorant or culturally deficient.”154
There is concern that rejection of purchases at checkout could
cause embarrassment and stigmatization of SNAP recipients by
signaling them out as receiving assistance.155 Increased stigma
could become a threat to participation, and a decline in SNAP
participation could in turn increase food insecurity.156
To counter the concerns above, the issue of whether SNAP
participants would feel stigmatized and deterred from using their
benefits are empirical issues that can only be assessed through a
pilot study.157 Several surveys of SNAP recipients may actually
demonstrate that concerns about potential negative impacts
of a restriction are unwarranted. In recent surveys of SNAP
recipients, the majority of respondents agreed that it would be
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appropriate to restrict SSBs from SNAP.158 When New York City
SNAP participants were surveyed on their consumption patterns
and attitudes around restrictions in 2011, “almost 70 percent of
surveyed SNAP participants supported restricting sweetened
beverages from SNAP (49 percent)” or did not express an opinion
on the issue (16 percent).159 An extensive campaign to notify all
SNAP recipients should accompany any change in the types of
items that can be purchased. Embarrassment and stigma, if any,
would have to be weighed against the potential benefits of SSB
restriction, such as lower rates of obesity, diabetes, and other
chronic disease, conditions that are themselves stigmatizing.160
Rather than causing the stigmatization of SNAP recipients,
there could actually be a reduction of stigma associated with a
restriction of SSBs. Excluding SSBs from SNAP could bolster the
public perception of SNAP, portraying the program as a carefully
designed nutrition assistance program that helps families eat
healthier, as opposed to an inefficient welfare program.161 Rather
than sending negative messages about SNAP participants, a
restriction on SNAP sends messages about nutrition—that SSBs
are unhealthy, people drink fewer SSBs, and that SSBs do not
contribute to good nutrition.162 These messages should be aimed
not only at SNAP recipients, but at all Americans.163 Put another
way, a restriction on purchases of SSBs is a policy focused on
singling out the drinks, not singling out SNAP participants. It is a
policy solidly backed by nutrition science and public health goals
articulated by the government and advocacy organizations.164
Michael Long et al., Public Support For Policies To Improve The Nutritional
Impact of The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 17 Pub. Health
Nutrition 219, 219 (2014); Cindy Leung et al., Improving the nutritional impact of
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: perspectives from the participants,
52 Am. J. Prev. Med. 193, 196 (2016).
159
Rachidi, supra note 74, at 7.
160
Barnhill, supra note 56, at 2038-39.
161
Id. at 2039.
162
Barnhill & King, supra note 117, at 306.
163
Id.
164
See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, The CDC Guide to Strategies
for Reducing the Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 4 (2010),
158
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There are other examples of anti–SSB policies that only reach
a subset of the population, such as restricting these products
in schools, hospitals, and government buildings. Like the SSB
SNAP restriction, “these policies are not aimed uniquely” at poor
people; they are aimed uniquely at sugary drinks.165
In summary, a pilot program to test the efficacy of a
restriction on SSB purchases with SNAP can and should be
included in the 2018 Farm Bill. The administrative obstacles
for the USDA, states, and retailers are not insurmountable, as
evidenced by other such as WIC nutrition assistance programs and
HIC pilot program. There are several recent studies suggesting
that a SSB restriction would reduce consumption of SSBs, which
could lead to improved health outcomes. The ethical objections to
a SSB restriction as patronizing and demeaning, though valid, are
not decisive. At stake is the public health of 42 million Americans
who depend on the SNAP program to purchase food. Given the
“general consensus that SSBs contain no beneficial nutrients”166
and compelling evidence linking SSBs to obesity, diabetes, and
other chronic diseases for which low-income Americans are
particularly at risk, it is the government’s moral imperative to
implement policies that address health disparities.167
V. Recommendation for a SSB Restriction Pilot Project
The 2018 Farm Bill presents an opportunity for Congress
to authorize the funding of a pilot that restricts the purchase
of SSBs168 with the use of SNAP. Such a restriction brings the
http://dhhs.ne.gov/publichealth/Documents/Guidance_Doc_Sugar_Sweetened_Bev.
pdf; AMA Adopts Policy to Reduce Consumption of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages,
American Med. Ass’n, (June 14, 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-adoptspolicy-reduce-consumption-sugar-sweetened-beverages.
165
Schwartz, supra note 22, at S201.
166
Blondin, supra note 57, at 5.
167
See Cynthia M. Jones, The Moral Problem of Health Disparities, 100 Am. J. Pub.
Health S47, S47 (2010).
168
Although pilot proposals can suggest definitions of SSBs, one suggestion is from
the CDC: caloric, sweetened beverages including: soft drinks (soda or pop), fruit
drinks, sports drinks, tea and coffee drinks, energy drinks, sweetened milk or milk
alternatives, and any other beverages to which sugar, typically high fructose corn
syrup or sucrose, has been added. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
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program in alignment with its longstanding goal—to “safeguard
the health and wellbeing of the Nation’s population and to raise
levels of nutrition among low-income households.”169
An evidence base is needed to evaluate the most effective
ways to curb the obesity epidemic, particularly among the nation’s
most vulnerable populations who are at higher risk of diet-related
diseases. As the USDA has recognized, “carefully designed
and evaluated pilot tests” are the only way to evaluate the effect
of a SSB restriction on reducing consumption.170 To date, no
randomized trial has been conducted to examine the effects of
restrictions on the purchase of certain food and beverage items.171
The objections regarding feasibility and efficacy discussed in the
preceding sections rely on empirical issues that could be resolved
with a pilot project. In addition, many of the ethical debates and
assumptions about stigma to SNAP recipients could similarly be
resolved with more data, and more importantly, more inclusion
of SNAP recipients in the conversation about how to improve
nutrition of low-income populations. Thus, Congress should
direct the USDA to invite applications from states to pilot a welldesigned, thoroughly evaluated, and carefully messaged SSB
restriction.
A well-designed pilot will include a rigorous evaluation
plan to compare similar locations that would experience the
restriction while others would not, and to assess whether retailers
could appropriately implement the restriction and whether
participants could follow the changes.172 Like the NYC proposal,
a pilot authorized in the farm bill should use survey data and
retailer data to assess changes in consumption patterns over time,
as well as qualitative assessments of the experiences of retailers

supra note 164, at 4.
169
The Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-525, §2, 78 Stat. 703 (1964) (demonstrating
the goal of the original food stamp program).
170
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 36, at 5.
171
French et al., supra note 105, at 2.
172
Rachidi, supra note 74, at 8.
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and participants during the pilot.173 Messaging and education
will also be critical to address concerns regarding stigma and
administrative burdens for retailers. A public information campaign
should inform all SNAP recipients of changes, and retailers
should be notified well in advance of implementation to allow
time to upgrade systems and procedures. The public information
campaign should explain the public health justifications for the
restriction to make clear that the policy is aimed at SSBs, not
SNAP recipients.
A restriction on the purchase of SSB should not be read to
support a reduction of SNAP benefits. It is beyond dispute, from
this author’s perspective, that SNAP benefits should be increased
to alleviate food insecurity, increase food expenditures, and
improve diet quality among low-income Americans, while also
injecting money into local economies.174 Nor should this proposal
be interpreted as a rejection of other measures to improve the
health and nutrition of SNAP recipients, such as educational
campaigns about the harms of SSBs175 and incentives to purchase
fruits and vegetables.176 Rather, a restriction on the purchase of
SSBs means that the federal government will cease subsidizing
the purchase of products that are demonstrably and indisputably
harmful to public health.
There should be no winners or losers in the debate about
restricting SNAP among anti-hunger and public health advocates.
Anti-hunger, social justice, and public health groups should
Id. at 7.
See Michael Leachman et. al, President Trump’s Budget Would Shift SNAP Costs
to States, Increasing Risk of Hunger and Weakening Response to Recessions, Ctr.
on Budget & Pol’y Priorities (July 19, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/
state-budget-and-tax/president-trumps-budget-would-shift-snap-costs-to-statesincreasing.
175
See Jess Lynch, HIA on SNAP and Sugar Sweetened Beverages, Ill. Public Health
Institute
(2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/09/25/3lynch.
pdf?la=en (recommending education about the health effects of drinking SSBs).
176
See, e.g., Bartlett Et Al., supra note 87, at 11; Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive
(FINI) Grant Program, Nat. Inst. of Food & Agric., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., http://
nifa.usda.gov/program/food-insecurity-nutrition-incentive-fini-grant-program (last
visited May 14, 2018); Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program (SFMNP), U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sfmnp/seniorfarmers-market-nutrition-program-sfmnp (last updated Apr. 15, 2015).
173
174
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coalesce around the issue of improving the health and nutrition of
our country’s most vulnerable populations. Rather than framing
the issue as a restriction of choice, with low-income individuals
aS targets, the issue is about targeting SSBs as void of nutrition,
detrimental to public health, and undeserving of subsidization
by the government. Allowing the purchase of SSBs with SNAP
makes the government complicit in lining the soda industry’s
pockets at the expense of the public health.
Conclusion
SNAP is essential for hunger prevention in the United
States, but its exclusive focus on food quantity contributes
to malnutrition and obesity and is misaligned with the goal of
helping beneficiaries lead healthier lives.177 SNAP is not merely
a transfer of wealth, but a program intended to alleviate hunger
and improve nutrition and health of low-income Americans.
Authorizing a pilot program in the 2018 Farm Bill to test the
efficacy of a SSB restriction could be a significant opportunity
to reduce the burden of diet-related disease among low-income
children and families.

177

Ludwig et al., supra note 27, at 2568.

Strengthening the National Organic Program with State
Organic Programs
Kelly Damewood*
Introduction
Now, more than ever before, organic stakeholders
must consider all options to strengthen the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s (USDA) National Organic Program (NOP). Over
the last 15 years, USDA-certified organic production significantly
grew both domestically and abroad.1 This growth is largely
attributed to consumer trust in the integrity of the USDA-certified
organic seal—NOP sets and enforces federal organic standards
for all products sold or labeled as organic in the United States.2
kjdamewood@gmail.com
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv. Highlights, 2015
Certified Organic Survey: Farms, Land, and Sales Up 1 (2016), https://www.
nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015_Certified_Organics/2015_
Certified_Organic_Survey_Highlights.pdf; Documentation, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Econ. Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/organicproduction/documentation/ (last updated Sept. 22, 2016) (“Together, certified organic
cropland and pasture accounted for about .6 percent of the U.S. total farmland in
2011”); Organic Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Researsch Serv., https://www.
ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organictrade/ (last updated Jan. 19, 2018) (“Growth in organic agricultural production is
occurring in both developed and developing countries worldwide, and the competition
for major consumer markets in developed countries, particularly the United States and
Europe, is increasing.”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service,
Nat’l Organic Pro., Strategic Plan 2015-2018 2 (2015), https://www.ams.usda.
gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP-2015StrategicPlan.pdf (“With an appropriated
budget of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the NOP oversees more than
80 certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around the world. In the U.S., there
are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of $39.1 billion in U.S. organic
sales was reached in 2014.”) [hereinafter AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018].
2
Robust organic sector stays on upward climb, posts new records in U.S. sales,
Organic Trade Association (May 24, 2017), https:www.ota.com/resources/marketanalysis (“The robust American organic sector stayed on its upward trajectory in 2016,
gaining new market share and shattering records, as consumers across the United
States ate and used more organic products than ever before. . . . Organic sales in the
U.S. totaled around $47 billion in 2016, reflecting new sales of almost $3.7 billion
from the previous year. The $43 billion in organic food sales marked the first time
the American organic food market has broken though the $40-billion mark. Organic
food now accounts for more than five percent -- 5.3 percent to be exact -- of total
*
1
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But the continued success of organic depends on whether NOP
can maintain strong oversight in a rapidly evolving marketplace
with its current enforcement budget and authority.3 Therefore,
organic stakeholders must work to strengthen NOP enforcement
resources because it will protect consumer trust in the integrity of
the USDA-certified organic seal.
At the federal level, efforts are well underway to
strengthen NOP enforcement resources through the next farm bill.
food sales in this country, another significant first for organic.”); The Cost of Organic
Food, Consumer Reports (Mar. 19, 2015, 12:00 PM), www.consumerreports.org/
cro/news/2015/03/cost-of-organic-food/index.htm (finding that “[o]n average, organic
foods were 47 percent more expensive” and describing reasons consumers are willing
to pay more for organic).
3
See Organic Trade Association Priorities for the Farm Bill, Organic Trade
Association
https://ota.com/advocacy/organic-trade-association-2018-farm-billpriorities (last visited May 2, 2018) (describing need for “support and adequate funding
for the [NOP] to keep pace with industry growth, set uniform standards, and carry out
compliance and enforcement actions in the U.S. and abroad.”); Documentation, supra
note 1 (“Together, certified organic cropland and pasture accounted for about .6 percent
of the U.S. total farmland in 2011.”); Organic Trade, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ.
Research Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/
organic-agriculture/organic-trade/ (last updated Jan. 19, 2018) (“Growth in organic
agricultural production is occurring in both developed and developing countries
worldwide, and the competition for major consumer markets in developed countries,
particularly the United States and Europe, is increasing.”); Miles McEvoy, former
Deputy Administrator of National Organic Program, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Presentation at Spring 2017 National Organic Standards Board Meeting (Apr. 19, 2017)
(noting the amount of resources spent on tasks other than enforcement such as 2 full
time FOIA staff and several contractors); Peter Whoriskey, The labels said ‘organic.’
But these massive imports of corn and soybeans weren’t, The Wash. Post (May 12,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-labels-said-organicbut-these-massive-imports-of-corn-and-soybeans-werent/2017/05/12/6d165984-2b7611e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.ae4e87fdbe65 (describing a case of
organic fraud in organic grains). AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018, supra note 1, at 2
(“With an appropriated budget of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the
NOP oversees more than 80 certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around
the world. In the U.S., there are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of
$39.1 billion in U.S. organic sales was reached in 2014.”); Peter Whoriskey, “Why the
hell am I paying more for this?” Major egg operation houses “USDA Organic” hens at
three per square foot, The Wash. Post (July 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/13/more-than-a-million-hens-filling-barns-at-threeper-square-foot-and-yes-theyre-usda-organic/?utm_term=.88178cb01d51;
Peter
Whoriskey, Millions of pounds of apparently fake ‘organic’ grains convince the food
industry there may be a problem, The Wash. Post (June 12, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/12/millions-of-pounds-of-apparentlyfake-organic-grains-convince-the-food-industry-there-may-be-a-problem/?utm_
term=.f3ceee314e97; Peter Whoriskey, Why your ‘organic’ milk may not be organic,
The Wash. Post (May 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
why-your-organic-milk-may-not-be-organic/2017/05/01/708ce5bc-ed76-11e6-96626eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.59baf3a57a28; The Cost of Organic Food,
supra note 2.
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Congress first authorized NOP when it passed the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) as part of the 1990 Farm Bill, and
Congress must reauthorize funding for NOP in the next farm bill
as well as include any other changes to the program.4 So now is
the time to make any changes to the program—such as shoring
up NOP enforcement authority—and to advocate for increased
authorized funding.5 Thus, organic stakeholders are prioritizing
and advocating for increased NOP enforcement resources in the
next farm bill.6
But in addition to their farm bill advocacy, organic
stakeholders should also consider how state-level action can
support their federal efforts. Precedent and other pressing federal
issues indicate that Congress could likely delay the next farm
bill, which should be reauthorized in September 2018 when the
2014 Farm Bill expires.7 Moreover, the Trump administration
has already taken action to undermine new organic enforcement
standards.8 And organic critics have also called for changes to
NOP that could undermine its efficacy.9 So, given the current
political climate, it is worth supplementing farm bill advocacy
Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6524 (2012); Faso
Introduces Bill to Crack-Down on Fake Organics, Support Organic Farmers,
U.S. Congressman John J. Faso (Sept. 28, 2017), https://faso.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=582.
5
See Organic Trade Association Priorities for Farm Bill, supra note 3 (describing
need for “support and adequate funding for the [NOP] to keep pace with industry
growth, set uniform standards, and carry out compliance and enforcement actions
in the U.S. and abroad.”); Faso Introduces Bill to Crack-Down on Fake Organics,
Support Organic Farmers, supra note 4.
6
See Organic Trade Association Priorities for Farm Bill, supra note 3.
7
Ed O’Keefe, Farm bill passes after three years of talks, The Wash Post, Post Politics
(Feb. 4, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/02/04/
farm-bill-passes-after-three-years-of-talks/?utm_term=.bb0bc8a146f9.
See
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress.gov Resources, https://www.
congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+2017
(showing trend of continued resolutions and partisan voting rather than passing timely
legislation).
8
Lynne Curry, Years in the Making, Organic Animal Welfare Rules Killed by Trump’s
USDA, Civil Eats (Dec. 18, 2017), https://civileats.com/2017/12/18/years-in-themaking-trumps-usda-kills-organic-animal-welfare-rules/.
9
Peter B. Matz, Organic Reform, Olsson Frank Weeda (Jan. 17, 2017), www.
ofwlaw.com/2017/01/17/organic-reform/; Tom Philpott, “Dark Forces” Are Coming
for your Organic Food, Mother Jones (Feb. 9, 2017, 6:30 PM), www.motherjones.
com/politics/2017/02/dark-forces-organic/.
4
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with state-level action.
Specifically, organic stakeholders should consider
advocating for state organic programs at the state-level because
they are unique, often overlooked enforcement tools. It may seem
counterintuitive to consider state-level action to protect a federal
program, but OFPA has a unique provision whereby NOP can
authorize state departments of agriculture to enforce federal organic
standards, e.g. states can create ‘state organic programs’.10 So far,
California is the only state to establish a state organic program,
the California State Organic Program (SOP).11 NOP audits and
oversees the program, but its program functions, funding, and
structure are set forth in California state law.12 While the SOP
has some drawbacks for California’s organic producers, overall
California has the most robust, efficient organic enforcement
in the United States.13 Therefore, organic stakeholders should
consider how advocating for additional state organic programs
can strengthen organic enforcement, and in turn support their
farm bill priorities.
Thus, this article examines how organic stakeholders can
strengthen NOP with state organic programs. Section I reviews
the authority, functions, and responsibilities of state organic
programs. Section II weighs the costs and benefits of the SOP.
Section III then applies the cost-benefit analysis of the SOP to
describe key attributes of states with potential to establish state
organic programs. Section IV recommends guiding principles for
new state organic programs. Finally, this article concludes that
some states should consider establishing carefully constructed
7 C.F.R. §§205.620-205.622 (2017).
State Organic Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing
Service, https//www.ams.usda.gov/services/enforcement/organic/state-compliance
(last visited May 2, 2018).
12
See generally Kelly Damewood & Jane Sooby, California Certified Organic
Farmers, Review of the California State Organic Program (2015), https://
www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/Review%20of%20the%20California%20State%20
Organic%20Program%20-%20CCOF%202015%20web.pdf
(describing SOP authority); State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
13
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 29-30 (discussing challenges SOP creates
for California producers).
10
11
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state organic programs because additional state organic programs
can support national efforts to strengthen NOP enforcement
resources in the next farm bill.
I. Overview of State Organic Programs
State organic program are a commonly overlooked tool
for organic enforcement. Although the NOP primarily works with
organic certifiers to regulate the organic marketplace, OFPA also
authorizes NOP to work with state organic programs to ensure
local oversight and control over organic production in the state.14
California is the only state operating a state organic program.15
As a result, California has a different regulatory framework for
organic production and certification than other states.16
A. The NOP works with Organic Certifiers to regulate the
Organic Marketplace
Organic certification is the primary means of ensuring
agricultural products sold as organic in the U.S. are produced
and handled in compliance with federal organic standards.17 NOP
accredits private and governmental entities, both domestically
and abroad, to verify that products with organic claims have been
produced and labeled in compliance with the organic standards.18
Operations who produce or handle agricultural products intended
to be sold as organic with gross annual organic sales of more
than $5,000 must be certified by an accredited certifier.19 Thus,
the NOP works with organic certifiers around the world to ensure
products sold as organic are meeting the requirements of NOP’s
standards.20
Organic certifiers have an important role in oversight and
7 C.F.R. §§205.620-205.622.
State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
16
Id.
17
See 7 C.F.R. §§205.500-205.510 (2017).
18
Id. §§ 205.500-205.501(a).
19
Id. § 205.100.
20
Id. § 205.400.
14

15
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enforcement because they work directly with producers to ensure
compliance with NOP standards. Certifiers review producers’
organic system plans, annually inspect facilities, verify producers’
record-keeping, and analyze residue samples of at least 5% of
their certified clients annually.21 Producers must immediately
notify their certifiers of any application, including drift, of a
prohibited material or a change in production systems that may
impact compliance with the organic standards.22 If a producer is
not in compliance with NOP standards, then the certifier must
alert NOP, issue a noncompliance, and evaluate actions taken
to correct the noncompliance.23 Therefore, the rigorous organic
certification process ensures products labeled as organic are in
compliance with NOP standards.
While organic certifiers play an important role, NOP is
ultimately responsible for enforcement. NOP has authority to
enforce the standards through legal action, including stopping the
sale of a product and issuing civil penalties.24 Any individual or
operation who makes a false statement to NOP or to an organic
certifier is subject to fines and even imprisonment of up to five
years.25 Additionally, NOP must audit organic certifiers and
oversee compliance with accreditation requirements.26 So NOP
oversees all final enforcement actions and decisions.
In sum, NOP works with organic certifiers to monitor the
organic marketplace. Through the organic certification process,
accredited certifiers verify that agricultural products sold and
labeled as organic are in compliance with the organic standards.27
And NOP has authority to enforce the standards and oversee
certifiers.28
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id.; Id. §205.670.
7 C.F.R. § 205.400(f) (2017).
Id. § 205.405.
Id. § 205.100(c)(1).
Id. § 205.100(c)(2); Id. §3.91.
Id. § 205.501.
7 C.F.R. §205.400 (2017).
Id. § 205.661; Id. § 205.668.
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B. In California, NOP works with certifiers and the
California State Organic Program.
In California, the NOP not only works with certifiers, but
it also works with the California State Organic Program (SOP)
to oversee organic production and certification. The NOP can
authorize state departments of agriculture to establish what are
referred to as ‘state organic programs.’29 State organic programs
are enforcement programs that provide local oversight of
certification, production, and handling in the state; they do not
operate independently from the NOP.30 So far, California is the
only state operating a state organic program.31 So California is the
only state enforcing NOP standards.32
The SOP is a unique enforcement arm of the NOP. The
SOP assumes activities conducted by NOP in other states such
as working with certifiers to resolve non-compliances, stopping
sale of noncompliant products, issuing civil penalties, or handling
legal actions when a producer appeals the decision of a certifier.33
The SOP even takes on some enforcement activities that NOP
cannot provide for all states such as proactively monitoring the
organic marketplace with unannounced inspections and residue
testing beyond what certifiers are already required to perform.34
Thus, the SOP handles all organic enforcement activities in
California with approval and oversight from NOP.35
If NOP suspects a noncompliance of a certified organic
operation, then it will work with the operation’s certifier to
investigate the complaint.36 But in California NOP will direct

Id. § 205.622.
Id. § 205.620; See also id. §205.100 (requiring that all agricultural products sold
as organic be in compliance with OFPA and federal organic standards, i.e., OFPA
preempts any state organic law or standard).
31
State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
32
Id.
33
7 C.F.R. §§ 204.101(c)(2), 205.620(d), 205.668, 205.670 (2017).
34
Id. § 205.670.
35
State Organic Programs, supra note 11.
36
7 C.F.R. §205.661(a); Id. §205.668.
29

30
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the SOP to work with the certifier.37 California is the only state
where a state department of agriculture is regularly working with
certifiers to resolve non-compliances.
Another important area of enforcement handled by
the SOP is investigations of potential fraud. Any member of
the public may submit a complaint to NOP.38 If the complaint
regards a noncertified operation selling product as organic, then
NOP must investigate the operation itself because certifiers
only have jurisdiction over their clients.39 But if the complaint
concerns a noncertified operation in California, then NOP will
direct the SOP to investigate the complaint.40 The public may also
submit complaints of fraud directly to the SOP.41 In other words,
California is the only state with a state department of agriculture
regularly receiving and investigating complaints of fraud in the
organic marketplace.
In sum, the SOP is a unique enforcement arm of the NOP
because it is the state-administered organic enforcement program
in the U.S. As an enforcement arm, it enforces federal organic
standards such as resolving non-compliances and investigating
complaints of fraud within the state.42

Id. §205.661(b); Id. 205.668.
How to File a Complaint on Organic Regulations, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Agricultural
Marketing
Service,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/
enforcement/organic/file-complaint (last visited May 2, 2018).
39
7 C.F.R. §205.661(a) (2017).
40
Id. §205.661(b).
41
CDFA Organic Complaints, Cal. Dept. of Food & Agric., https://organic.cdfa.
ca.gov/complaints/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
42
Id.
37

38
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C. State Organic Programs are different than State
Organic Certifiers
An important yet often misunderstood distinction exists
between state organic programs and state organic certifiers.43
California is the only state operating a state organic program
while some states have state departments of agriculture that are
accredited certifiers such as the Washington State Department
of Agriculture (WSDA).44 An accredited state department of
agriculture has the same requirements and functions as an
accredited private company—they maintain records with their
certified clients, notify clients of regulatory changes or compliance
issues, and annually inspect their clients’ farm or facilities.45 In
contrast, a state organic program takes on functions similar to
the NOP—it works with certifiers to resolve non-compliances,
investigates noncertified operations, and handles appeals or other
legal actions.46 Thus, state organic programs have different roles
than state organic certifiers.
The difference between a state organic program and a
state organic certifier is further highlighted by the impact of each
on producers operating in the state. Producers may choose to
certify with any certifier operating in the state.47 So a producer
in Washington could certify with the WSDA Organic Program,
or it could choose to certify with another accredited certifier
like Quality Insurance International (QAI), which is a private
organization.48 In contrast, producers must comply with a state

Kelly Damewood, California Certified Organic Farmers, Compilation of Interviews
& Key Takeaways for SOP Report 2015-2016 (2016) (on file with author) (noting that
many interviewees do not understand the differences between state certifiers and state
organic programs) [hereinafter Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report].
43

44

Damewood & Scooby, supra note 12, at 8.

Id. at 27-37.
46
Id. at 38-49.
47
See 7 C.F.R. § 205.100 (mandating certification of applicable operations with
any accredited certifying agent), see also id. § 205.401 (setting forth requirements
for certification applications and not requiring producers certify with any specific
certifier).
48
Id.
45
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organic program.49 For example, in California producers choose a
certifier but they must comply with SOP requirements in addition
to certifying with their chosen certifier.50 So the SOP impacts
producers differently than a state organic certifier because it has
authority over all organic producers in the state while certifiers
only have authority over their clients.
D. State Organic Programs may create Additional
Requirements.
Another unique feature of state organic programs is their
ability to impose additional requirements for certification. The
NOP may allow a state organic program to set more restrictive
requirements than what is required under OFPA and the organic
standards.51 The additional requirements should address the
environmental conditions or the necessity of specific production
or handling practices particular to the State or region.52 So
producers selling agricultural product as organic in the U.S. must
meet the requirements of OFPA, but they may also be required
to meet state requirements if they operate in a state with a state
organic program.
In California, the SOP has four additional requirements:
1. Organic producers and handlers must register with the
SOP through the California Department of Food and
Agriculture.53
2. Organic processors must register with the SOP through
the California Department of Public Health (CDPH).54
3. Organic producers, processors, and handlers must

See id. §§ 204.101 (c)(2), 205.620 (d), 205.668. 205.670 (requiring producers make
records and facilities available to state organic programs).
50
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 9.
51
7 C.F.R. § 206.620 (c) (2017).
52
Id.
53
Policy Memorandum from Miles McEvoy to Stake Holders and Interested
Parties on California State Organic Program, Additional Requirements Granted,
(Jan. 21, 2011), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP-PM-11-8CaliforniaRequiremetns.pdf.
54
Id.
49
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provide verification of SOP registration to their
accredited certifying agent prior to granting or
continuing organic certification;55 and
4. Accredited certifying agents must register with CDFA
and pay registration fees.56
As a result of these additional requirements, California
producers must annually register and pay fees to the SOP in
addition to annually renewing and paying fees to their certifier.
II. The Benefits of the SOP outweigh the Costs.
The costs and benefits of the SOP must be carefully
evaluated before establishing more state organic programs
because it is the only established state organic program from
which to judge the merits of such a program on. Under its current
structure, the benefits of the SOP outweigh the costs—the SOP
had significant issues in the past, but these have largely been
addressed or are being addressed through ongoing refinements
to the program. But the SOP would not be easily replicated or
suitable for all states; rather, state organic programs modeled
after the SOP would only be appropriate in states where there is
sufficient benefit to the state’s organic producers, high stakeholder
engagement, and no conflict of interest issues with a state certifier.
A. The Benefits of the SOP.
The SOP benefits California producers by providing them
with the most efficient, robust enforcement of national organic
standards in the U.S. The primary benefits include: reliable
funding, local staff, local legal authority, marketplace surveillance,
and close oversight over noncertified operations. The SOP also
has several ancillary benefits to enforcement such as reliable
data, administration of cost share, and authority to further support
organic production in the state. Additionally, the SOP benefits the
entire organic sector, not just California.
55
56

Id.
Id.
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i. The SOP has consistent funding independent of farm
bill negotiations and federal appropriations and is entirely focused
on enforcement.
One significant benefit of the SOP is that it allows
California to have a consistent, independent source of funding
dedicated entirely to enforcement activities. NOP’s budget
must fund a range of activities including enforcement actions,
developing and implementing organic standards, auditing
certifiers, responding to Freedom of Information Acts, and
other administrative functions.57 In contrast, the SOP’s budget is
almost entirely dedicated to enforcement activities—it has some
administrative costs, but it does not write rules, conduct audits,
or handle FOIA requests like NOP.58 Thus, the SOP funding is
focused solely on enforcement.
Additionally, the SOP budget is not subject to farm bill
negotiations and federal appropriations. Upon reviewing its entire
farm bill budget, Congress authorizes an annual budget for NOP—
that is, Congress determines the maximum amount Congress
may appropriate to NOP annually.59 But Congress is not under
an obligation to appropriate the full amount.60 To date, Congress,
has not appropriated NOP at its full authorized amount—the
2014 authorizes $15 million a year for NOP but Congress has
always appropriated $9 million a year.61 But the SOP budget is
AMS Strategic Plan 2015-2018, supra note 1, at 2 (“With an appropriated budget
of approximately $9 million in FY 2014 and 2015, the NOP oversees more than 80
certifying agents and 27,800 organic operations around the world. In the U.S., there
are 19,474 certified organic operations; a new record of $39.1 billion in U.S. organic
sales was reached in 2014.”); 7 U.S.C. §§ 6519, 6505, 6514, 6581 (2012). See also Key
Activities, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., National Organic Program, https://www.ams.
usda.gov/about-ams/programs-offices/national-organic-program (last visited
May 2, 2018) (listing the range of NOP responsibilities and activities).
58
California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46000 (2017).
59
What are Appropriations?, Nat’l Sustainability Agric. Coal., http://
sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/campaigns/annual-appropriations/what-areappropriations/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
60
Id.
61
Nat’l Sustainability Agric. Coal., House and Senate Appropriations
Committees,
Agricultural
Appropriations
Chart
Fiscal
Year
2018,http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/
57
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completely independent of the NOP because it is funded almost
entirely funded by registration fees paid by organic producers in
the state.62 Therefore, SOP funding is consistent and independent
of the political pressures faced by NOP.
Stable funding is increasingly important in today’s
political climate. Some organic critics have called on Congress to
slash funding to the NOP.63 While Congress so far seems unwilling
to slash NOP funding altogether, there is ongoing uncertainty as
Congress struggles to pass annual appropriations due to ongoing
partisan disagreements.64 If NOP were to lose its funding for
enforcement, then the organic seal would lose the confidence
of consumers.65 Therefore, the consistent, independent funding
stream is increasingly reassuring for organic producers during a
time of heightened uncertainty.
Moreover, if Congress were to defund the NOP, either by
cutting it from the 2018 farm bill or by not appropriating funds,
then the SOP would become an important backstop for the organic
marketplace. Before NOP implemented federal standards, the
SOP had its own standards, which were the de facto standards
for organic production nationwide because producers selling into
California had to comply with the SOP.66 Today, California state

NSACFY2018AgAppropriationsChart-SComfull.pdf.
62
California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46013.1 (e)(1).
California Department of Food & Agriculture, Organic Program Budget FY 20152016 (January 2016) (receiving no funding from the NOP but receiving proportionally
small amounts of funding from other sources than registration fees). See also
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 16.
63
Tom Philpott, “Dark Forces” Are Coming for your Organic Food, Mother Jones
(Feb. 9, 2017, 6:30 PM), www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/02/dark-forces-organic/.
64
See Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, Congress.gov Resources, https://www.
congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+2017 (last
updated May 4, 2017). (showing continued resolutions and partisan voting but no cuts
to NOP funding).
65
See Organic Trade Association Priorities for the Farm Bill, supra note 3.
66
Mark Lipson et. al., Remarks at 2016 EocFarm Conference Panel: Campaign to End
State Organic Program Fees (2016), https://eco-farm.org/sites/default/files/session_
audio/EFC16_Campaign_to_End_State_Organic_Program_Fees.mp3 (“In the 1990’s
California organic foods act of 1990 was the de facto national standard. It was the
foundation on which consumer trust on a national level was built. I strongly believe
that”).
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law mandates the SOP enforce federal organic standards.67 So
if Congress defunds the NOP, then the SOP would once again
become the de facto assurance of organic enforcement because it
would still have funding and enforcement authority.68 Thus, under
the worst case scenario of a defunded NOP, the SOP would serve
as a back stop for enforcement.
ii. The SOP has local enforcement Staff.
A second benefit of the SOP is its local enforcement
69
staff. NOP investigative staff are primarily based in Washington,
D.C.70 To investigate complaints of fraud, the NOP must fund
travel to the reported operation, handle the complaint from afar,
or perhaps work with the local state department of agriculture,
which may or may not have the expertise to track down the
necessary information.71 In contrast, the SOP has trained organic
investigators who immediately travel and respond to complaints
in California.72 The SOP also contracts with county agricultural
commissioners—county-based personnel who provide regulatory
services for a variety of CDFA and USDA programs—to handle
SOP enforcement activities in their region.73 Therefore, the SOP
provides boots on the ground enforcement to quickly investigate
and resolve compliance issues or complaints of fraud.
California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46000 (2017).
CCOF Priorities for the 2018 Farm Bill, California Certified Organic Farmers
(2018), https://www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/2018%20CCOF%20Farm%20Bill%20
priorities.pdf.
69
See Cal. Dep. Of Food & Agric., State Organic Program, Compliance &
Enforcement/Appeals Summary: FY 2015/2016 & FY2016/2017 (2017), https://
www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/SOP_EnforcementActivitiesSummary.pdf (citing 66
complaints investigated by SOP staff) [hereinafter Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric.,
Compliance Summary].
70
See Miles McEvoy, supra note 2 (citing eight compliance and enforcement staff in
addition to NOP Compliance and Enforcement Director).
71
Interview with Miles McEvoy, former Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, National Organic Program in Washington, D.C. September 30, 2015
(noting that NOP successfully contracted with state departments of agriculture to
investigate fraud but NOP staff are primarily based in D.C.).
67

68

See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note
69. See also, Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 12 (describing one
supervising special investigator and three special investigators on SOP staff).
72

73

California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46000 (b) (2017).
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Local staff are especially important for investigating
noncertified operations.74 For complaints or issues with certified
organic operations, NOP can often rely on the certifier to inspect
the operation, take residue tests, or otherwise investigate the
operation.75 But if an operation is not certified, then the certifier
has no authority to investigate the operation.76 So NOP cannot rely
on certifiers for investigating noncertified operations, which then
requires NOP to travel to the region, contract with the state staff,
or otherwise handle the investigation.77 But as an enforcement arm
of NOP, the SOP has authority over anyone selling agricultural
product as organic in California so it can send staff to investigate
noncertified operations.78 Thus, the SOP’s local enforcement staff
ensure efficient resolution of issues with noncertified operations
in California.
iii. The SOP has Local Legal Authority.
A third benefit is the SOP resolves issues that rise to legal
action more efficiently than the NOP because it handles local
appeals and mediations. NOP may suspend or revoke certification
of an operation.79 The operation may go through mediation
with the NOP, appeal the suspension or revocation to the AMS
Administrator, or, if the AMS Administrator denies the appeal,
the operation may request a hearing with a USDA Administrative
Law Judge.80 NOP may settle an appeal, and mediation is
common.81 But in California alone, organic operations go through

See 7 C.F.R. § 205.101 (2017) (stating that operations exempt from certification
“must comply with the applicable organic production and handling requirements”).
75
Id.
76
See id. § 205.661(a) (granting authority to certifying agents to investigate production
and handling operations “certified as organic by the certifying agent.”).
77
See id. § 205.101 (stating that operations exempt from certification “must comply
with the applicable organic production and handling requirements”).
78
See Ca Agric. Code §46002 (adopting by reference the NOP standards); 7.C.F.R.
§205.661 (b) (stating authority of SOP over all organic operations in California).
79
7 C.F.R. § 205.660 (2017).
80
Id. § 205.680(a)-(c).
81
Id. § 205.663.
74
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a local legal system to appeal decisions.82 So California-based
operations are not dependent on a backlogged federal system and
do not have to work with a court from across the country.83 So
the SOP responds to and resolves noncompliance issues more
efficiently than NOP.
iv. The SOP provides Marketplace Surveillance.
A fourth benefit is that the SOP proactively monitors the
organic marketplace. The NOP has limited staff and financial
resources, so its enforcement budget is almost entirely aimed at
responding to noncompliances and investigating complaints.84
The SOP, however, not only responds to noncompliances
and investigates complaints, but it also monitors the organic
marketplace through spot inspections and random pesticide
residue sampling.85 So unlike NOP, the SOP helps certifiers
monitor the organic marketplace.
Spot inspections may help find bad actors who would not
otherwise be identified by a complaint. For example, the SOP
contracts with the county agricultural commissioners who go
to farmers markets to make sure producers have the appropriate
signage and adequately separate organic produce from their
conventional produce.86 So county agricultural commissioners
Id. § 205.681; see generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing
Service, National Organic Program, Office of the Administrator Adverse
Action Appeal Process for the National Organic Program (2014), https://www.
ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/4011.pdf.
83
See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69;
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, National Organic
Program, Compliance & Enforcement/Appeals Summary: FY 2016 (2017), www.
ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOPQtrlyEnforcementRptQ4FY16Summary.
pdf. (closing one out of three appeals in process in FY2015/216 versus NOP closing 14
out of 32 appeals in FY 2016. 6 of the closed appeals were carried over from previous
fiscal years).
84
Interview with Miles McEvoy, former Deputy Administrator, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, National Organic Program in Washington, D.C. September 30, 2015
(noting that NOP would like to do more random residue testing and marketplace
surveillance, but it has limited capacity).
82

California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46003.2
(2017).
86
Id. § 46003.2 (6); Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California’s State
Organic Program Fact Sheet 1, 2 (2017), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/
85
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are out in the field proactively looking for any issues.87
Like spot inspections, pesticide residue sampling can
be helpful in identifying any issues in the organic supply chain.
SOP staff or county agriculture commissioners can go to farmers
markets or retail establishments—from local grocers to large
supermarkets—and sample produce for pesticide residues.88 If
a residue test is over the allowed amount in organic production
or shows a residue of a prohibited material, then the SOP will
initiate an investigation where it will trace the produce back to the
handler and producer.89
However, the value of marketplace monitoring should
not be overly exaggerated. Some would argue that the SOP spot
inspections and residue testing not only duplicate certification
requirements but also duplicate other California regulations.90
For example, the Certified Farmers Market program also inspects
for organic compliance at farmers markets and the Department
of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) also conducts periodic residue
sampling.91 A recent stakeholder taskforce reviewed the SOP and
concluded that spot inspections and residue testing benefit the
organic sector when the SOP prioritizes enforcement actions and
does not duplicate other areas of enforcement.92 So marketplace
surveillance is a benefit when surveillance activities are properly
conducted.
v. The SOP monitors Noncertified Operations.
A fifth benefit is the SOP monitors exempt operations. All
producers selling agricultural products as organic must comply
i_&_c/pdfs/CalOrganicPrgrmFactSheet.pdf.
87
See Cal. Dep. Of Food & Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69.
88
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 24-25.

See Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., Compliance Summary, supra note 69
(detecting 4 instances of residues in violation of tolerance levels in FY2015/106 as a
result of sampling and conducting).
90
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 30.
91
Id.
92
Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California State Organic Program:
Recommendations from the Organic Stakeholder Work Group 11, 13-14 (2017),
www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/OSWG_RecommendationsReport.pdf.
89
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with the federal organic standards.93 However, organic producers
with gross annual organic sales of $5,000 or less are exempt from
certification requirements.94 There are two risks of fraud for these
exempt producers: first, they may be surpassing the $5,000 mark
but they are avoiding the hassle of certification;95 second, they
may not be in compliance with the standards because they do not
have a certifier annually inspecting and surveying their production
practices.96 Many certified producers who sell at farmers market
or directly to consumers suspect this may be an area of significant
fraud.97
The SOP is better equipped to enforce organic standards
for exempt operations than the NOP. While the NOP has authority
to investigate any exempt operation when it receives a complaint
or suspects fraud, the NOP does not have information on hand
about noncertified entities because they have no obligation to
report to NOP, and they are not undergoing the annual inspection
or paperwork of certified operations.98 In contrast, producers
exempt from certification who operate in California must register
with and provide production information to the SOP.99 The SOP
uses this information to conduct investigations as well as spot
inspections or residue testing.100 Thus, the SOP ensures robust
oversight over exempt producers, which helps level the playing
field at farmers markets and direct to consumer sales channels.
vi.The SOP has Authority to Create Additional
Requirements.
A sixth benefit is the SOP has the unique authority to
add requirements to organic certification. Its current additional
93
94
95
96
97
98

7 C.F.R § 205.102 (2017).
Id. § 205.101(a).
Id.
Id. § 205.102; id. §205.101(a).
Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
7 C.F.R. § 205.101(c) (2017).

California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46013.1
(2017).
99

100

Id.
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requirements—registration and annual fees—provide for
reliable funding, marketplace surveillance, and oversight over
noncertified operations.101 However, the SOP could also leverage
this unique authority to address enforcement issues when the
federal rulemaking process is stalled or not making sufficient
changes.
For example, the SOP could potentially strengthen
the prohibition of the use of GMOs. Organic producers may
not use inputs derived from GMOs and they must proactively
prevent inadvertent contamination of their crops.102 Despite
this requirement, testing shows that GMO contamination is
occurring in organic grains.103 Many suspect that contamination
most likely occurs when producers use conventional seeds.104 So
one way to strengthen enforcement of the prohibition of GMOs
is to add a requirement that producers growing crops at risk of
GMO contamination keep records demonstrating the seed they
plant has been tested to show no presence of GMOs.105 Certifiers
could then verify that producers have taken all precautions to
prevent inadvertent contamination.106 Thus, the SOP could add
requirements to further strengthen enforcement.
But the authority of the SOP to strengthen enforcement
through additional requirements—such as requiring increased
See supra text accompanying section II A (i)-(v).
See 7 C.F.R. § 205.2; id. § 205.105(3) (prohibiting the use of excluded methods
and defining excluded methods as “[a] variety of methods used to genetically modify
organisms”).
101

102

Letter from Danny Lee, Supervising Special Investigator, California State
Organic Program, to Industry Stakeholders (May 3, 2017). https://www.cdfa.
ca.gov/is/i_&_c/pdfs/Organic-Letter_IndustryStakeholders.pdf.
103

National Organic Standards Board, Crops Subcommittee Proposal:
Strengthening the Organic Seed Guidance 1 (2017) (“Since the mid-2000s,
genetically engineered seeds have led to contamination of the seed supply, and organic
seed companies are struggling to stay viable when the adoption of organic seed is not
growing at the same rate as the organic products market.”).
105
California Certified Organic Farmers, Public comment on Crops
Subcommittee’s Proposal: Strengthening the Organic Seed Guidance 2 (2017),
https://www.ccof.org/sites/default/files/CCOF%20Comments%20on%20Crops%20
Proposal%20-%20Strengthening%20the%20Organic%20Seed%20Guidance.pdf
(“Operations should demonstrate that seeds of at-risk crop have been produced
without excluded methods.”).
106
Id.
104
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record keeping for at risk seed—is only theoretical at this time.
The SOP’s current additional requirements relate to fees and
registration;107 they do not substantively alter enforcement of
the federal organic standards.108 To date, an effort to strengthen
standards at the state level have not been made in California;
rather, organic stakeholders generally work to strengthen organic
standards through the federal rulemaking or guidance process in
which he National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) reviews
public input and makes recommendations to the NOP for
clarification, guidance, or new standards.109 Thus, the full potential
to leverage the authority to impose additional requirements
remains untested.
Further, establishing more requirements for certification
through the SOP could be quite challenging because CDFA or
stakeholders would have to sponsor legislation to change the
requirements and then the NOP would have to approve the
requirements.110 On one hand, some producers may not support
more additional requirements because it would put them at a
competitive disadvantage to other producers who certify with
fewer requirements.111 On the other hand, some producers may
welcome stronger enforcement and recognize the potential for
California to pave the way for stronger standards as it leads by
example. So it is not clear whether an effort to add requirements
through the SOP would be successful.
Nonetheless, it is still important to consider the benefits
of additional requirements because it could help strengthen
enforcement when the federal NOSB and NOP process is stalled.
For example, it took the NOSB at least three years before it
finalized a recommendation to update the definition of GMOs in
Policy Memorandum from Miles McEvoy, supra note 53.
Id.
109
7 U.S.S. § 6518.
110
California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. § 46000; 7 C.F.R. §
206.620(c) (2017).
111
COFFA FAQs: Policy & Advocacy, California Certified Organic Famers,
https://www.ccof.org/policy-advocacy/california-organic-food-and-farming-act/
coffa-faqs (last visited May 2, 2018).
107

108
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the organic standards.112 And the NOSB recommendation is not
enforceable; rather the NOP must go through formal public notice
and comment.113 It can take years before NOP pursues rulemaking
on an NOSB recommendation.114 And even if the NOP acts on the
recommendation, the rule can be stalled by political pressures or
Congressional interference.115 Therefore, the SOP’s authority to
establish additional requirements is an untested but potentially
potent benefit to California’s organic producers.
vii. The SOP also has Benefits ancillary to Enforcement.
While the primary purpose of the SOP is enforcement, the
program also provides ancillary benefits to the organic sector in
California. The SOP provides unique data on organic production,
it administers the National Organic Cost Share Program on behalf
of California producers, and it has authority to support organic
producers through education, outreach, and other programmatic
activities.

See Letter from Tracy Favre, Chair of National Organic Standards Board to Secretary
of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Report to the USDA Secretary on
Progress to Prevent GMO Incursion into Organic Agriculture (Nov. 18, 2016), https://
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/MSFall2016ReporttoSecy.pdf
(“To
address public concerns, 5 years ago the NOSB established an ad hoc Committee on
GMOs”); Letter from Tracy Favre, Chair of National Organic Standards Board to
National Organic Program, Formal Recommendation regarding Excluded Methods
Terminology (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
MSExcludedMethods.pdf (recommending updates to definitions of GMOs).
113
Letter from Jeff Moyer, Chair of National Organic Standards Board to National
Organic Program, Formal Recommendation regarding Animal Welfare (Nov. 5,
2009),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/NOP%20Final%20
Sunset%20Rec%20Animal%20Welfare.pdf (passing livestock recommendation in
2009); National Organic Program (NOP); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—
Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 59,988, 59,988 (Dec. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 205) (noting that NOP issued first publication of final rule for comment on Jan.
19, 2017).
114
See Rulemaking, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rulesregulations/rulemaking (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
115
OTA submits comments on animal welfare rule, AgNews Feed (June 9, 2017), http://
agnewsfeed.com/2017/09/11/ota-submits-comments-animal-welfare-rule/ (describing
stalls in the implementation of the proposed Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices
rule despite overwhelming support from the organic sector and a thorough NOSB
process because a few egg companies do not like the rule’s provisions).
112
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1. The SOP has unique data on California production.
The information collected by the SOP at registration
has several uses not related to enforcement. For example,
production data may be useful for producers who may evaluate
crop trends to make decisions about perennial crop plantings.116
Additionally, county agriculture commissioners report they use
SOP registration data to ensure organic farms are not sprayed with
prohibited materials when there is a federal or state-mandated pest
treatment.117 Finally, organic advocates use data about organic
production to make the case for increased public investment in
organic research and other programmatic support.118 Thus, the
SOP registration data has uses beyond enforcement.
In fact, the unique data collection in California through
the SOP is the most reliable data on organic production in the
state. Organic data is notoriously difficult to track because
traditional agricultural data reporting has not called out organic in
the past.119 And most organic data is collected through voluntary
reporting while SOP registration reporting is mandatory.120 Thus,
historically California has had the most reliable farm production
data on the organic farming sector because all organic producers
are required to report to the SOP every year.
Moreover, California is the only state with reliable data
on the organic processing industry.121 Organic farms and ranches
voluntary report production information to federal statistics and
research agencies, but organic processers do not have analogous
survey opportunities through federal agencies. In California,
however, processors report production information, including
gross organic sales, to the SOP.122 And the SOP annually reports
Kelly Damewood, Notes from COPAC Technical Subcommittee on Registration
(Jan.-May 2017) (on file with author).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Interview with Jane Sooby, Senior Policy Specialist, California Certified Organic
Farmers, in Santa Cruz, CA (Aug. 1, 2017).
120
Id.; California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code §§ 46013.1.
121
See California State Organic Program Fact Sheet, supra note 89.
122
Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 22.
116
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this data back to the industry.123 Reports show that organic food
processing has grown to almost $10 billion in 2016.124 This
impressive sales number helps organic advocates demonstrate the
value of organic to the California economy and make the case for
investment in organic.125
Despite the benefits of SOP data, it is also important to note
that this data is not being used to its fullest potential. Under state
law, the SOP must report data on the processing sector annually,
but it is not required to report data on farm production.126 The
SOP makes data available upon specific request, but it does not
systematically report the data.127 So while the SOP registration
data may have many uses, it is currently underutilized because the
general public does not have regular access to it.128
2. The SOP administers Cost Share
Another ancillary benefit of the SOP is it administers the
National Organic Cost Share Program (cost share) on behalf of
organic farmers in the state.129 First authorized in the 2002 Farm
Bill, cost share is a federal program that reimburses organic
producers 75% of their certification costs, up to $750 per scope.130
The USDA works with state departments of agriculture, and the
Farm Service Agency (FSA) to administer cost share.131 Some
state departments choose not to administer it, but the SOP has
always been committed to administering it and strives to enroll
as many producers as possible in the program.132 Due to recent
Id.
CDPH Report on Organic Processing FY 2015-16 (on file with author).
125
Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
126
See CA Health & Safety Code §§110811-12 (requiring annual reporting); Ca
Agric. Code § 46000, et seq. (not requiring annual reporting).
127
Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
123

124

128
129
130

Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12, at 27-28.
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changes, California producers may also apply through their local
FSA office; however, it is helpful for organic producers to apply
through the SOP because they already register with the SOP
annually.133 Therefore, the SOP benefits the organic sector by
administering cost share.
3. The SOP can support Education, Outreach, and other
Programmatic Activities.
An important but unrealized ancillary benefit of the
SOP is its authority to support education, outreach, and other
programmatic activities for organic producers. In 2016, California
updated and streamlined the SOP through the passage of the
California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA).134 These
updates broadened the authority of CDFA and the SOP from
solely enforcing federal organic standards to also incorporating
education, outreach, and other programmatic activities for organic
producers.135 While CDFA has not yet acted on this new authority,
it is expected that COPAC will consider advising the Secretary
of CDFA on new opportunities for the SOP in the future.136 Thus,
the SOP could implement programs to support and grow organic
production in the state.

to Congress Fiscal Year 2015, National and Agricultural Management
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California has distributing 88% of cost share funds to 2384 participants), https://www.
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viii. The SOP benefits the entire Organic Sector.
The full range of SOP benefits cannot be discussed
without considering the impact on national enforcement and the
organic marketplace as a whole. As the state with the highest
volume of organic production, strong enforcement in California
supports consumer confidence in the integrity of organic
production and compliance.137 Moreover, the SOP essentially
subsidizes enforcement throughout the U.S.—by funding its own
enforcement through fees, California’s SOP allows the NOP to
direct its limited resources toward enforcement in other states.138
As discussed below, many California producers resent subsidizing
national enforcement.139 Nonetheless, additional resources and
support for the NOP benefits the entire organic sector because
the success of the organic marketplace depends upon strong
enforcement.140 Therefore, the SOP benefits the entire organic
sector by providing strong, self-funded enforcement.
B. The Costs of the SOP
While the SOP provides the strongest, most robust
enforcement in the U.S., the SOP also has several disadvantages.
California organic producers have the highest costs of certification
because they pay more fees, comply with more paperwork,
operate in a more confusing regulatory landscape, have more
communications challenges, and have more need for engagement
and advocacy. However, COFFA addresses many of these costs
and stakeholders continue to work with CDFA to refine the
program.
i. California’s Organic Producers pay more Fees for
Organic Certification.
One SOP cost is the requirement that California producers
pay an annual SOP registration fee in addition to their certification
137
138
139
140

Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 130-40.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
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fee.141 The NOP allows the SOP to collect an annual SOP registration
fee as an additional requirement to organic certification.142 Many
California producers resent paying an additional fee because
they feel it puts them at an unfair advantage to organic producers
outside the state who only pay a certification fee.143
Many California producers also resent subsidizing
national enforcement. The NOP does not spend enforcement
dollars in California because the SOP is self-funded through its
registration fees.144 This allows the NOP to spend its enforcement
dollars outside the state.145 So, at the very least, California
producers argue that they should receive their fair share of federal
enforcement dollars from the NOP.146
SOP fees also create an additional barrier to certification
for small to mid-scale farmers. The fees are relatively low—
they range from $25 to $3,000 depending on gross annual
sales, with the majority paying in the range of $250. However,
farmers operate with thin margins.147 And California farmers are
arguably the most regulated farmers in the world with multiple
layers of fees.148 Small to mid-scale producers report that the fees
are a barrier to the success of their business.149 Therefore, even
seemingly small SOP fees challenge producers, especially small
to mid-scale farmers.
Organic stakeholders are also concerned that the SOP has
an excess reserve fund of about three million dollars.150 The SOP
California Organic Program, Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., https://www.cdfa.
ca.gov/is/i_&_c/organic.html (last visited May 2, 2018).
142
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143
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144
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2016).
148
American Farmland Trust, Cal. Dep’t of Food and Agric., California
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first accumulated a large reserve of excess funds in 2009 when
every state agency was ordered to freeze spending.151 During
that time, the SOP collected fees without expending them on
enforcement.152 Now the SOP reports that it operates at budget,
yet the reserve fund continues to grow.153 So some stakeholders
are concerned about the legitimacy of the SOP growing a large
reserve fund while small and mid-scale farmers struggle to pay
their fees.
Fortunately, the burden of SOP fees has eased over the last
year. In 2016, a new state organic law—the California Organic
Food and Farming Act (COFFA)—streamlined SOP registration
and updated the fee schedule.154 It capped the current fee schedule
so producers will not see higher fees, and it lowered fees for
producers in the lowest category of gross organic sales.155 CDFA
could also lower SOP fees further, especially given the cost
savings of a more streamlined registration process.156 Therefore,
COFFA helped ease some concerns regarding fees.
Additionally, SOP fees are now eligible for cost share
reimbursement as an additional scope of certification. California
producers may receive up to $750 in reimbursement for their
SOP fees, which would cover the entire SOP fee for most small
to mid-scale producers.157 The downside is that producers must
still pay their SOP fee and then apply for reimbursement.158 And
an even more important concern is that cost share is at high
risk for defunding in the 2018 Farm Bill because Congress will
Interview with Rick Jensen, former Director of Inspection Services, California
Department of Food and Agriculture, Sacramento, CA November 24, 2014.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46000
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See Historic Updates to California State Organic Program Becomes
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be looking to cut programs that make direct payments such as
cost share.159 So, as long as cost share funds are available and
producers make use of the program, the burden of SOP fees is
greatly diminished.160
Concerns regarding the excess reserve fund are also
being addressed. COPAC may advise CDFA on the expenditure
of the reserve fund; however, it must work through bureaucratic
budgeting steps to access the funds.161 COPAC began the process
to access the funds in May of 2017.162 Now it will consider how to
best spend the funds, such as updating communications to organic
stakeholders about the role and enforcement actions of the SOP.163
ii. California organic producers have more paperwork.
Historically, the most significant SOP cost has been
cumbersome paperwork and reporting requirements.164 As part of
their annual SOP registration, producers must report information
about their crop production.165 Before COFFA, producers were
reporting highly detailed information including gross sales per
crop per location166. These reporting requirements were especially
cumbersome for highly diversified operations who may grow over
50 crops.167 And, just as California farmers pay multiple layers
of fees, they also complete multiple layers of state paperwork
requirements—they were reporting information to the SOP that
they already reported to other state and federal agencies as well as
Organic Certification Cost-Share at Risk, National Organic Coalition (Dec.
15, 2017), http://www.nationalorganiccoalition.org/news-items/organic-certificationcost-share-at-risk. California Organic Products Advisory Committee, Minutes,
Public Comment by Laura Batcha of the Organic Trade Association (Jan. 25, 2018),
available at https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/uploader/postings/hearings/#hide-fam2009.
160
Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
161
See Inspection Service Minutes, California Organic Products Advisory
Committee, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/uploader/postings/hearings/#hide-fam2009
(last visited May 4, 2018) (describing multi-step process to access reserve funds).
162
See id.
163
See id.
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Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
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Id. at 29.
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their certifiers.168 The additional and duplicative paperwork was
extremely burdensome for producers.169
However, the cost of excess paperwork has largely been
addressed or is being addressed by ongoing refinements to the
SOP. COFFA significantly reduced the information required
at SOP registration.170 And the SOP is working with CCOF,
which certifies the majority of farms in the state, to develop a
data sharing system whereby certifiers can report information on
behalf of their clients.171 So the cost of additional paperwork has
diminished.
iii. California producers operate in a more challenging
regulatory landscape.
An unavoidable cost of the SOP is that it creates a more
challenging regulatory landscape for California producers. Even
with greatly improved fee and paperwork requirements, the SOP
adds another layer of compliance on California producers who
have seen significant rises in compliance costs over the last few
years. For example, California producers must comply with a wide
range of regulations not commonly required in other agricultural
states such nutrient management reporting, comprehensive
pesticide use reporting, and overtime and minimum wage
requirements for farmworkers.172 Keeping up with regulations
and state agencies is especially challenging for small and midscale producers who cannot afford staff to oversee compliance.173
Therefore, even a streamlined SOP costs California producers
Id. at 9.
Id. at 29.
170
Kelly Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration
Requirements, From Field to Forum (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.ccof.org/blog/
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Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration
Requirements].
171
Id.
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who are under significant regulatory pressures.
iv. SOP creates communication challenges around organic
certification and compliance.
Another SOP costs is the communication challenges
it creates for organic stakeholders. For many years, organic
producers thought that they were paying fees and registering
with the SOP for absolutely no reason—they were not aware of
the extent of SOP enforcement activities.174 Although CCOF’s
work to pass COFFA helped raise awareness about the program,
many producers still struggle to understand the role of the
SOP.175 Certifiers must explain to their clients that they cannot
finalize certification until their client registers with the SOP.176 In
other words, navigating the certification process is challenging
enough for producers but in California they must also grasp the
relationship between the SOP, the NOP, and certifiers.
COPAC and CDFA are slowly addressing the
communication challenges. Historically, the SOP put out little
to no communications about the program.177 It did not attend
industry events such as organic conferences or NOSB meetings.178
As a result, organic stakeholders had no understanding of the
program. Now, COPAC is working to recommend an updated
website, newsletter, and other basic communication functions.179
Additionally, SOP staff have begun engaging in industry events
such as hosting a booth at an organic trade show. So some
communication challenges are being addressed.
v. Additional need for advocacy and engagement
An important SOP cost is that it will require ongoing
advocacy and engagement from organic stakeholders. Like
174
175
176
177
178
179

Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
Kelly Damewood, notes on input after COFFA (on file with author).
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any industry, the organic stakeholders must ensure statewide
officeholders and representatives are meeting the unique needs
of organic producers and supporting the growth of organic
production. But organic is especially challenged in arguing
for their fair share of public funds and programs because they
compete with powerful conventional lobby groups and critics
of organic certification.180 Moreover, organic advocates spend
significant advocacy efforts on improving and protecting organic
standards.181 Thus, the need to engage with an additional state
program strains organic stakeholders who already struggle to
represent the diverse needs of the organic sector.
The importance of stakeholder advocacy and engagement
should not be underestimated. The most significant SOP costs were
made worse when organic stakeholders failed to engage CDFA
and COPAC. Stakeholders did not ask the state to update the fee
schedule and other program requirements for over ten years while
producers expressed grave concerns about and resentment towards
the program.182 COPAC could have long ago recommended
streamlined reporting requirements, better communications,
and other improvements; however, the committee struggled to
maintain active membership.183 And stakeholders failed to go to
committee members for help.184 Now, with renewed engagement
from CCOF, the largest organic advocacy group in California,
advocacy and engagement have improved.185 For example,
COPAC has nearly a full roster and is working to further refine
the program.186 Nonetheless, organic stakeholders will have to
continue to engage with the SOP to ensure it is an effective, not
See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
See id.
182
See Damewood & Sooby, supra note 12; Minutes of January 2016 COPAC
meeting (discussing long standing concerns not brought to COPAC’s attention and not
addressed by SOP).
183
Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136.
184
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overly burdensome program.
C. The Benefits outweigh the Costs.
Overall, the benefits of the SOP outweigh the costs. The
SOP has numerous benefits for California’s organic producers,
which in turn benefits the organic sector as a whole.187 Although
the SOP had significant costs in the past, they have largely been
addressed with the passage of COFFA or are being addressed
through further refinements to the program.188 Meanwhile, funding
for the NOP and its ability to strengthen standards is increasingly
uncertain under the current political climate.189 Therefore,
the SOP is a valuable program and a model for strengthening
enforcement through state organic programs because the costs to
organic producers in California are diminishing while the benefits
are increasingly important.
III. Key Attributes of States with Potential for State
Organic Programs.
The benefits of a new state organic program may not
outweigh the costs for all states. The costs and benefits of the
SOP are directly related to the unique regulatory landscape and
the overall production value of organic in the state.190 Therefore,
the costs and benefits of establishing a new state organic program
should be considered in the context of that state’s own organic
production and agricultural regulations.
Applying the SOP as a model, state organic programs
are most likely viable in states with the following attributes:
additional enforcement adds value to the state’s organic sector,
organic stakeholders are highly engaged with the state department
of agriculture and other agencies, and the state department of
agriculture does not have a conflict of interest.

187
188
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A. Additional Enforcement adds Value to the State’s
Organic Sector.
To justify the costs, state organic programs should add
value the state’s organic sector. For example, the SOP adds
value because California produces the highest volume of organic
products, which increases the risks of noncompliance and fraud.191
By contrast, additional enforcement would not add much value to
a state like Mississippi where there is a small amount of organic
production and, therefore, relatively low risks of fraud.192
But the potential value of additional enforcement should
not be judged on volume of organic production in the state alone.
The SOP helps with oversight of farmers markets and direct to
consumer sales because it has registration data and local staff.193
Other states like Hawaii and Northeastern states have a strong
direct to consumer market.194 Therefore, they would likely benefit
from more oversight of the use of the term organic at farmers
markets and other direct to consumer sales channels.195
Another factor impacting the value of additional
enforcement would be risks associated with the types of crops
grown in the state. The SOP’s random testing and inspections help
identify issues such as GMO contamination.196 So state organic
programs may be helpful in a state like Montana where grain is
staple crop for organic producers.197
Thus, states should consider the volume of organic
production, the types of sales channels, risks associated with the
state’s main organic crops, and other factors when weighing the
value of a state organic program.
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B. Organic Stakeholders are Highly Engaged with the
State Department of Agriculture and other Regulatory Agencies.
It is also important to consider the level of engagement and
advocacy a state may expect from organic stakeholders. One of the
long standing problems with the SOP was a lack of understanding
about the program and engagement from the community to
improve its outdated requirements.198 If a state does not have
existing organic organizations or trade associations, then it will
be difficult for producers to understand state organic program
developments or to advocate for changes to the program. But,
for example, a state like Montana has an active organic farming
association, which would presumably engage with a state organic
program to represent the interests of its growers.199 Therefore, the
level of engagement a state may expect from organic stakeholders
will determine whether a state organic program will have long
lasting benefits without overly burdening the state’s organic
producers.200
C. The State Department of Agriculture does not have a
Conflicts of Interest.
Finally, state organic programs may not be appropriate
for states where the state department of agriculture operates an
organic certification agency. State organic programs can overrule a
certifier’s decision and must work with all certifiers in the state.201
So a state department of agriculture may have a real or perceived
conflict of interest if it operates both a state organic program
and a state certifier.202 California has never operated an organic
certification agency, and it is the only state that has applied for
state organic program status.203 Therefore, the potential conflict
See supra accompanying text for notes 164–169.
Montana Organic Association, http://montanaorganicassociation.org/ (last
visited May 2, 2018).
198

199

200
201
202
203

See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
See supra accompanying text for notes 40-59.
Id.

Interview with Miles McEvoy, supra note 84.

2018]

Strengthening the National Organic Program

145

of interest issue has yet to be tested.
If a conflict of interest exists, then some state certifiers
should consider becoming state organic programs. For example,
Oregon has a long-established, well-respected private certifier—
Oregon Tilth—as well as many other certifiers operating in the
region while its state certifier is relatively new.204 Given the high
amount of organic production in the state, a state organic program
would make sense for Oregon’s department of agriculture.205 In
contrast, WSDA has long certified producers in the state.206 So
if a conflict of interest exits, then it may be more worthwhile to
replace some state certifiers with state organic programs but it
will depend upon the history and reputation of the certifier.
IV. Recommendations for Structuring State Organic
Programs
Using the costs and benefits of the SOP as a model, a new
state organic program should be structured under the following
principles: high accountability, streamlined requirements, and
fair funding sources.
A.
State Organic Programs should have High
Accountability to the State’s Organic Stakeholders.
New state organic programs can avoid the downfalls of
the SOP by putting in place a program structure that ensures high
accountability to the state’s organic sector. Prior to COFFA, one
core issue with the SOP was lack of accountability—it had poor
communications, outdated requirements, and low engagement
with the organic community.207 Therefore, new state organic
programs should be structured to ensure high accountability.
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To ensure high accountability, a state organic program
should incorporate the following programmatic features: a
concise advisory committee, staff attendance at industry trainings
and events, state of the art communications, and a sunset date.
i. Establish a concise, meaningful advisory committee.
State organic programs should have advisory committees
made up of a small, but representative number of committee
members. COPAC advises the Secretary of CDFA on the SOP,
but low participation in COPAC resulted in ongoing issues
with the SOP.208 Some would argue that COPAC has too many
seats to fill, including alternate seats, which requires ongoing
outreach and support from NGOs and other stakeholders.209 A
more effective committee would have a limited number of seats
with no alternates—this would make selection more competitive
and incentivize higher participation by sitting members. Another
problem with COPAC is that it did not include a certifier seat,
which made it difficult for the committee to address coordination
with certifiers or complicated certification issues.210 Therefore,
new state organic programs should have concise advisory
committees.
Additionally, the committee members must have authority
to advise the program on meaningful recommendations. One
reason for low COPAC participation was its limited authority to
advise the Secretary CDFA on enforcement activities.211 COFFA
broadened COPAC’s authority, so it may now advise the Secretary
of CDFA on a range of activities related to organic production.212
This broader authority is attracting more interest and participation
from stakeholders.213 Thus, state organic programs should have
Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136.
Damewood, Key Takeaways for SOP Report, supra note 43.
210
Peter Nell, CCOF Representation on COPAC Increases with Key Appointments,
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211
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concise advisory committees who also advise on a range of topics
related to organic production.
Events

ii. Require staff attendance at Industry Trainings and

State organic programs should require staff to attend
industry trainings and events. NOP hosts annual trainings
for certifiers to ensure they are up to date on standards and
enforcement activities as well as promote a consistent certification
process among the certifiers.214 However, SOP did not regularly
attend these trainings until 2010 when NOP audited the SOP and
directed the SOP to require attendance at NOP-hosted trainings.215
SOP staff also did not frequent industry events such as organic
conferences or NOSB meetings until work began to reform the
SOP through the passage of COFFA.216 Now, staff attend industry
events such as organic conferences or NOSB meetings, which is
improving communication with the industry.217 Therefore, state
organic program staff should attend industry trainings and events.
iii. Use State of the Art Communications
State organic programs should use state of the art
communications. Perhaps one of the greatest downfalls of the SOP
was its poor communications to the organic sector—the majority
of organic producers in the state assume the SOP only collects
fees;218 they do not understand the SOP’s important enforcement
functions.219 By contrast, California’s new program to regulate
cannabis production, CalCannabis, has a reader-friendly, regularly
136.
214
See Organic Training, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agricultural Marketing
Service,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/organic-certification/
training (last visited May 3, 2018) (listing ongoing trainings for certifiers).
215
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updated webpage, social media accounts, accessible flyers, and
other useful communication tools.220 Producers regulated under
CalCnnabis already have much more public information available
to them than producers regulated under the SOP.221 Thus, new
state organic programs should use state of the art communications
from the outset.
iv. Establish a Sunset Date
State organic programs should have sunset dates. A sunset
date is a date in the authorizing legislation when the program will
expire unless renewed by legislation.222 Although a sunset date
is severe, it ensures accountability because organic stakeholders
will have to weigh in with their state representatives when the
state legislature votes on whether to renew the program. Organic
stakeholders advocated for the original law establishing the SOP;
however, when the NOP implemented the national standards,
many stakeholders no longer supported the SOP.223 Rather, they
wanted to be on the same regulatory playing field as producers
in other states who were all subject to national standards and
certification.224 But the SOP did not consult with stakeholders
when it applied for state organic program status with the NOP.225
Thus, state organic programs should have sunset dates to ensure
buy in from the state’s organic stakeholders.
B. Streamline Paperwork
The second principle for new state organic programs is
See CalCannabis: What We Do, Cal. Dept. Food & Agric., http://calcannabis.
cdfa.ca.gov/ (last visited May 3, 2018) (hosting a reader-friendly, modern webpage
with resources, an events & activities paged, and photos).
221
See California Organic Program, Cal. Dept. of Food & Agric. (last visited August
1, 2017) (listing details about the program but showing no branding or reader-friendly
interface; hosting one fact sheet created in 2016; not hosting any details about COPAC
meetings).
222
Brian Baugus & Feler Bose, Mercatus Ctr. At George Mason Univ., Sunset
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223
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224
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streamlined paperwork. State organic programs should collect
data from certifiers rather than from producers. And they should
share their data with state and federal agencies to avoid duplication
of other reporting requirements.
i. State organic programs should collect data form
certifiers rather than producers.
State organic programs should have as streamlined
paperwork requirements as possible to ensure the program does
not overly burden producers. COFFA helped ease the most
significant cost of compliance for the SOP, excess paperwork,
by greatly reducing the information producers must report at
registration.226 And paperwork may be eliminated altogether
when CDFA establishes a data sharing system with certifiers.227
While some certifiers may need to collect more information at
certification to ensure they have all the information the SOP
needs, it will be more efficient for the SOP to collect data from
the 20 (give or take) certifiers operating in the state rather than the
3,000 plus individual farmers and ranchers.228 Thus, state organic
programs can streamline paperwork at the outset by collecting
registration information from certifiers rather than directly from
individual producers.
ii. State organic programs should share data with other
state and federal agencies.
State organic programs should share their data and
registration information with other state and federal agencies
because it could help ease the burden of duplicate reporting
requirements. Organic producers report the same information
in many different formats to many different agencies. For
example, they complete annual production surveys for agencies
like the Economic Research Service or the National Agriculture

226
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228
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Statistics Service.229 They also report production information
for programs under the Farm Services Agency, the National
Resource Conservation Service, and crop insurance programs.230
And they may have to report to state agencies like departments
of pesticide regulation or water quality control boards.231 If state
organic programs can share their information in such a way that
it eliminates the need for producers to complete separate forms
or reporting requirements, then the SOP would greatly benefit
producers by streamlining paperwork across a variety of agencies
and programs.
C. Establish a Fair Funding Source
The final principal for state organic programs is a fair
funding source. A long-time concern of California producers is
that they subsidize national enforcement by paying an unfair,
additional fee in California. There are two complimentary
solutions to establishing a fair funding source for a state organic
program: NOP could allocate some funds to the program, and the
state organic program can collect fees from certifiers rather than
directly from individual producers.
i. NOP could allocate Funds to State Organic Programs.
The NOP could direct enforcement funds to state organic
programs to ensure producers in those states receive their fair
share of NOP resources. Arguably, the NOP should help fund
investigations in California because it funds investigations in all
other states.232 But the SOP also takes on enforcement activities
that the NOP cannot afford in other states, like spot inspections and
residue testing.233 NOP could give SOP funds for investigations
while the SOP continues to fund its additional enforcement
activities through fees. Thus, NOP could ensure producers receive
229
230
231
232
233

Interview with Jane Sooby, supra note 119.
Id.
Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
See supra text accompanying sections II (A)(i), (iv).
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their fair share of enforcement resources by allocating funds to
state organic programs for investigations.
ii. State organic programs should collect fees from
certifiers rather than individual producers.
State organic programs should ensure they maintain a
reliable funding source. NOP allocations should not be the sole
income stream for state organic programs because the NOP has
limited resources, and its funding is subject to Congressional
discretion.234 By contrast, one of the benefits of the SOP is a
consistent, abundant funding stream through registration fees.235
Therefore, state organic programs will need a locally generated
funding source.
The most reliable way to ensure a funding source is fees
not funds from the state general fund. Organic stakeholders would
have to successfully pass legislation directing general funds to the
program. This would be a challenging political lift for many states.
Additionally, general funds are not as reliable as fees because they
are subject to the discretion of the state legislature. So the most
reliable funding source would be a fee-based program.
To be most cost effective and limit the burden on producers,
state organic programs should collect fees from certifiers rather
than individual producers. COFFA now allows certifiers to
renew their clients’ registration on their behalf.236 However, the
only certifier pursuing this option, CCOF, cannot renew their
members registration at this time because collecting and passing
on the mandatory registration fee is too challenging.237 A more
straightforward option would be to levy a fee on certifiers rather
than directly on individual producers. The certifier would pass
See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
See supra text accompanying section II (A)(i).
236
California Organic Food and Farming Act, Ca Agric. Code § 46014.1(c) (2017).
237
See Damewood, A New Era of Organic Leadership in California, supra note 136
(stating that CCOF would pursue the option to renew their members certification);
Damewood, Comment Period Open on State Organic Program Registration
Requirements, supra note 170 (stating CCOF would pursue data sharing with CDFA
but no longer stating it would pursue option to renew registration).
234
235
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that cost onto its clients; however, producers would have the
benefit of only one billing for their certification a year. Moreover,
collecting from certifiers may reduce the fee because there will be
cost savings when the program collects fees from 25-30 certifiers
rather than over 3,500 individual organic operations every
year. Thus, collecting fees from certifiers would provide stable,
consistent funding for state organic programs.
Conclusion
Organic stakeholders should consider how to better
leverage state organic programs as they work to advance their
farm bill priorities. While there are a number of options to shore up
enforcement through the farm bill process, state organic programs
offer a viable, often- overlooked solution to strengthening organic
enforcement without further changes to OFPA. As demonstrated
in California, state organic programs create a robust enforcement
scheme at the state-level and add valuable support to NOP.
Therefore, organic stakeholders should consider establishing state
organic programs to support organic enforcement throughout the
United States.
But new state organic programs should not simply
replicate the SOP; rather, they should learn from the successes
and failures of the SOP to ensure effective programs in the future.
Specifically, state organic programs should be established in
states where additional enforcement adds value to the organic
sector, where organic stakeholders are highly engaged with the
state department of agriculture and other regulatory agencies, and
where no conflict of interest exists for the state department of
agriculture. And new programs should be structured to include
the following principles: accountability, streamlined paperwork,
and fair funding sources. By using the SOP as a model, organic
stakeholders are well poised to create effective state organic
programs in new states.
Thus, organic stakeholders in some states should consider
establishing state organic programs with the recommended
guiding principles outlined in this article because additional state
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organic programs would support national efforts to strengthen
NOP enforcement resources in the next farm bill.

The End of the Ramen Diet:
Higher Education Students and SNAP Benefits
Erika M. Dunyak*
Introduction
Americans joke that college students have so little money
that they subsist on ten-cent packs of ramen. Unfortunately,
the current reality of nutrition on campus is no joking matter.
Statistically, college students face much higher rates of food
insecurity than the general population and the situation is
particularly dire for students of color.1 This article will look to a
solution for this hungry, and often neglected, population.
In a statement to Congress encouraging “Great Society”
legislation, President Lyndon Johnson said, “Higher education is
no longer a luxury, but a necessity.”2 The average graduate with
a Bachelor’s degree will earn double what the average individual
without a degree will make in his or her lifetime.3 By federally
supporting students during this period, they will likely have
greater financial self-sufficiency later in life.
Hunger advocates have focused especially on children,
through the National School Lunch Program (NSLP);4 the
Erika Dunyak is a graduate of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law and the Agricultural and Food Law LL.M. at the University of Arkansas.
The author would like to express her gratitude to Jessica Friedman for her
tireless support and encouragement.
1
See Sara Goldrick-Rab et al., Wisconsin Hope Lab, Still Hungry
and Homeless in College 17 (2018), http://wihopelab.com/publications/
Wisconsin-HOPE-Lab-Still-Hungry-and-Homeless.pdf.
2
Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress: “Toward Full Educational
Opportunity,” The American Presidency Project (Jan. 12, 1965), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27448.
3
Brad Hershbein & Melissa Kearney, The Hamilton Project, Major
Decisions: What Graduates Earn Over their Lifetimes 5 (2014), https://
www.financialbuildingblocks.com/assets/What%20Graduates%20Earn%20
Over%20Their%20Lifetimes.pdf.
4
National School Lunch Program, Food Research & Action Center (Feb.
*
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working poor, though the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP);5 and the elderly, though Meals on Wheels and
SNAP.6 However, all of these programs exclude actively enrolled
college students.7 Those students have outgrown NSLP and
are excluded from SNAP.8 A two-prong solution would require
striking the exclusion of college students from SNAP and, further,
actively enrolling college students who are financially supported
by federal income-based university programs.
In 2010, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA)
reauthorized the NSLP.9 HHFKA contained several innovations
in the NSLP; one that is particularly relevant is expansion of the
“identified students” provision.10 Under this scheme, students
whose families already receive SNAP benefits also qualify for free
or reduced-price school meals without a separate application.11
With the next iteration of the Farm Bill, SNAP should be adjusted
to similarly accommodate low-income college students without
an additional application. Under this new program, students who
qualify for Perkins Loans, Pell Grants, Federal Supplemental
Educational Opportunity Grants, and similar federal programs
would also receive SNAP benefits without an additional
application.
The benefits to such a program would be tremendous.
College students are often specifically excluded from receiving
benefits such as SNAP and Medicaid. This policy change would
move students away from food insecurity, reduce the burden of
18, 2018, 9:55 AM), http://frac.org/programs/national-school-lunch-program.
5
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Food Research & Action
Center (Feb. 18, 2018, 9:55 AM), http://frac.org/programs/supplementalnutrition-assistance-program-snap.
6
Id., Meals on Wheels Facts & Resources, Meals on Wheels America (Feb.
18, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://www.mealsonwheelsamerica.org/theissue/factsresources.
7
See National School Lunch Program, supra note 5; see also Meals on Wheels
Facts & Resources, supra note 7.
8
See National School Lunch Program, supra note 5.
9
Randy Alison Aussenberg, Cong. Research Serv., Tracking the Next
Child Nutrition Reauthorization: An Overview 3 (2017).
10
7 C.F.R. § 245.9(f)(1)(ii) (2016).
11
Id.
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schools providing high quality dining experiences that are a major
contributor to the cost of higher education, reduce student debt,
and bring the political capital of university students to SNAP.
This article will first define the problem of hunger on
campuses and provide an overview of the potential economic
impacts of food insecurity on college campuses. The second
section will describe the proposed Farm Bill-based solution to
hunger and food insecurity on campuses. Finally, the third section
will explore the possible benefits and difficulties of implementing
the program.
This article is limited in its scope and only applies to
undergraduate students. Further research must be completed to
both understand the degree and effects of hunger for graduate
students and research assistants and explore federal policy shifts
to address those problems.
I. Background
Like any social policy, hunger policy exists within a
complex landscape of moving parts. This section will break down
that landscape. First, this section will define the terms “hunger”
and “food insecurity” as they are used in this article. The next
subsection will examine some of the latest data on hunger and
food insecurity on college campuses. Third, this section will
describe the economic burden of the college experience, generally,
and the cost of providing food to students, specifically. The third
subsection will also address the cost of food from the angles of the
students, parents, and the schools. Finally, this section will briefly
describe the existing legal frameworks that have the greatest effect
on hunger in the United States, namely the Supplement Nutrition
Assistance Program and the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act.
A. What are Hunger and Food Insecurity?
In 2006, the Committee on National Statics (CNSTAT), at
the behest of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), authored
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a report that defined both “hunger” and “food insecurity.”12 The
Food Insecurity and Hunger in the United States report defines
“food insecurity” as “whenever the availability of nutritionally
adequate and safe foods or the ability to acquire acceptable foods
in socially acceptable ways is limited or uncertain.”13
The USDA expands its definition to create a range of food
security. The USDA contrasts “high food security,” defined as
“no reported indications of food-access problems or limitations,”
with “marginal food security,” defined as “one or two reported
indications—typically of anxiety over food sufficiency or shortage
of food in the house [with] little to no indication of changes in
diets or food intake.”14 These two categories comprise the USDA
definition for “food security.”15
Similarly, “low food security” and “very low food security”
make up “food insecurity.”16 “Low food security” occurs when a
household “reports […] reduced quality, variety, or desirability of
diet [with] little to no indication of reduced food intake[;]” low
food security is sometimes referred to as food insecurity without
hunger.17 “Very low food security” refers to “reports of multiple
indications of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food intake”
and is sometimes described as food insecurity with hunger.18
The CNSTAT report defines hunger as “a potential
consequence of food insecurity that, because of prolonged,
involuntary lack of food, results in discomfort, illness, weakness,
or pain that goes beyond the usual uneasy sensation.”19
Importantly, the report clarifies that hunger and food insecurity
Comm. on Nat’l Statistics, Div. of Behavior and Soc. Sci. and Educ.,
Food Insecurity & Hunger in the United States: An Assessment of the
Measure 17 (Gooloo S. Wunderlich & Janet L. Norwood eds., 2006).
13
Id. at 43.
14
Definitions of Food Security, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv.
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/
food-security-in-the-us/definitions-of-food-security/.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Comm. on Nat’l Statistics, supra note 13, at 48.
12
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are distinct.20 Specifically, hunger is an indicator and a potential
outcome of food insecurity and is a condition that researchers and
agencies must study on an individual level and separate from food
insecurity.21
This article will use both the terms “food insecurity” and
“hunger.” While “food insecurity” will typically describe the
conditions described above as “low food security” and “very
low food security,” some referenced research may use other
definitions of food insecurity and those will be distinguished
as appropriate. This article will also use the term “hunger” as
described above, as the prolonged, involuntary lack of food. As
described by CNSTAT,22 food insecurity usually, but not always,
causes hunger. As such, this article will often use both terms.
However, the program proposed in this article can only target
food insecurity and the hunger resulting thereof.
B. Food Insecurity and Hunger on Campus
There is a significant lack of data regarding the overall
problem of hunger and food insecurity on college campuses.
Many schools’ researchers have collected data on the hunger and
food insecurity for a specific campus.23 This research is important
for effective policy advocacy. One study, and subsequent report,
aggregated the data of thirty-four campuses — both community
colleges and four-year universities — and found 48% of students
at those institutions are food insecure.24 While that survey states
its data may skew toward over-representing food insecure
Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
See e.g., Kate K Diamond & Michael J. Stebleton, “Do you Understand
What It Means to be Hungry?” Food Insecurity on Campus and the Role
of Higher Education Professionals, The Mentor: An Acad. Advising J.
(Apr. 11, 2007), https://dus.psu.edu/mentor/2017/04/do-you-understand-whatit-means-to-be-hungry-food-insecurity-on-campus-and-the-role-of-highereducation-professionals/.
24
James Dubick et al., Nat’l Student Campaign Against Hunger &
Homelessness, Hunger on Campus: The Challenge of Food Insecurity
for College Students 7 (2016), http://studentsagainsthunger.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Hunger_On_Campus.pdf.
20
21
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students,25 that data is not grossly inconsistent with the findings of
other, narrow- scope studies. Recently, the Wisconsin Hope Lab
published a broad study on campus hunger.26 That study found that
36% of four-year university students experience food insecurity.27
Other studies estimate a range of food insecurity on campus from
14% to 59%, with most studies finding food insecurity in the midthirties percent range.28
In addition to the limited number and scope of studies,
the data on food insecurity and hunger on college campuses is
lacking in other ways. The data to date suffers from four major
inadequacies and inconsistencies, which make aggregating
studies from various institutions difficult. First, current studies
inquire about food insecurity over inconsistent durations — from
one month to one year.29 Secondly, the studies that do aggregate
Id at 15.
See Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 17.
27
Id. at 10.
28
See, e.g., Alisha Gaines et al., Examining the Role of Financial Factors,
Resources and Skills in Predicting Food Security Status among College
Students, 38 Int’l J. of Consumer Studies 374, 379 (2014) (finding 14%
food insecurity at the University of Alabama); Meg Bruening et al., Factors
Related to the High Rates of Food Insecurity among Diverse, Urban College
Freshmen, 116 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics 1450, 1452 (2016)
(finding 32% food insecurity over one month and 37% food insecurity
over three months at Arizona State University); Loran Mary Morris et al.,
The Prevalence of Food Security and Insecurity Among Illinois University
Students, 48 J. of Nutrition Educ. & Behavior 376, 379 (2016) (finding
35% food insecurity across four public Illinois universities); A. Hillmer et al.,
Prevalence of Food Insecurity Among College Students at a Small Midwestern
University, Suppl. 1—Abstracts 117 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics
A-92 (2017) (finding 37.5% food insecurity at a small Midwestern University);
Linda L. Knol et al., Food Insecurity, Self-rated Health, and Obesity among
College Students, 48 Am. J. of Health Educ. 248, 251 (2017) (finding 37.6%
food insecurity at the University of Alabama); R. Holland et al., Prevalence
of Food Insecurity among College Students at a Southeastern University,
Suppl. 1—Abstracts 117 J. of the Acad. of Nutrition & Dietetics A-93
(2017) (finding 48% food insecurity at a Southeastern University); Megan M.
Patton-Lopez et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Food Insecurity Among
Students Attending a Midsize Rural University in Oregon, 46 J. of Nutrition
Educ. & Behavior 209, 210 (Nov. 2014) (finding 59% food insecurity at a
midsize, rural university in Oregon — this study includes students enrolled in
academic programs other than 4-year undergraduate).
29
See, e.g., Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 10 (one month); Gaines et
al., supra note 29, at 378 (twelve months); Bruening et al., supra note 29, at
1452 (one month and three months); Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378 (nine
months); A. Hillmer et al., supra note 29; Knol et al., supra note 29, at 250
25

26
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information may include four-year universities, two-year
programs, and graduate students. This is particularly relevant
here, because only students enrolled in four-year undergraduate
programs are excluded explicitly from participation in SNAP,30
see below for more information. The recent Wisconsin Hope
study did aggregate several schools and separated data of fouryear and two-year institutions.31 However, even that study only
included 35 four-year institutions of the over three thousand fouryear institutions in the country.32 Additionally, much of the data
skews toward female students or other demographics.33 Finally,
the inconsistency in recruitment and small sample sizes yield
inconsistent results.34
The studies mentioned in this article do consistently
use a USDA-defined methodology of determining rates of food
insecurity. This allows additional researchers and commentators
to compare roughly the data from a variety of studies and reports.
However, campus food security studies would be stronger if a
single entity collected the data and further standardized it. The
Department of Education should collect this data for every student
in the United States. The Department of Education already collects
(twelve months); R. Holland et al., supra note 29 (twelve months); PattonLopez et al., supra note 29, at 210 (did not disclose duration).
30
7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) (2015).
31
Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 7.
32
Id.; Thomas D. Snyder et al., Digest of Education Statistics 2015 62
tbl. 105.50 (51st ed. 2016) (table titled “Number of educational institutions, by
level and control of institution: Selected years, 1980-81 through 2013-14”),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016014.pdf.
33
See, e.g., Goldrick-Rab et al., supra note 2, at 8 (over-represents female
students); Gaines et al., supra note 29, at 379 (over-represents female students
and seniors); Bruening et al., supra note 29, at 1452 (likely over-represents
female students); Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378 (likely over-represents
female students, over-represents white students); Knol et al., supra note 29,
at 251 (likely over-represents female students); Holland et al., supra note 29;
Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 210 (over-represents female students).
34
See, e.g., Gaines et al., supra note 29, at 379 (finding 14% food insecurity at
the University of Alabama); Knol et al., supra note 29, at 251 (finding 37.6%
food insecurity at the University of Alabama). These studies were only three
years apart and at the same institution. Yet, they show vastly different statistics
about the number of food insecure students at the University of Alabama. It
is not likely that campus food security would change that dramatically over
that time.
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over thirty datasets; including student migration, demographics,
and parental financial status.35
Finally, and importantly, participation in a universitysponsored meal plan does little to curb food insecurity.36 Meal
plans, participation in which is often required for first- and secondyear students at four-year universities, typically include an option
to receive only seven to ten meals per week. These smaller meal
plans cost less over the semester, though more per meal, and are,
therefore, a frequent choice of low-income students who are more
likely to be food insecure. These students may be getting by on
little more than one good meal per day. Additionally, the dining
hall system relies on students receiving meals at designated food
service locations, rather than cooking for themselves in kitchens.
In addition to the costs associated with dining hall meals, students
are losing valuable skills necessary for life after college.
Researchers have long focused on the impact of food
insecurity as it relates to academic and social performance in
children.37 Some recent studies have similarly examined the
association of food insecurity and academic performance on
college campuses.38 These studies have found a strong correlation
between food security and grade point average.39

DataLab, Inst. of Educ. Sciences: Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., https://
nces.ed.gov/datalab/ (last visited May 17, 2018).
36
Dubick et al., supra note 25, at 8.
37
See e.g., Diana F. Jyoti et al., Food Insecurity Affects School Children’s
Academic Performance, Weight Gain, and Social Skills, 135 J. of Nutrition
2831 (2005) (finding that food insecurity in kindergarten predicts imparted
academic performance).
38
Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378; Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at
210.
39
Morris et al., supra note 29, at 378; Patton-Lopez et al., supra note 29, at 212.
35
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Figure 1. Grade Point Average Distribution by Food
Security.40

In addition to the clear academic disadvantage for individual
students who are affected by food insecurity and hunger, the
difference in academic performance could have broader societal
implications. Students who experience food insecurity are more
likely to be low-income.41 A positive correlation between students
with reduced food security and lower grade point averages likely
means low-income correlates with lower grade point average.
Grade point averages can be loosely associated with salary, where
higher grades result in higher salaries and lower grades in lower
salaries.42 Additionally, these students may have lower educational
attainment, as grade point averages are critical in admission to
professional degree programs. Due to difficulties in securing
higher paying entry-level positions or obtaining graduate degrees,
Morris et al., supra note 29 (table created from data found in article).
See generally Dubick et al., supra note 25.
42
See Philip L. Roth & Richard L. Clarke, Meta-Analyzing the Relation
between Grades and Salary, 53 J. of Vocational Behavior 386, 396 (1998).
40
41
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low-income and food insecure students may also have reduced
earning potential. This could widen the income gap and further
reinforce a cycle of poverty among low-income individuals, even
those with college degrees.
Despite the inadequacies in data regarding food insecurity
and hunger on campuses, the existing data is conclusive on the
severity of the problem. The exact statistics of food insecurity and
hunger may vary, but any public health issue that affects between
14% and 59% of students demands attention. This is particularly
concerning due to this public health issue’s effect on academic
performance and earning potential.
C. Economic Burden of Providing Food on Campus
Media outlets and politicians have recently taken up the
charge of the student debt crisis.43 According to the Department of
Education, in the fourth quarter of 2017, there were 42.6 million
recipients with $1.37 trillion in outstanding federal student loan
debt.44 This averages to more than $32,000 of student loan debt per
recipient, just in federal loans.45 In 2007, the average outstanding
debt was a mere $18,233 per recipient. The increase to an average
debt over $32,000 for every individual with federal student loan
debt represents an increase of 76% in just ten years.46
The dramatic and sudden increase in federal student loan
debt mirrors similarly dramatic and sudden increases in tuition.
Based upon the average advertised cost of four-year universities,
See e.g., Elizabeth Bernstein, The Price of Admission, Wall St J. (Apr. 2, 2004),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SB108085665347972031.
htm; Lee Siegel, Why I Defaulted on My Student Loans, N.Y. Times (June 6,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/why-i-defaultedon-my-student-loans.html; It’s Time to Make College Tuition Free and Debt
Free, Bernie Sanders, https://berniesanders.com/issues/its-time-to-makecollege-tuition-free-and-debt-free/ (last visited May 16, 2018); Jack Herrera,
How Republicans and Democrats Plan to Attack Student Debt, USA Today
(Aug. 3, 2016), http://college.usatoday.com/2016/08/03/how-republicans-anddemocrats-plan-to-attack-student-debt/.
44
See Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal
Student Aid, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio
(last visited May 16, 2018).
45
Id.
46
Id.
43
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in the last ten years, tuition and fees have increased about 37%
and 26% at public and private universities, respectively, even
after being controlled for inflation.47 School tuition increased
most strikingly for the 2009-10 academic year, at the peak of the
economic recession, when low- and mid-income students could
least afford the increase. In that year alone, private universities
increased tuition and fees by 5.9% and advertised tuition at public
universities increased a staggering 9.5%.48
Beyond tuition, many students pay room and board
to attend a four-year university. The cost of room and board
comprises a significant amount of the total cost of attendance at a
university. In terms of percentage, room and board are 52% and
26% at public and private universities, respectively, of the total
bill for a year of university attendance.49 Following the trend of
tuition, room and board has also dramatically outpaced the rate
of inflation. Between the 2007-08 and 2017-18 academic years,
room and board costs increased 25% and 21% at public and
private universities, respectfully.50 In the academic year 20142015, the average four-year student paid $4,412 and $5,021 at
public and private universities, respectively, for board (meals);
making it about half of the cost of room and board.51 Over a ninemonth academic year, board costs about $115 and $131 per week
at public and private universities, respectfully.52
Each month, the USDA issues a report that details the
cost of food when cooking at home, called the Official USDA
Food Plans. The reports include four budget levels: the “Liberal
Tuition and Fees and Room and Board over Time, College Board, Trends
in Higher Education (2017), https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/
figures-tables/tuition-fees-room-and-board-over-time.
48
Id.
49
See id.
50
See id.
51
Thomas D. Snyder et al., Inst. of Educ. Sciences, Nat’l Ctr. For Educ.
Stat., Digest of Education Statistics 2016 605 tbl. 330.20 (52d ed. 2016)
(table titled “Average Undergraduate Tuition and Fees and Room and Board
Rates Changed for Full-Time Students in Degree-Granting Postsecondary
Institutions, by Control and Level of Institution or Jurisdiction: 2013-14 and
2014-15”).
52
Id.
47
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Plan,” the “Moderate-Cost Plan,” the “Low-Cost Plan,” and the
“Thrifty Plan.”53 The cost of a campus meal plan is dramatically
higher than the USDA Food Plans — even “Liberal Plan,” has
an estimated weekly cost of $85 for a male between the ages of
nineteen and fifty.54 While the meal plans that offer fewer meals
per week cost less per week, the cost per meal increases.55 As
a result, in addition to the high cost per meal to every student,
students with the fewest financial resources pay the most for
their campus dining. The current system poses a dramatic cost
to students and exaggerates the student debt burden, but has not
been effective in alleviating student food insecurity.
The economic burden of providing food to college students
affects not only students, but may also affect their parents. Parents
are more likely to provide financial support to their adult children
when their children are in need.56 This often includes financial
and food insecurity. There is also evidence that parental support
of their adult children has increased over the past generation.57
See USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Ctr.
For Nutrition Pol’y & Promotion, https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/
USDAFoodPlansCostofFood (last visited May 16, 2018).
54
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Official USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food at
Home at Four Levels, U.S. Average, December 2017 (2018), https://www.
cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/CostofFoodDec2017.pdf.
55
See, e.g., Meal Plans: 2017-2018 Meal Plans, Williams College, https://
dining.williams.edu/meal-plans/ (last visited May 16, 2018) (Smallest meal
plan costing about $11.07 per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest meal
plan costing about $8.69 per meal over a 9-month academic year); Columbus
Campus Dining Plans, Ohio State Univ., https://dining.osu.edu/diningplans/columbus-campus-dining-plans/ (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest
meal plan costing about $8.38 per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest
meal plan costing about $7.75 per meal over a 9-month academic year);
Undergraduate Dining, Rice Univ., http://dining.rice.edu/undergraduatedining/ (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest meal plan costing about $8 per
meal; largest meal plan costing about $7.59 per meal); Traditional Meal Plans,
Arizona State Univ., https://sundevildining.asu.edu/meal-plans/traditionalmeal-plans (last visited May 17, 2018) (Smallest meal plan costing about $8.24
per meal over a 9-month academic year; largest meal plan costing about $7.75
per meal over a 9-month academic year).
56
See Karen Fingerman et al., Giving to the Good and the Needy: Parental
Support of Grown Children, 71 J. of Marriage & Family 1220, 1220 (2009).
57
Patrick Wightman et al., Univ. of Michigan: Inst. for Social
Research, Population Studies Center, Historical Trends in Financial
Support of Young Adults 20 (2013), https://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/
pdf/rr13-801.pdf.
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While proving such a hypothesis is beyond the scope of this article,
it is possible that this increased parental financial support might
correlate to increased university expenses and decreased financial
and food security. This means that even families whose students
do not take out student loans may face significant financial burden
due to the increasing cost of attending university.
Additionally, increased university-associated costs, such
as food and other expenses, means that parents who support, at a
higher rate than previous generations, their college-aged children
are diverting money from other expenses and savings, such as
retirement, to support their adult children financially.58 This
could cause an important economic ripple effect. If parents are
not saving for retirement until later in their careers, they must
retire later.59 This pattern might prevent movement and transition
at the highest-level positions in companies. Thus, if executives
are not retiring, mid- and entry-level associates cannot advance
and there is little space for new hires.60 This hypothetical chain of
events would further compound both the student debt crisis and
parental financial dependence by making entry-level employment
unattainable resulting in reduced income and greater likelihood of
defaulting on student loans.
Universities face similar burdens from the growing
expense of campus dining, a system that leaves some students
without consistent food access. In the competition to attract
academically successful seventeen-year-olds, major universities
are in an arms race for the best food and most interesting dining
experiences.61 The National Center for Education Statistics at
the Department of Education keeps data on university expenses,
but the Center combines campus-dining expenditures with other
Dan Kadlec, How to Avoid Paying for Your Kids Forever, Time (Sept. 10,
2014), http://time.com/money/page/parents-adult-children-financial-support/.
59
Id.
60
Stephen Miller, When Workers Won’t Retire, Workforce Challenges Arise,
Soc’y for Human. Res. Mgmt (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.shrm.org/
resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages//workers-not-retiring.aspx.
61
Cara Newlon, The College Amenities Arms Race, Forbes (Jul. 31, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caranewlon/2014/07/31/the-college-amenitiesarms-race/#380ced9c4883.
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expenses, such as residence halls, into “auxiliary expenses.”62
However, these expenses, which fund programs that should be
self-sustaining, cost public and private four-year universities
$3,090 and $4,819, respectively, per full-time student in the 20132014 academic year.63 With every university expenditure, there is
an associated opportunity cost; the same is true for campus dining
expenditures. When schools spend more money on dining, they
have less money to spend on instruction, research, or financial
support.
Quality education from a four-year university is an
expensive investment. The costs associated with higher education
affect students, parents, and the universities, themselves. However,
on many campuses, the high cost of postsecondary education does
not include reliable access to food. Students must feed themselves
on meager, but expensive, meal plans. Parents step in to offer
financial support when meal plans fail. Yet, universities spend
large amounts on a dining system that will always be outshined
by the lavishness of another institution and leaves many students
hungry.
D. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Approach
to Hunger
The federal government has many programs that work to
alleviate hunger and food insecurity across the country, with some
programs specifically adapted to regional and community needs.
The two with perhaps the largest reach are SNAP, authorized
through the Farm Bill,64 and the National School Lunch Program,
last authorized through the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act.65
This section and the next will briefly explain these two important
Snyder et al., supra note 33, at 748 tbl. 334.30 (2015) (table titled “Total
expenditures of private nonprofit degree-granting postsecondary institutions,
by purpose and level of institution: 1999-2000 through 2013-14”).
63
Id. at 745 tbl. 334.10.
64
7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2036c; Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128
Stat. 649.
65
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1769j; Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183.
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programs.
The Farm Bill is a large omnibus piece of legislation
that includes agricultural trade, agricultural commodity support,
agricultural conservation, nutrition, and other areas. The
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is one of the largest
programs in the Farm Bill and makes up the majority of the
Nutrition Title (Title IV).66 Nutrition spending comprises $756
billion over ten years or 79% of the total Farm Bill spending.67
Congress can amend SNAP with each new iteration of the Farm
Bill though the Nutrition Title of the Bill.
SNAP is a monthly benefit program. Each month authorized
state agencies provide eligible recipients with an allotment of
benefits loaded onto an EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer) card.68
In order to be eligible for the program, a recipient’s net income
must be at or below 130% of the poverty line,69 which, in 2018,
is $12,140 for an individual.70 The allotment of the benefits is
determined by calculating the cost of the USDA’s Thrifty Food
Plan,71 less 30% of an individual’s income minus deductions.72
For example, for a 20 year-old, the Thrifty Food Plan is $184,
if that individual’s income is $200 per month after taking into
account any deductions, the recipient would receive $124 per
month in SNAP benefits or $184 minus $60, which is 30% of
$200. The maximum monthly benefit for an individual in 2018 is
$192 and the estimated average benefit for an individual in fiscal

Id.
Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, in One Graph, Wash. Post (Jan.
28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/28/the950-billion-farm-bill-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.0a1dcbc9e994.
68
7 U.S.C. § 2016 (2012); see also id. § 2017.
69
Id. § 2014(c); A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/
a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits.
70
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines Notice, 83 Fed. Reg. 2642,
2642-44 (Jan. 18, 2018). 130% of the poverty line would be $15,782 for an
individual.
71
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 55 (for a male individual between 19 and
50 years old, the thrifty plan costs $184.60 per month).
72
7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (2012).
66
67
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year 2018 is $145.73 Once the state agency loads these benefits
onto the recipient’s EBT card, the recipient may then use that
card, similar to a debit card, to make approved purchases at any
approved food retail store, which includes most food in grocery
stores or convenience stores.74
SNAP has two limitations that are particularly relevant
to college students First, SNAP’s authorizing language explicitly
excludes students “enrolled at least half-time in an institution of
higher education.” 75 Some students are exempt from the blanket
exclusion of college or university students from SNAP if the
student works more than twenty hours per week, is not between
the ages of eighteen and fifty, or meets other exemption criteria.76
Second, SNAP is only available to able-bodied adults without
dependents for three months in a three-year period.77 Both of
these present challenges to using SNAP to prevent food insecurity
and hunger on college campuses.
There are certain exceptions to this general disqualification.
Importantly, students who work more than 20 hours per week or
participate in work-study may participate in SNAP.78 Additionally,
students who are parents or enrolled in some career or technical
education programs may also qualify for SNAP.79 However, only
27% of full-time students are employed and work more than 20
hours a week,80 and therefore, most college students are prevented
Letter from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director, Food and Nutrition Service, to All
Regional Directions of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (July 28,
2017), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/SNAP_Fiscal_
Year_2018_Cost_of_Living_Adjustments.pdf; see Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) – National Data: National View Summary, U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/
supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap (last updated May 4,
2018).
74
7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (2012).
75
Id. § 2015(e).
76
Id.
77
Id. § 2015(o)(2).
78
Id. § 2015(e)(4).
79
7 U.S.C. § 2015(e)(3),(5) (2012).
80
College Student Employment, The Condition of Education, https://nces.
ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_ssa.asp (last updated May 2017).
73
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from accessing SNAP benefits. Moreover, only 56% of food
insecure students are employed and only 38% of those employed
work over 20 hours per week.81 This means that 79% of food
insecure students are either not employed or work fewer than 20
hours per week. This exception to the general disqualification
of traditional college students does not reach most of the food
insecure and hungry students on campuses.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 imposed limitations on SNAP. The
act limits any able-bodied recipient with no dependents to only
three months of benefits within any three-year period.82 There are
certain exceptions to this restriction, including if a recipient works
more than an average of twenty hours per week.83 The three-month
limitation of SNAP benefits for non-working able-bodied adults
without dependents is called the “work requirement.”84 Under the
authorizing statute, state agencies are given the authority to waive
the work requirement in areas in which the unemployment rate
is over 10% or there is an insufficient number of jobs to provide
employment to all individuals.85
SNAP is a powerful food insecurity and hunger alleviation
tool managed by the federal government. Through the monthly
EBT structure, SNAP preserves individuals’ dignity and teaches
valuable skills in finance management. However, under SNAP’s
current design, it is unable to reach the food insecure and hungry
students at four-year traditional universities. The few exceptions
for students who work at least twenty hours per week are
inadequate to sustain food security.

Dubick et al., supra note 25, at 6.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-193, § 824, 110 Stat. 2105, 2323-24.
83
7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2)(A) (2014).
84
Id.
85
See id. § 2015(o)(4) (2014).
81

82
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E. Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act Approach to Hunger
Championed by First Lady Michelle Obama, the Healthy,
Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFKA) included several innovations
on the National School Lunch Program (NSLP).86 The NSLP
provides free and reduced-price meals to children while they
are at primary and secondary school. Chief among the HHFKA
innovations is expansion of automatic enrollment in the NSLP if
a child’s family participates in SNAP, Medicaid, Head Start, or
other federal programs.87 These students, who receive free lunch
without an additional application, are “identified students.”88 In
order to identify these students, HHFKA relies on interagency
communication and coordination.89 Further building on the
strength of the “identified students” system, schools could elect to
participate in the “community eligibility provision” (CEP). CEP
created a model in which schools with at least 40% identified
students could provide free lunch to all students in the school.90
HHFKA is an example of successful interagency
coordination. By eliminating administrative burdens for parents,
more students are able to participate in the NSLP. As will be
explained, SNAP could build on the success of this program by
similarly creating an automatic enrollment program based on
participation in other federal programs.
F. Federal Need-Based Postsecondary Education Support
Programs
Under Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda, the
federal government implemented and continues to maintain
several programs designed to help students pay for college.91
At the signing of the Higher Education Act of 1965, President
Lyndon Johnson said that Congress had opened a new door for
See National School Lunch Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769j (2012).
7 C.F.R. § 245.9(f)(1)(ii) (2016).
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219.
86
87
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young people and “it is the most important door that will ever
open — the door to education. And this legislation is the key
which unlocks it.”92
Many of these federal postsecondary education support
programs are available to all students regardless of financial need,
while others are reserved for students with demonstrated financial
need. Federal financial assistance is divided into three categories
— grants, loans, and work-study.93 The federal government
determines need through a formula by calculating the cost of
attendance minus expected family contribution minus financial
assistance from other sources.94 Typically, the government
obtains this information when students file their online “Free
Application for Federal Student Aid” or “FAFSA.”95 There are
five federal, need-based programs. Two of these programs are
grant-based and do not require repayment — Pell Grants96 and
Federal Supplemental Education Opportunity Grants.97 Two
other federal aid programs are low interest or no interest loans —
Perkins Loans98 and Federal Direct Stafford Loans (“Subsidized
Loans”).99 The fifth program helps students pay for college
when they work in addition to taking classes — Work-Study.100
Eligibility for these programs is not tied to the federal poverty
line, in the way that SNAP or the NSLP are, but is instead more
dynamic, reflecting both the cost of the education and financial
resources of the student.101

Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks on Signing the Higher Education Act
of 1965, Texas State University (Nov. 8, 1965), http://www.txstate.edu/
commonexperience/pastsitearchives/2008-2009/lbjresources/higheredact.
html.
93
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1070h (2012).
94
See id. § 1087-2.
95
See id. § 1090(a)(1).
96
See id. § 1070a(a).
97
See id. § 1070b-1(a).
98
See 20 U.S.C § 1087 (2012).
99
See id. §§ 1078(a)(2); see id. 1087e(a)(2)(A).
100
See id. § 1087-52(c)(2) (2008).
101
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087.
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II. Expanding SNAP to Meet the Needs of College
Students
As described above, the current system of feeding
America’s postsecondary students is expensive and does not
alleviate food insecurity or hunger. Many students, who are the
future leaders and current innovators of the country, face declining
academic performance related to food insecurity and hunger. This
section will propose a program that would allow more college
students to access food using SNAP benefits.
The partial solution outlined in this article to the problems
of hunger and food insecurity on college campuses is two-pronged.
The first prong removes the barrier for college students wishing
to participate in SNAP. This proposal eliminates the current
exclusion of traditional, four-year college students from SNAP
benefits by simply repealing § 2015(e) and creating an exception
to the work requirement.102 The second component of the program
actively facilitates enrollment in SNAP. Standing on the shoulders
of the widely supported HHFKA, states should automatically
enroll college students in SNAP according to data reported to the
federal government in applying for student financial assistance.
This section will describe each of these portions of this proposed
federal program to stymie hunger on campuses.
A.
Remove College Student SNAP Participation
Disqualification
First, Congress must remove the exclusion of four-year
college students from receiving SNAP benefits.103 Currently,
SNAP is only available to traditional four-year university students
without dependents if those students are enrolled in work-study
or work more than twenty hours per week.104 As described above,
these exceptions are quite small in comparison to the total student
population experiencing food insecurity or hunger. By simply

102
103
104

7 U.S.C. § 2015(o).
Id. § 2015(e).
Id.
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striking the language of § 2015(e), Congress would permit the
participation of 80% of food insecure and hungry students who
do not work more than twenty hours per week.
Congress must also exempt students from the “work
requirement” for able-bodied adults without dependents.
Currently, the issue of only receiving benefits for three months in a
three year window does not occur when making SNAP eligibility
determinations for college students. This is because the college
students who may currently enroll in SNAP are those who are
working at least twenty hours per week and, thereby, satisfy the
work requirement. However, if Congress made SNAP available
to all college students that demonstrate financial need, it must
also remove the work requirement for those students.
Congress should use one of three drafting strategies to
make sure that the three-month limit does not apply to university
students. First, Congress may accomplish this by adding “fulltime student” to the list of exceptions to the work requirement.105
Second, Congress could redefine “work twenty hours” to
recognize the over twenty hours of work per week that students
invest in a full-time course load. This alteration, however, would
require a formulation to adapt enrolled credit hours into working
hours and could quickly become complicated; for example,
two semester credit hours would convert to one working hour.
Alternatively, Congress could completely remove the 1996 “work
requirement.” The latter option is likely the least politically
feasible. As Congress debates its steps forward in balancing the
budget amid government shutdowns, a proposal to significantly
expand SNAP to all recipients would likely not be met graciously.
There is one existing loophole to the “work requirement.”
States may waive the “work requirement” in high poverty areas.106
As mentioned above, only about half of university students are
employed. This would meet the definition waiver requirement

105
106

Id. § 2015(o)(3).
Id. § 2015(o)(4).
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of unemployment greater than 10% in a particular area, 107
specifically within the university’s campus and student housing
areas. Seemingly, the size of the allowable area for a state waiver
is not defined and has not been tested in the courts. This would
be a promising option if Congress only removes the exclusion of
traditional college students from receiving SNAP, but does not
remove the work requirement. The drawbacks with this approach
are that it would rely on states to identify the problem of food
insecurity and hunger on campuses, and to act on that information.
This strategy would ultimately result in an unequal distribution of
SNAP benefits, with students in some states receiving benefits
and others not.
The best option is for Congress, in addition to repealing
§ 2015(e), to create an explicit exception to the “work
requirement.” This would provide the greatest access to SNAP
for college students in a way that simplifies the law, rather than
further complicates it. This strategy also has the greatest political
feasibility, to the extent that any SNAP expansion is currently
politically feasible.
B. Enroll Federally Supported Students in SNAP
The second prong of the federal program to enroll
traditional college students in SNAP revolves around the
direct enrollment of students. Because states execute the
eligibility determinations for SNAP,108 this plan requires that
state governments are responsible for the enrollment of college
students in SNAP. Similar to HHFKA, the program would
enroll students based on data obtained through other programs.
However, distinctions between HFFKA and automatic enrollment
of students in SNAP are necessary. Primarily, SNAP and NSLP
eligibility are both contingent on a particular income relative to
the federally determined poverty line. However, the need-based
programs through the Department of Education include the cost
107
108

7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)(A)(i).
Id. § 2014.
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of attendance in their need determinations and, as mentioned
above, this metric is dynamic, not static. Therefore, it would not
be practical for state agencies to directly enroll recipients in the “if
SNAP, then NSLP” manner of HHFKA. Instead, the Department
of Education compiles student financial data through FAFSA, and
state agencies could then use this data to enroll students.
In order for state agencies to enroll students in SNAP,
the Department of Education, which maintains student financial
records, must release the aid information to the necessary state
agencies. This plan would be similar to the successful interagency
coordination mandated in HHFKA. Drafters could use the
language directly from HHFKA, which requires appropriate
access to information and includes penalties for misuse of
information. The details of the FAFSA sharing scheme must be
defined by federal regulation. It would also be necessary for the
statute and regulations to define the exact criteria for automatic
enrollment; this would make the program more predictable for
students.
In implementing this two-pronged program, the federal
government could make strides in curbing food insecurity and
hunger on campuses. More needy college students would be
eligible for SNAP by removing the disqualification of college
students and altering the “work requirement.” Through effective
information sharing, state agencies could directly enroll lowincome college students in SNAP.
III. Benefits and Challenges of SNAP Expansion
The two-pronged approach of addressing SNAP benefits
for college students has many benefits beyond reducing food
insecurity and hunger on campuses. The next section will describe
what some of those benefits might include. The following section
is intended to describe some of the potential benefits and outline
where more research must be conducted to further understand
whether these benefits are achieved by SNAP access to college
students. The subsequent section will describe the administrative
hurdles of implementing the program outlined in this article.
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A. Benefits of SNAP Program for Undergraduates
The primary benefit of the program to students is the
alleviation of food insecurity and hunger during their college
years. However, the benefits may extend beyond simply providing
food. Students may attain greater financial independence, which
has the potential to instill a sense of dignity and build financial
management skills. Students may then matriculate from their
undergraduate programs with less debt. This reduced burden
might allow recent graduates to pursue public interest work
or other lower-salary positions. Allowing students to eat at a
lower cost may prevent the continued cycle of poverty related
to academic performance, as described previously. Additionally,
if students gain further financial security due to SNAP benefits,
those students may be less dependent on financial assistance from
their parents.
Beyond the financial benefits, participation in SNAP could
help students develop necessary cooking skills. If schools would
provide students with resident hall kitchens, those students could
develop and maintain cooking skills that are essential to healthy
and cost-efficient eating. These skills help contribute to life-long
food security.
Universities could also benefit from the expansion of
SNAP to low-income college students. Schools, who are concerned
about access to food on their campuses, will not have to contribute
funds to meal plans in order to increase their accessibility to lowincome students. The program also generally reduces the cost of
providing food on campus, by allowing students to participate in
smaller programs, supplemented by SNAP. Finally, this program
encourages schools to provide greater access to residence hall
kitchens and off-campus housing options. This may slow or end
the dining hall “arms race”, in which facilities that are more lavish
are necessary to attract academically competitive high school
graduates.
Some benefits may be less measurable; namely the
benefits to the program itself. University students are a segment
of the general population with substantial political capital. Once

178

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

these students graduate to become societal and political leaders,
their experiences with SNAP could inform commonsense policy
improvements in the future. These students would also come
to understand, by either first- or second-hand, the benefits and
drawbacks of federal entitlement programs. The program outlined
in this article could provide SNAP greater visibility nationwide
and decrease stigma among other recipients.
B. Challenges in Administering Undergraduate SNAP
Changes
Any policy proposal of this magnitude faces significant
challenges in its effective administration. Many of these
challenges can be resolved through continued research. One
possible difficulty with administering this program is that out-ofstate students may have to establish residency in a state in order to
qualify for that state’s social services. This process prevents fraud
by ensuring that non-resident individuals do not receive services
in more than one state. A possible solution to this problem may
be to restrict the program to only in-state students. However, this
alteration would shrink the program significantly and not serve
students who are food insecure or hungry. Another possible
solution is to grant eligible students temporary residency for
students during their four-year tenure.
College students often take longer to receive their degrees
than the expected four years. Politicians might be uncomfortable
with allowing students to receive benefits for an indefinite amount
of time. In drafting legislative language that expands options for
college and university students, Congress could limit students to
only receiving SNAP benefits for five years as an undergraduate
student or even require a particular grade point average to ensure
that the changes to SNAP do not incentivize poor academic
performance.
An additional hurdle facing the program is reliable access
to kitchens. Because current campus-dining programs require
students to eat meals prepared in dining halls, many students,
particularly underclassmen, do not have access to cooking
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facilities. Furthermore, SNAP forbids the use of benefits on hot
foods. Therefore, SNAP must be used to purchase raw ingredients
or packaged foods requiring kitchen preparation. This program
would require that universities provide kitchen-access to students
or permit off-campus housing. Residence hall kitchens could be
communal — for example, only one large kitchen per residence
hall — but all students should have access. Federal law could
begin to require cooking facilities in newly constructed student
housing facilities.
Lastly, many students file FAFSA and taxes as dependents,
even if they, in actuality, receive little financial support from
their parents. This may prevent students from accessing SNAP
benefits. Further research should determine how many students
this discrepancy effects. If a significant number of students are
affected, schools and states should consider simplifying processes
for undergraduate students to establish independence. One solution
could be that undergraduate students default to independent
status, similar to graduate students, unless the student and his or
her parents claim otherwise.
The above challenges to expanding SNAP to college
students are not insurmountable. Further research may help
illuminate the best path forward. Governments and institutions
must find innovative solutions to the problem of food insecurity
and hunger on America’s college campuses.
Conclusion
The status of food insecurity and hunger on college
campuses is alarming. The federal government is well situated to
make changes to the administration of SNAP. The recommendations
proposed in this article are to eliminate the disqualification of
college student participation and initiate an automatic enrollment
of eligible college student recipients in SNAP. This new program
has the potential to dramatically affect food insecurity and hunger
on college campuses nationwide. This article did not address the
federal economic impact of significantly expanding SNAP and
further research is necessary to complete a full economic analysis
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of the program described above.
Beginning with HHFKA and then moving to SNAP, this
program could be part of an eventual movement to consolidate
all federal benefits into a single FAFSA-style application. The
government could eventually even move to automatically enroll
eligible participants in federal programs when an individual files
his or her taxes.
The SNAP expansion outlined in this article is only
one proposed piece in the greater fight to end food insecurity
and hunger on college campuses. In addition to the points of
further research mentioned throughout this article, researchers,
potentially through the Department of Education, must work to
more fully understand the determinants of food insecurity on
college campuses.
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“It seeks for agriculture a normal income measured, not in
money but in exchange value—in real human satisfactions.
Because it has recognized this principle, the [Farm Bill] may be
justly termed a Magna Carta for the American Farmer.”1
Introduction
The 2014 Farm Bill felt somehow different from the sixteen
previous Farm Bills.2 In the few years leading up to its passage,
local-foods advocates across the United States seemed suddenly
called to action. The Seattle City Council convened community
leaders and quickly adopted Resolution 31296, official guidance
called the “Seattle Farm Bill Principles” that instructed the city’s
federal lobbyists to advocate for enumerated policy goals designed
to turn the upcoming Farm Bill into a tool of localized reform.3
Soon after, Seattle took its new Farm Bill platform to the National
League of Cities, who adopted it as NLC Resolution #201216.4 Across the country, cities rushed to adopt their own local
platforms: Santa Monica, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Duluth, Salt
Lake City, and New York City.5 Months later, the United States
Department of Agriculture unveiled its own local-foods platform,
the Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food Compass.6 With the
George N. Peek, Recovery from the Grass Roots, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
Agric. Adjustment Admin. 7 (Feb. 1934) (referring to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, the first iteration of the Farm Bill).
2
For a list of the seventeen iterations of the Farm Bill, see United States Farm
Bills, Nat’l Agric. Law Ctr., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills (last
visited May 15, 2018).
3
See Seattle, Wash., Resolution 31,296 (May 16, 2011).
4
National League of Cities, National Municipal Policy and
Resolutions 66–67 (2011), http://www.onehealthinitiative.com/publications/
nlc-national-municipal-policy-book-2012.pdf; Seattle Farm Bill Principles
Adopted by Council, to Go Before National League of Cities, Council
Connection (June 14, 2011), http://council.seattle.gov/2011/06/14/seattlefarm-bill-principles-adopted-by-council-to-go-before-national-league-ofcities.
5
Dan Imhoff, Food Fight: The Citizen’s Guide to the Next Food and
Farm Bill 192 (2d ed. 2012); Letter from Dean Kubani, Director of the Office
of Sustainability and the Environment, to Mayor of Santa Monica & City
Council of Santa Monica (May 8, 2012), https://www.smgov.net/departments/
council/agendas/2012/20120508/s2012050803-D.htm.
6
Tim Vilsack & Kathleen Merrigan, Introducing . . . . . The Know Your
Farmer, Know Your Food Compass, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Blog (Feb. 29,
1
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goal of supporting local and regional food systems, the Compass
helped all sorts of food-system stakeholders navigate agency
programs and resources, learn about changes going on in their
own communities, and read stories of the individuals transforming
their own local food systems.7
For the first time, it looked like communities of all types
had come together, empowered, to use federal legislation and
federal agency actions to transform their local food systems.
How long it would last, nobody could say. No doubt, though,
the surge had not been sudden at all. By the time Michael Pollan
began researching for his food-policy best-seller, The Omnivore’s
Dilemma,8 he thought he may have been too late. “Something
about the public’s attitude toward food and farming was already
shifting underfoot,” he wrote in the Washington Post, “and I
became convinced my book was going to be dated on arrival.”9
Thankfully for Pollan, he was wrong. Now, it is impossible to
imagine a discussion about food policy without acknowledging
the tremendous influence of The Omnivore’s Dilemma.10 But,
2012), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2012/02/29/introducing-know-yourfarmer-know-your-food-compass.
7
Id.
8
Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of
Four Meals (2006).
9
Michael Pollan, A Decade After “The Omnivore’s Dilemma,” Michael Pollan
Sees Signs of Hope, Wash. Post (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/a-decade-after-the-omnivores-dilemma-michael-pollansees-signs-of-hope/2016/06/06/85cdadfe-2c0a-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_
story.html.
10
Blake Hurst, Michael Pollan and His Faddish Foodie Followers, Ten Years
After The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.
nationalreview.com/article/438548/michael-pollans-omnivores-dilemmatenth-anniversary-edition-marks-decade-anti-science (“Ten years on, it is
hard to think of a book that has influenced the public conversation on food
more . . . .”); Susan A. Schneider, Reconnecting Consumers and Producers:
On the Path Toward a Sustainable Food and Agriculture Policy, 14 Drake J.
Agric. L. 75, 79 (2009). The book’s impact on the legal literature in food law
and policy is also noteworthy. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Goldberg, Administering
Real Food: How the Eat-Food Movement Should—and Should Not—Approach
Government Regulation, 38 Eco. L.Q. 773, 775 (2012) (“This Article represents
an attempt to take one step toward bridging the gap between the large and
complex regulatory structure that governs food production and sale of food in
the United States, on the one hand, and the fast growing and highly influential
food movement [made by popular by, most notably, Michael Pollan] . . . on the
other.”); Michael T. Roberts, The Beginnings of the Journal of Food Law &
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what Pollan was reflecting on in 2016, two years after the latest
iteration of the Farm Bill became law, were “some remarkable
changes [that] have taken place in the food and farming landscape
since the book was published in 2006.”11 Namely, the American
food system has begun an unprecedented process of selfdetermination.
Today, the Seattle Farm Bill Principles are a civic relic,
the platform’s website no longer accessible, and the Know Your
Farmer, Know Your Food Compass seems to have vanished under
Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue.12 Nevertheless, as we
attempt to show in this article, the seeds of food democracy have
already been sown and are beginning to sprout, and, as we show,
it is through the Farm Bill that these seeds are broadcasted. These
seeds, however, are scattered across a vast landscape. Although
Congress has shown its interest in promoting diverse representation
in American food systems, the methods to demonstrate that
interest are piecemeal, lopsided, and often temporary. Localfoods advocates and others concerned with transforming their
community food systems may look ahead brightly to future Farm
Bills, but more must be done to systematize the innovations and
advances made in localizing the Farm Bill. In this article, we
propose various methods Congress can use to focus its efforts in
localizing food systems by promoting diverse representation in
various Farm Bill programs and initiatives.
Policy, 11 J. Food L. & Pol’y 1, 1 (2015) (“The nascent, social food movement,
popularized in literature, media, and progressive circles, was just starting. For
example, Michael Pollan’s best-seller, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural
History of Four Meals, which galvanized tremendous interest food policy
and food studies, was published in 2006, one year following the Journal’s
inaugural edition. In short, the Journal was a novel, specialty law journal
attempting to lead the way of a food law and policy movement that was just
inching off the starting block.”).
11
Pollan, supra note 12.
12
The website that formerly hosted this program—https://www.usda.gov/
kyfcompass—no longer exists. Additionally, the USDA Center for Nutrition
and Policy used to provide access to this program at https://www.cnpp.usda.
gov/KnowYourFarmer. That website, too, no longer exists. The USDA
archives the program, though, which is apparently only accessible through a
search engine. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Know Your Farmer Know Your
Food, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/KYFCompass.pdf.
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Our intent in this Article is not to delineate foods that are
local or not local, nor is it to lionize one agricultural production
method over another. Rather, we hope to build on the literature that
for many decades has documented how local communities have
emerged as influential actors on the American food system through
establishing control over local supply chains often alongside
national and global supply chains. Such a community food system
are those “a collaborative network that integrates sustainable
food production, processing, distribution, consumption and waste
management in order to enhance the environmental, economic,
and social health of a particular place.”13 In this network, farmers,
consumers, and other community members “partner to create a
more locally based, self-reliant food economy.”14 Thus, when we
discuss food localization—that is, the so-called localization of the
food system, local food systems, and local foods generally—we
are discussing all at once community food systems.
We begin with Part I, which explores how some foodsystem scholars have conceptualized how these democratic
changes are occurring. We look to Thomas Lyson’s concept of
civic agriculture, which attempts to move corporation-oriented
communities away from the model of industrial agriculture and
toward a model in which individuals are locally empowered in
the land and marketplace. We also review Neil D. Hamilton’s
concept of food democracy, which, like civic agriculture, acts
as a set of alternative choices to the industrial food system and
allows for more localized control of the food supply chain.
Afterward, we attempt to connect two seemingly unrelated case
studies to demonstrate what a food system influenced by Lyson
and Hamilton could look like and how it could empower local
communities.
Next, in Part II, we turn to federal local-food policy.
Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education Program, Defining
Sustainable Community Food Systems, U.C. Davis Agric. Sustainability
Inst.,http://asi.ucdavis.edu/programs/sarep/research-initiatives/fs/sfs/
defining-sustainable-community-food-systems.
14
Id.
13
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We discuss why laws promoting local food systems are proxies
for laws democratizing our food system, and we then review a
selection of federal legislation, often originating in the Farm Bill,
that promote localization of the food system.
In Part III, we explore deliberative democracy, a
political framework that encourages the sort of participation
and representation conceptualized in food democracy and civic
agriculture. We then summarize the work of contemporary
schools who have identified how deliberative democracy has
been crafted by food-system participants. We highlight examples
from the American political process to demonstrate their current
existence in the food system. Afterward, we observe more deeply
how deliberative democracy has grounded federal agriculture
policy.
Finally, in Part IV, influenced by past Farm Bills and
historical agricultural policy, we propose various mechanisms
Congress can implement in future Farm Bills to further legitimize
its actions to promote localized food systems, as well as to provide
structure to the democratization efforts it continues to support.
Specifically, we propose various ways Congress can increase
diverse representation in the food system and federal agricultural
programs, which, through expanded access to decision-making
and the strengthening of self-determination among an array of
individuals, provide for further and enhanced food localization.
I. Democratizing the Food System
The food movement comprises countless individual actors
and independent groups, as well as coalitions and federations,
advocating for myriad issues, ranging from increased food safety
to greater concern for environmental effects of agriculture to
demands for more sustainably sourced crops.15 The collective
consequences of this advocacy has resulted in a remarkable
transformation of the food system, noteworthy for its substitution
of the dominant industrial food system. Scholars Thomas
Joshua Ulan Galperin, Value Hypocrisy and Policy Sincerity: A Food Law
Case Study, 42 Vt. L. Rev. 345, 355–56 (2017).
15
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Lyson and Neil D. Hamilton have conceptualized models of
these changes, both as attempts to understand the changes and
as visions of how these changes may further innovate the food
system. At the heart of their models—civic agriculture and
food democracy, respectively—is the self-determined, diverse
community exercising sovereignty over decision-making in the
food system.
A. Conceptualizing Localized Food Systems: Civic
Agriculture and Food Democracy
Two years before Pollan published The Omnivore’s
Dilemma, professors Thomas A. Lyson and Neil D. Hamilton
separately published their own descriptions of the shifts in attitude
toward American food and agriculture. Lyson termed these changes
“civic agriculture,” which referred to “the emergence and growth
of community-based agriculture and food production activities
that not only meet consumer demands for fresh, safe, and locally
produced foods but create jobs, encourage entrepreneurship, and
strengthen community identity.”16 Meanwhile, Hamilton termed
his own observations “food democracy,” a social movement that
encompasses (1) citizen participation in all aspects of the food
system; (2) the availability of information about the food system
with citizens making choices based on such information; (3) a
proliferation of choices for consumers, growers, manufacturers,
processors, and others in the food system; and (4) strong local
community engagement alongside robust federal food policy.17
i. Civic Agriculture
Professor Thomas A. Lyson presents civic agriculture
as an alternative model to the industrial model that largely
dominates the American food system (and, thus, the global
supply chain) today. For Lyson, this industrial model, which he
Thomas A. Lyson, Civic Agriculture: Reconnecting Farm, Food, and
Community 2 (2004).
17
Neil D. Hamilton, Essay—Food Democracy and the Future of American
Values, 9 Drake J. Agric. L. 9, 21–24 (2004).
16
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estimates began to replace small-scale family farming with the
passage of the Morrill Act of 186218 and the growing influence
of “scientific agriculture,”19 has resulted in an artificial emphasis
on agricultural inputs and outputs, favoring “commodities that
can be ‘mass-produced’ in accordance with the precepts put forth
by the neoclassical production function and that articulate with
standardized mass markets” and leaving behind “[n]onstandard
varieties or commodities that have not achieved ‘economies of
scale’ because they are too embedded in household or community
relations to get an ‘economically unencumbered’ reading . . . .”20
In other words, the industrial model of the food system “is framed
in terms of well-defined markets and constructed categories of
land, labor, capital, and management, which are organized to fit
the production function.”21
Condensing the food system into this industrial model,
Lyson believes, fails to account for the “community and household
relations that can and do structure everyday economic activities.”22
This community-centered economy is what Lyson calls the “civic
economy” of urban and rural populations, “a richly textured set
of intertwined household, community, and economic relations”
that are evidenced especially by countless community gardens,
farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture operations,
community kitchens, and U-Pick operations.23
Industrial agriculture and civic agriculture may be in
philosophical opposition with each other, but for Lyson their
co-existence is essential. Industrial agriculture comprises
“large-scale, well-managed, capital-intensive, technologically
sophisticated, industrial-like operations” that produce “large
quantities of highly standardized bulk commodities” by a “network
of national and global food producers” who will generate the
Pub. L. 37-130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3001).
Lyson, supra note 19, at 15-16.
20
Id. at 22–23.
21
Id. at 23.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 26–28.
18

19
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majority of gross agricultural sales.24 Civic agriculture, however,
includes “smaller-scale, locally oriented, flexibly organized farms
and food producers” who “will fill the geographic and economic
spaces that have been passed over or ignored by large-scale,
industrial producers” and “articulate with consumers demand for
locally produced and processed foods.”25
Civic agriculture, therefore, is an embedded local food
system—local agriculture and local food processing—that not
only provides income to the civic agriculture enterprises, but
improves the “health and vitality of communities in a variety of
social, economic, political, and cultural” forms that industrial
agriculture is fundamentally ill-equipped to account for.26
Accordingly, because of its community-centered focus, the
food system viewed under civic agriculture embodies the “civic
concept.”27 Such manifestations may include direct marketing,
integration into local networks of food processing, local producer
and marketing cooperatives, regional trade associations, and
community-based farm and food organizations.28 The supply
chain here is not concerned with global influence, unlike its
industrial counterpart; instead, the supply chain is controlled by
and for the benefit of the local community.
ii. Food Democracy
Law professor Neil D. Hamilton synthesizes his own
observations of the changing food system through political
participation.29 For Hamilton, “[t]he medium is food, but
the theme is democracy.”30 Food democracy, as Hamilton
Id. at 61.
Id.
26
Id. at 62.
27
Id. at 63.
28
Id.
29
Hamilton began writing about food-system alternatives and the move
toward local decision-making in the food system as early as 1996. See Neil
D. Hamilton, Tending the Seeds: The Emergence of a New Agriculture in the
United States, 1 Drake J. Agric. L. 7 (1996).
30
Hamilton, supra note 20, at 15.
24
25
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searchingly calls his food-system model, refers to the collective
effort of communities to promote democratic ideals through food
and agriculture.31 In other words, it “is a framework for making
food more responsive to citizens’ needs (health, access, quality)
and decentralizing control of production.”32 Such attempts at
embodying these democratic values are seen in the growth of
farmers’ markets and CSA memberships, the rise of chefs as much
famous for their dishes of food as for their dishes of social justice,
the proliferation of process-oriented food labels, the emergence of
buy-local campaigns, and the increase in farmers and consumers
engaging in direct commerce and community building.33
Food democracy comprises four essential traits. First,
because the success of democracy relies on citizens participating
in the democratic process and on their representation in making
decisions, food democracy requires that all stakeholders within
the food system participate in decision-making and have
their interests represented. Such stakeholders would include
consumers, food processors, farmers, food markets, workers,
and regulators. The interests of these stakeholders might consist
Id. at 16. As Baylen Linnekin points out, Hamilton “does not proffer a
succinct definition of the term . . . .” Baylen J, Linnekin, The “California
Effect” & the Future of American Food: How California’s Growing
Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13 Chap. L.
Rev. 357, 380 n.205 (2010). Despite this, the term “food democracy” was also
popularized by Tim Lang, who, believing that “food is both a symptom and a
symbol of how we organize ourselves and our societies,” wrote that the term
referred to “the demand for greater access and collective benefit from the food
system.” Tim Lang, Food Policy for the 21st Century: Can It Be Both Radical
and Reasonable?, in For Hunger-Proof Cities: Sustainable Urban Food
Systems 218 (Mustafa Koc et al., eds. 1999). See also Neva Hassanein,
Practicing Food Democracy: A Pragmatic Politics of Transformation, 19 J.
Rural Studies 77, 79 (2003) (“At the core of [Lang’s] food democracy is
the idea that people can and should be actively participating in shaping the
food system, rather than remaining passive spectators on the sidelines. In
other words, food democracy is about citizens having the power to determine
agro-food policies and practices locally, regionally, nationally, and globally.”).
Because of the strong similarity between Hamilton’s and Lang’s food
democracies—notably, both rely explicitly on alternatives and democratic
participation—we interchangeably cite literature referring to either author or
term.
32
Laurie Ristino, Back to the New: Millennials and the Sustainable Food
Movement, 15 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 1, 19 (2013).
33
Hamilton, supra note 20, at 16.
31
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of financial viability of small farmers, the workers’ wages, or
consumer preferences. “This means a food democracy seeks ways
to broaden the involvement and representation of all segments of
the food system in decisions.” 34
Second, since democratic participation demands the
availability of information and the ability of citizens to make
informed choices using that information, food democracy thrives
when stakeholders, especially consumers, question their foodsystem choices, uncover the reality of those choices, and adjust
those choices according to what they learn. Ideally, consumers
“have dozens of votes to cast for the food [they] buy [from] dozens
of polling places,” like grocery stores and farmers’ markets,
ideally favoring candidates “providing information and education
to the voters involved . . . .”35
Third, in order for a citizen to properly compare and
contrast the various voting choices, a democracy necessitates that
the voter have alternatives to choose from. Similar to Lyson’s
civic agriculture, Hamilton’s food democracy exists as an
alternative to the predominant industrial model of production and
consumption.36 But for Hamilton, the existence of alternatives is
essential to the success of his model, and the greater the choice
of alternatives, the more vibrant and democratic the food system.
This means that a robust food democracy includes not only
various choices of food, but of markets, farms, food processors,
and consumer education, as well.37
Fourth, food democracy exists on various levels, from
inside the home to national institutions. This means that citizens of
a food democracy—food democrats—make decisions regarding
local farms and local markets, school cafeteria criteria, national
food labels, the impact of their food choices on distant reaches
of the globe, and so on. Although food democracy is built on
local food systems, it comprises myriad levels of democracy and
34
35
36
37

Id. at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 22.
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varying localized civic efforts.38
Just as industrial agriculture stands as antithesis to
Lyson’s civic agriculture, so does Big Food stand as antithesis to
Hamilton’s food democracy. For Hamilton, Big Food constitutes
the businesses and institutions that currently dominate the food
system.39 Big Food’s behemoth industrial model, Hamilton
argues, is “in many ways anti-democratic” and thus anti-fooddemocracy.40 In an essay published a year after his first essay
on Food Democracy, he tells the story of the American public’s
reaction to mad cow disease in 2003 and 2004 as an example
of this argument.41 According to Hamilton, the shock of
realizing that bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), known
colloquially and notoriously as mad cow disease, could originate
in American beef surprised the American public in no fewer than
six ways: (1) “downer” cows, regarded as carriers of BSE, were
regularly processed at slaughterhouses for human consumption;
(2) the number of downer cows actually tested for BSE by USDA
was, at best, minuscule in comparison to the actual number
processed; (3) luck, rather than reliable methods, led to the initial
discovery of BSE; (4) animals suspected of containing BSE are
nonetheless carried through processing because of inadequate
storage facilities; (5) the meat Americans consumed often traveled
halfway across the nation to reach their dinner plates; and (6) pet
food was often made of the most detestable bits of “droppage”
that no human would dare touch.42 Had mad cow not swept the
American media, the public may not have been so surprised; after
all, Big Food, specifically Big Meat and Big Food Regulator,
preferred to keep these revelations concealed.43 Enlightened,
Id. at 22–23
Id. at 19.
40
Id. at 25.
41
See Neil D. Hamilton, Food Democracy II: Revolution or Restoration?, 1 J.
Food L. & Pol’y 13, 18–24 (2005).
42
Id. at 19–21.
43
Hamilton, supra note 20, at 25 (“Much of the economic and political agenda
of Big Food is designed to limit the information and choices available to
consumers, to restrict the availability of alternative products and markets, and
38
39
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however, the American public would soon force the USDA and
some large meat processors to shift their practices based on the
new available information.44
Fundamentally, Big Food and food democracy are at odds
with each other in three significant and irremediable ways. The
first is that Big Food opposes the consumer’s “right to know more
about food,” as seen in the mad cow episode.45 The second is
that Big Food’s products lack any sense of place or origin, which
is at the heart of local foods and local markets.46 And the third
concerns how food exists as an idea: Big Food regards food as
a definition for a product, but food democracy regards it as a
set of values or traits of the product.47 Unlike civic agriculture,
which requires industrial agriculture for its co-existence, food
democracy competes against Big Food for the preferred foodsystem model; Big Food is “threatened” by values that perpetuate
food democracy.48
Regardless of the actual potential for civic agriculture or
food democracy to flourish, both Lyson and Hamilton present
their models in conjunction with their observations of what has
already transpired. For Lyson and Hamilton, the localization of
the food system was already underway, and the time had come,
as Pollan also realized, to begin asking questions about how the
food system was being transformed and how local efforts were
steering its evolution.
B. Democratic Food Systems in Action: Two Case Studies
Both Lyson and Hamilton developed their models for
more democratic food systems in relation to a dominant paradigm
that, in many ways, is antithetical to democracy. Curiosity of
and concern with the effects of the industrial model’s erosion of
to assure consumers there is no reason for concern about our food.”).
44
Hamilton, supra note 44, 19, 22–24.
45
Id. at 34.
46
Id. at 34–35.
47
Id. at 35.
48
Hamilton, supra note 20, at 25.
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local decision-making and participation within the food system
has motivated others to determine whether models like civic
agriculture and food democracy ought to be given a chance
in rural communities or how rural communities might begin
shifting toward a more democratic food system. In this section,
we discuss how the unrelated studies of Walter Goldschmidt, an
anthropologist who studied the agriculture and economies of two
rural California towns in the 1940s, and Allyson Hayes-Conroy,
a twenty-first-century sociologist who attempted to introduce
civic agriculture to a small New Jersey town, illustrate the
practical consequences of implementing these models in specific
communities.
i. The Goldschmidt Study: Arvin and Dinuba
In the 1940s, Walter Goldschmidt was an anthropologist
at the USDA Bureau of Economics when the Bureau took the
lead in researching the economic problems and potential social
consequences arising from a federal law designed to promote
family farming in the West.49 Pertaining primarily to the Western
United States, this law held that water, developed through projects
of the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation,
would be made available to those holding 160 or fewer acres;
meanwhile, those with larger tracts had to take additional steps to
claim some of that water.50
Goldschmidt premised his investigation on a single
question: “Within the framework of American tradition, what
effect does scale of farm operations have upon the character of
the rural community?”51 To determine the answer to this, he
and his team analyzed the social, civic, political, and economic
conditions of two rural California towns, Arvin and Dinuba, that
Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and Political Power, in As You Sow:
Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 455–56
(1978).
50
Id. at 456.
51
Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and the Rural Community, in As You
Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 392
(1978).
49
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shared similar qualities, including geography, size, population,
proximity to major roads, variety of crops grown, total value of
production, and more.52
Despite these similarities, certain differences existed,
twelve of which Goldschmidt found noteworthy. Namely,
compared to residents in Dinuba, residents of Arvin tended to be
dependent on wages; have generally lower standards of living;
experience less population stability; dwell in houses and on streets
of general poorer appearance and condition; have less access to
community social services; possess poorer schools, parks, and
facilities; engage less often in community organizations; choose
from fewer religious institutions; express a lesser degree of
community loyalty; make fewer decisions on community affairs;
live in a greater degree of social segregation and greater social
distance between various groups; and shop at fewer retail and
other businesses in a marketplace.53
Goldschmidt began to address his question by scrutinizing
various social aspects of community life between Arvin and
Dinuba. For example, he concluded that a town’s incorporation
and quality of civic government “are important to this analysis
not only because they affect the lives of citizens, but because they
are indicative of the spirit and motivation of the community.”54
While Dinuba had robust civic engagement, Arvin had never
incorporated, which “undoubtedly finds its root cause in the lack
of any real civic unity.”55 As another example, he looked at the
recognized civic leaders of the two towns: In Dinuba, not only
was the school superintendent recognized as a leader at social
gatherings, but other teachers also served as leaders, such as by
starting a civic organization, youth services, or other community
improvements; yet, “lack of this type of leadership is constantly
made evident in Arvin. School and community functions suffer
from an inadequate number of public-minded and trained citizens
52
53
54
55

Id. at 287–91.
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 344.
Id.
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to supervise such affairs.”56
After cataloguing these several social and economic
differences between Arvin and Dinuba, Goldschmidt set out
to discover their cause. He looked especially at cultural and
demographic factors. In Arvin, eight out of ten families depended
on wages; but, in Dinuba, only five out of ten were wage earners.57
“These workers, especially those who are agricultural workers,”
Goldschmidt observed, “have little economic or social investment
in the community. Furthermore, they do not supply the leadership
for social activities, which almost without exception comes from
farmers and white-collar workers.”58 This discrepancy in the pool
of potential civic leaders is remarkable, because it influences the
cultural, civic, and demographic development of the community.59
At its core, though, this difference is “very largely a direct result
of farm size—a simple arithmetic certainty. For the number of
farmers that can be supported by a given resource base is a direct
function of the amount of resources each one controls.”60 In Arvin,
the large-scale of agricultural operations that developed there
“had one clear and direct effect upon the community: It skewed
the occupation structure so that the majority of the population
could only subsist by working as wage labor for others.”61 As a
result, this occupation structure, “with a great majority of wage
workers and very few persons independently employed and the
latter generally persons of considerable means, has had a series
of direct effects upon the social conditions in the community.”62
These direct effects, according to Goldschmidt, are reluctance
among residents to engage socially or economically with their
town and little incentive to motivate them to do so.63 “The
Id. at 351.
Id. at 401.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 401–02.
60
Id. at 402.
61
Id. at 415.
62
Id. at 415–16.
63
Id. at 416.
56
57

198

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

laboring population does not take leadership in general civic
action and rarely supports organizations that exist, out of a usually
well substantiated feeling of ostracism that results from the large
differences in economic status.”64 In other words, it is the very
structure of agriculture in Arvin—large scale farming operations,
absentee landowners, low-paid migrant workers, and clear class
distinctions—that contributed to the town’s social, economic, and
political nature. Consequently, the town’s social institutions and
retail trade are impoverished, and it is difficult for entrepreneurs
to become independently employed.65
The answer to Goldschmidt’s question— What effect does
scale of farm operations have upon the character of the rural
community?—resulted in what is today known as the Goldschmidt
Hypothesis.66 Based on his observations and conclusions,
Goldschmidt hypothesized that large-scale farming bore the
major responsibility for the social differences between Arvin and
Dinuba for several reasons. First, and most importantly, it created
the social conditions giving rise to social, civic, and economic
impoverishment.67
Additionally, large-scale agricultural
operations that dominate towns tend to produce company
towns, in which the communities depend almost entirely on that
business, and the conditions at the operations can directly affect
the conditions of the community.68 Finally, similar conclusions
by previous researchers in other California towns and a cursory
review of other California towns support these conclusions.69
Although Goldschmidt’s research was controversial as
Id.
Id. at 416–17.
66
See Linda M. Lobao, Michael D. Schulman & Louis E. Swanson, Still Going:
Recent Debates on the Goldschmidt Hypothesis, 58 Rural Sociology 277
(1993).
67
Walter Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and the Rural Community, in As You
Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 421
(1978).
68
Id. at 421. Goldschmidt points out that Arvin is not entirely dominated
by large-scale agriculture, since it maintains “a small nucleus of working
farmers” whose land would likely be held in large farms in their absence. Id.
69
Id. at 421–23.
64
65
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soon his project became public, his basic premise has remained
relevant.70 The differences between Arvin and Dinuba roughly
correspond to the differences that Lyson and Hamilton have
long observed. While neither town fully embodies one model
or its antithesis, Goldschmidt’s study has illustrated the practical
consequences of how a community’s food system is controlled,
designed, and incorporated civically and economically.
ii. An Attempt to Introduce Civic Agriculture to a New
Jersey Community
Inspired, in part, by the Goldschmidt Hypothesis and
Lyson’s work, Allison Hayes-Conroy, a professor of critical food
studies and geography, conducted a study in Burlington County,
New Jersey, to determine the extent to which a rural community
was willing to adopt a a stronger community food system.71
Hayes-Conroy conducted her study in two phases. The
first was in a case study, wherein she gathered county educators
and administrators and used civic agriculture as a “guideline for
discussion” to determine individual perceptions of actualizing
such an agricultural system.72 Her respondent group consisted
of 30 individuals, comprising equal parts men and women, most
of whom were in their 40s or 50s, and representing professors,
nonformal educators, educational administrators, and county
administrators.73
Through these dialogues, Hayes-Conroy
hoped to ascertain what the respondents thought about such “a
transformation, a movement in a different direction in regard to
the overall way people think, society functions, and land figures
on the horizon.”74
For a summary of the backlash Goldschmidt faced and the attempt by
various individuals and groups to prevent the study’s publication, see Walter
Goldschmidt, Agribusiness and Political Power, in As You Sow: Three
Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness 482–87 (1978).
71
Allison Hayes-Conroy, Reconnecting Lives to the Land: An Agenda
for Critical Dialogue 49 (2007) (discussing the Goldschmidt Hypothesis);
id. at 125–50 (summarizing her case study and discussion study).
72
Id. at 126.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 125.
70
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She made six separate inquiries. First, she asked about
the degree to which community members might notice ecological
activities, which she termed “place-based perceptual ecology.”75
She asked respondents to judge the ability of individuals in
South Burlington to “notice, comprehend, and identify with the
complexities of surrounding human systems and ecosystems.”76
The majority of respondents, although diverse in their individual
responses, generally agreed that Burlington County was
“deficient” in “attentiveness to human and natural systems,
including agriculture,” and many wondered whether collective
action could really make a difference to that deficiency.77
Second, she asked about the extent to which the attitudes
and passions of community members were affected by the
seasons.78 The responses to this inquiry suggested to Hayes-Conroy
that “the seasons will be an effective way to locate attentiveness
precisely because everyone must be aware of seasonal change on
some level. Furthermore in Burlington County many educators
do tend to conflate seasonal change with phases in the agricultural
calendar.”79
Third, she inquired into the possibility of adjusting the
specific professions of her respondents by proposing whether
agriculture could be taught widely across the curriculum; that is,
whether “agricultural seasonal rounds can affect what is taught in
classroom and in outreach programs.”80 Hayes-Conroy admitted
that many of the respondents saw no connection between
agriculture and their curriculum, but a majority were interested in
discovering how their areas of expertise could fit with agriculture;
moreover, Hayes-Conrroy found a few respondents were inspired
to “think holistically” about incorporating agriculture into the

75
76
77
78
79
80

Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128–29 (referring to “seasonal rounds”).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
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range of their work.81
Fourth, inspired by Wendell Berry, Hayes-Conroy sought
to measure how aware Burlington County residents were of
linkages between the natural world and the act of eating food.82
Most respondents concluded that the community was “culturally
inattentive” to these linkages, but several were personally inspired,
after making the link themselves, to consider how much the term
“agriculture” encompassed.83
Fifth, she asked educators about “localism through
food”—what they thought about “the potential effect of the
whole agricultural experience,” the combination of the changing
landscapes throughout the year, the act of cultivation, and the
purchasing of and eating of food.84 Hayes-Conroy found that
this issue was “quite contested” such that those involved in local
planning believed localism through food and farm already had
momentum, but those with less direct experience in farming and
no similar experience in local planning believed more cultural
awareness of local food and farm issues had “the potential
to affect sense of place or belonging, but that they have never
given it much thought . . . .”85 Moreover, all respondents were
skeptical that agriculture could be “culturally significant enough
to substantially affect those outside the farming community.”86
Lastly, Hayes-Conroy asked the educators and
administrators to consider “cultural reflection” of the ideas and
its significance to the community and its issues of “land and
landscape.”87 Overall, this inquiry exposed the most difficult
obstacle to “transformational learning” in the community—
that is, shifting cultural attitudes about agriculture and the food

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
83
Id. at 133–34.
84
Id. at 134.
85
Id. at 135.
86
Id. at 135–36.
87
Id. at 136.
81

82
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system.88 Several of the respondents appeared open to this wider
view of agriculture in light of cultural reflection, while others
voiced various obstacles “to furthered perceptual expansion in
this direction.”89
This first case study involving the preceding six inquiries
revealed three broad barriers to transforming a community into
one that adopts civic agriculture. These barriers are all rooted in
attitudes of individuals: (1) the attitude that social change is too
difficult; (2) the attitude that it is not one’s duty (for example, as
an educator or administrator) to work for transformation; and (3)
the attitude that agriculture and any of its potential ecological or
social effects is simply not important.90
Despite these attitudes, Hayes-Conroy found that
respondents were enthusiastic about thinking through her
agriculture-based questions, and many expressed an interest in
thinking critically about and reflecting on the cultural issues
implicated in them.91 Most of the educators, she found, believed
that interest in local land, landscape, and ecology existed among
residents, and that this interest could give the necessary support
to advance a community-wide dialogue on civic agriculture or
its values.92 For instance, pride in local food or locally grown
produce, appreciation of or nostalgia for local agriculture, and
the seasonal habits of purchasing and decorating could motivate
residents to take up such discussions.93
The necessity to bring together a representative sample
of the community, including antagonists and neutrals, to begin
that discussion process encouraged Hayes-Conroy to conduct her
second study.94 With support from a local community college,
donations, and volunteers, she organized a community forum
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 139.
90
Id. at 139–40.
91
Id. at 140–41
92
Id. at 141.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 141–42.
88
89
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centered around the theme of adopting civic agriculture.95 Open
to farmers, educators, landowners, business people, planners,
naturalists, politicians, students, and others, the community forum
included five break-out sessions, a keynote speaker to ground the
various issues into a common theme of transformation, lunch
with locally grown food, panel discussions, an open-floor Q&A,
and an optional end-of-day field trip to a historical farming site.96
The topics were similar to those presented to the educators and
administrators from the first study—seasonal awareness, farming
in the suburbs, agriculture across the curriculum, eating as an
agricultural act, and food security.97
More than 100 individuals attended, from the “progressive
Roman Catholic and conservative religious right, the struggling
horse farmer and the concerned college student, the electrician
and the professor, all side-by-side bringing up points that the rest
may not have otherwise considered.”98 Noticeably, though, there
were limitations in diversity and some “lifestyle” demographics
were missing.99
Overall, Hayes-Conroy found the responses positive.
Motivated attendees felt a “sense of inspiration” and they planned
“further programs on issues of agriculture and reconnection to
the land for the local area.”100 Additionally, the forum generally
recognized the importance of “wholeness” in the community and
in agriculture—“the need to include all voices was stressed quite
firmly at the forum; if a dialogue is to be ‘whole,’ in any sense
of the word, it must actively seek out ways to be inclusive.”101
According to early responses, stressing inclusion and wholeness
prompted a “sense of belonging in individuals from divergent
groups” and left “them with a sense of responsibility for land and
Id. at 143–46.
Id. at 144–147.
97
Id. at 144.
98
Id. at 147.
99
Id. at 149–50.
100
Id. at 148.
101
Id. at 148–49.
95

96

204

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

place.”102 In other words, assuring individuals in a community
that their opinions and decisions matter with respect to the local
food system may negate the attitudes otherwise preventing a shift
toward civic agriculture.
Goldschmidt’s study illustrates the potential economic
and civic benefits of communities composed primarily of small
farms owned and operated by community residents, especially
in relation to towns dominated by large agricultural producers.
Hayes-Conroy’s study identifies social barriers to transforming a
community into one in which civic agriculture may prevail, but
it also identifies how empowering individuals through inclusive
and democratic discussion and decision-making may reduce
those barriers. Taken together, these two studies illuminate how
communities can work together to localize their food system and
why doing so benefits them as individuals and as a civic body.
II. Legislating Local Food Systems: Federal Policies
that Localize Food
In Part I, we saw the theories that motivate communities
to localize their food systems and empirical examples of those
theories in practice. In Part II, we turn to how the federal
government has incentivized these community-centered food
systems, particularly through the various iterations of the Farm
Bill.
As much as they are prescriptive models toward which
sectors of the food system may evolve, civic agriculture and
food democracy are also normative explanations of how the food
system has been changing toward conceptual food inversion.103
Both Lyson and Hamilton explain that their models follow the
natural tendencies they had been observing for years. Since
first presenting their models of localizing the food system, the
Id. at 149.
At least one case study has been developed to analyze the practicability
of implementing a model of food democracy. See Neva Hassanein, Locating
Food Democracy: Theoretical and Practical Ingredients, 3 J. Hunger &
Envtl. Nutrition 286, 290–304 (2008).
102
103
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tendencies they witnessed and were inspired by continue to
unfold in dramatic fashion.104 While civic agriculture and food
democracy might be dismissed or explained away by myriad
arguments, the trends the two professors witnessed have remained
remarkably resilient.105
The flourishing localization of the food system has been
captured not only in the marketplace—seen around the United
States in farmers’ markets, community supported agriculture
and aquaculture, and public and private buy-local campaigns, to
name a few—but in every link of the supply chain. Much has
been written about the localization innovations in production,
Hamilton notes as much more than a half-decade after publishing his
first essay on food democracy. See Neil D. Hamilton, Moving Toward Food
Democracy: Better Food, New Farmers, and the Myth of Feeding the World,
16 Drake J. Agric. L. 117, 118–19 (2011) (“The goal of this essay is to consider
some of the current developments in the U.S. food system with an emphasis
on sustainability and its connection to food, farming and the land. Much has
happened on the American food and agriculture scene since I first about the
idea of food democracy seven years ago.”). See also Susan A. Schneider,
Moving in Opposite Directions? Exploring Trends in Consumer Demand and
Agricultural Production, 43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 400, 408 (2017) (“As
the food movement has taken shape in recent years, Hamilton’s prediction of
an ‘emerging food democracy’ has begun.”); Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting
the Law: Personal Reflections on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural
Legislation, 46 Creighton L. Rev. 563, 573 (2013) (“In many ways, the ‘new
farmers’ of tomorrow, the people I wrote about in the ‘New Agrarians,’ and
the issues of food access and informed choice (e.g., ‘food democracy’), are the
focus of today’s activists.”).
105
For theoretical and practical arguments against civic agriculture, see Carrie
A. Scrufari, Tackling the Tenure Problem: Promoting Land Access for New
Farmers as Part of a Climate Change Solution, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 497,
501–03 (2017) (arguing that obstacles to land access among new and small
farmers make civic agriculture a near-impossible model to realize); Laura
B. DeLind & Jim Bingen, Place and Civic Culture: Re-Thinking the Context
for Local Agriculture, 21 J. Agric. & Envtl. Ethics 127, 128-30 (2007)
(presenting several arguments related to the conflation of “local” and “civic”
among some proponents of civic agriculture); Morgan L. Holcomb, Our
Agriculture Policy Dilemma: The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History
of Four Meals, by Michael Pollan, 8 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 249, 274–75
(2007) (arguing against the practicability of a large-scale implementation
of civic agriculture and doubting whether small-scale farms are any more
environmentally sound than their large-scale counterparts). And for those
against food democracy, see Stephen Carpenter, A New Higher Calling in
Agricultural Law, 18 Drake J. Agric. L. 13, 34–35 (2013) (noting that the
pursuit of food activists “to be more egalitarian than the mainstream food
industry” may, on closer inspection, reveal uneven accomplishments rooted
in elitism); Hassanein, supra note 34, at 80 (summarizing arguments that food
democracy has no singular unifying focus).
104
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processing, distribution, marketing, as well as developments
among minority and urban populations. Such changes have come
to embody the current food system.
As Lyson and others point out, however, for longerlasting structural changes to occur, the American public must
reckon with its governmental policies that help perpetuate the
status quo. Cities and local municipalities have played increasing
roles in developing and promulgating policies that promote the
localization of the food system.106 The federal government,
however, has the most potential to alter the national structure of
the food system toward more localizing policies. In recent years,
the federal government, especially through the 2008 and 2014
Farm Bills,107 has taken recent steps to encourage its citizens to
take more local control of the food system. Specifically, it has
done this through creating programs that promote local food.
A. Local Food as a Framework for Measuring
Representation in the Food System
Local food, as useful shorthand for a rich and thematic
conceptual framework of community food systems, lacks any
uniform legal definition.108 When advocates, consumers, scholars,
legislators and rule-makers, and other food-system stakeholders
use the term, they often refer to distance or geography, but the
term encapsulates numerous other attributes, as well, including
who produced the food, how the food was processed, and other
meaningful characteristics related to the supply chain.109 Since
we consider community food systems synonymous with local
Martha H. Chumbler, et al., Urban Agriculture: Policy, Law,
Strategy, and Implementation 232 (2015).
107
See, e.g., Renée Johnson & Tadlock Cowan, Cong. Research Serv.,
Local Food Systems: Selected Farm Bill and Other Federal Programs
1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43950.pdf.
108
Susan A. Schneider, Food, Farming, and Sustainability 684 (2d
ed. 2016); Local Foods: Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research
Serv., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/local-foods (last
updated Oct. 10, 2017).
109
Schneider, supra note 111, at 684–85; Marne Coit, Jumping on the Next
Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local Food
Movement, 4 J. Food L. & Pol’y 45, 47 (2008).
106
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foods, local food systems, and the localization of the food system,
we also consider policies promoting local foods as policies that
promote community food systems. Specifically, this localization
of the food systems refers to local participation in the community
food system and local decision-making in the food supply chain.
While localizing the food system constitutes an array
of attributes related to agriculture, economics, democratic
participation, personal identity, and community problem-solving,
it is helpful to look at the developments in local-food policy to
understand the trends Lyson, Hamilton, and others witnessed and
wrote about. Given the numerous ways to delineate local from nonlocal foods, or even “local foods” from “locality foods,”110 clarity
can be fleeting. Nevertheless, the USDA Economic Research
Service (ERS) has identified at least four broad iterations of local
food: (1) distance traveled, (2) marketing outlet, (3) perceived
attributes, and (4) potential to address food deserts.111
First, local food as distance traveled refers to how far the
food had to be transported to arrive at the consumer’s plate. This
may, for example, refer to a specific number of miles, such as
those in the 100-mile diet.112 It can, of course, be much more
or much less than that. The ERS found a range of instances in
distance-qualifying local foods, from as little as twenty-five miles
from the originating location to as far away as 350 miles from it.113
Congress also relies on distance in the two instances it has defined
local foods.114 In the first instance, the 2008 Farm Bill115 defined
a “locally or regionally produced agricultural food product” for
the purposes of a USDA loan program as food traveling fewer
See Schneider, supra note 111, at 685.
See Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., The Role of Local and
Regional Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy 2–11 (2016), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44390.pdf.
112
See generally Alisa Smith & J.B. MacKinnon, Plenty: Eating Locally
on the 100-Mile Diet (2008); Alisa Smith & J.B. MacKinnon, The 100Mile Diet: A Year of Local Eating (2007)
113
Johnson, supra note 114, at 3.
114
See Michael T. Roberts, Food Law in the United States 387 (2016).
115
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122
Stat. 1651.
110
111
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than 400 miles.116 The second instance, the Food Safety and
Modernization Act (FSMA)117 defined a “qualified end-user” as
a restaurant or retail food establishment located in the same state
in which the food was produced or “not more than 275 miles
from such farm.”118 Although this is not an explicit reference to
local food, FMSA exempts certain small-scale farms from the
Preventative Controls Rule and the Produce Safety Rule based on
amount of sales to qualified-end users, and these transactions are
often entirely local in nature.119 More than a mere measurement
of how far the crow might fly, distance can also refer to a specific
region, such as within the boundaries of a state120 or some of other
“geographical indicator,” which describes not only the place
where the food comes from, but also the processes used to grow
or manufacture that food; often, a geographical indicator informs
the consumer of perceived quality, such as Washington apples,
Florida oranges, or Napa Valley wines.121
Second, local food as marketing outlet refers to the sorts
of marketing channels farmers use to distribute the food they
produced or manufactured to consumers.122 These channels
include (1) direct-to-consumer outlets, such as farmers’ markets,
7 U.S.C. § 1932(g)(9) (2012) (defining a local food as food produced within
a state’s border or “the total distance that the product is transported is less
than 400 miles from the origin of the product”).
117
Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
118
21 U.S.C. §§ 350g(l)(4)(B), 350h(f)(4)(A).
119
21 U.S.C. §§ 350g(l)(1), 350g(l)(2) (exempting a “qualified facility” from the
Preventative Controls Rule); 21 U.S.C. 350h(f) (exempting certain small-scale
farms from the Produce Safety Rule); Gregory M. Schieber, Note, The Food
Safety Modernization Act’s Tester Amendment: Useful Safe Harbor for Small
Farmers and Food Facilities or Weak Attempt at Scale-Appropriate Farm and
Food Regulations?, 18 Drake J. Agric. L. 239, 252–53 (2013) (discussing
motivation for these exemptions as arising from congressional concerns about
FSMA’s regulatory burden on local-food systems).
120
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1931(g)(9)(A)(i)(II); CT Grown Program, Conn.
Dep’t of Agric., http://www.ct.gov/doag/cwp/view.asp?a=3243&q=398984
(last visited May 15, 2018) (stating that, with farmers and producers meeting
certain conditions, “[f]arm products grown or produced in Connecticut may
be advertised or sold in Connecticut as . . . “Local” or “Locally-Grown”).
Nearly all states have their own “state-grown” programs. Johnson, supra
note 114, at 4.
121
Id. at 4.
122
Id. at 5.
116
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roadside farm-stands, on-farm stores, and community-supported
agriculture; and (2) intermediated outlets, such as grocery stores,
restaurants, and regional distributors.123 As part of the agricultural
census, the USDA collects sales information related to some
of these local-food marketing channels, particularly direct-toconsumer models.124 The so-called Locavore Index, which ranks
states based on local-food sales and consumption, is based, almost
in whole, on these direct and intermediate marketing outlets and,
in part, on the USDA’s data collection related to them.125 For
many consumers, the economic support of regional agriculture
and the community is the primary motivation for using these
channels.126
Third, local food as perceived attributes refers to various
social or supply-chain characteristics in the food’s production
that consumers deem desirable.127 Such perceptions are based on
the type of farm, the methods of production, the simplification
of the supply chain, the financial and social support of local
communities, the fairness of the food system, and, as Lyson
and Hamilton show, alternatives to the predominant industrial
model of food production. More concretely, these attributes
might include whether the food originated at a small or urban
Id. at 5–6.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 U.S. Agricultural Census,
Table 2: Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold Including
Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2012 and 2007 9 (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_
Chapter_1_US/st99_1_002_002.pdf (“Value of agricultural products sold
directly to individuals for human consumption”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2007
U.S. Agricultural Census, Table 2: Market Value of Agricultural
Products Sold Including Landlord’s Share and Direct Sales: 2007
and 2002 9 (2009), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_
Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_002_002.pdf (same). See also
Direct Farm Sales of Food: Results from the 2015 Local Food Marketing
Practices Survey, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Agric. Stat. Serv. (2016)
(supplementing 2015 direct-marketing survey with Census of Agriculture
data).
125
How Locavore Is Your State?: Strolling of the Heifers 2017 Locavore Index
ranks states on local food commitment, Strolling of the Heifers (May 15,
2017), https://www.strollingoftheheifers.com/locavorei.
126
Johnson, supra note 114, at 7–8.
127
Id. at 9.
123
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farm or with sustainable practices; others might mean support of
the local economy, farmland preservation, minimal harm to the
environment, use of alternative fertilizer and pest-control methods,
and products that provide fairer wages to farm workers.128
Finally, local food as potential to address food deserts
refers less to criteria delineating local from non-local food
and more to the advocacy for an increase role of local foods in
addressing concerns about access to healthy food in some lowincome or otherwise underserved community (so-called food
deserts).129 While this may mean passing tax incentives to attract
more food-retail outlets, improving already-existing food-retail
outlets by encouraging stocking fresh foods, or diverting from
the waste-stream to the supply chain, it may also mean promoting
programs that encourage these communities to become active
producers in urban agriculture or community gardening.130 Many
local food policy councils prioritize local food production and
consumption in addressing community hunger issues.131
Although “local food” lacks a formal definition, these
four categories demonstrate, at the very least, that local food is
rooted in a community’s identity of land, economics, political
and social values, and unified problem-solving.132 Although these
Id.
Id. at 10.
130
Id.; Philip Ackerman-Leist, Rebuilding the Foodshed: How to Create
Local, Sustainable, and Secure Food Systems 111–13 (2013).
131
See, e.g., Detroit Food Pol’y Council, Creating a Food Secure Detroit:
Policy Review and Update 8 (2017), http://detroitfoodpolicycouncil.net/
sites/default/files/images/DFPC%20Food%20Policy%20Document%20
021317%20%281%29.pdf; Marin Food Pol’y Council, Equitable Access
to Healthy and Local Food in Marin County: Preliminary Report
on Policy Priorities to the Board of Supervisors 2–3 (2015), http://
www.ucanr.edu/sites/MarinFoodPolicyCouncil/files/223505.pdf;
Getting
Food, Santa Fe Food Pol’y Council, https://www.santafefoodpolicy.org/
food-plan/getting-food (last visited May 15, 2018). The Los Angeles Food
Policy Council has developed an innovative strategy to encourage owners of
corner liquor shops to stock their shelves with fresh produce. See Healthy
Neighborhood Market Network, L.A. Food Pol’y Council (2018), http://
goodfoodla.org/policymaking/healthy-neighborhood-market-network (last
visited May 15, 2018).
132
See Roberts, supra note 117, at 386 (identifying ten related objectives of
the local-food movement).
128
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communities are not easily defined, their cohesion often seems
bound by the voluntary participation of producers, distributors,
retailers, consumers, advocates, and other members of the public
in coming together to transact and exchange information. At its
essence, then, local food is a proxy for the determination of a
community to govern its food system, to set the goals that its food
system should achieve, to design the infrastructure to support its
food system, and to strive for self-reliance in its food system.
B. Federal Policies Localizing the Food System
Since at least the 1930s, during President Franklin
Roosevelt’s sweeping New Deal reforms, the USDA has
experimented with encouraging more diverse participation in local
and regional food systems, notably in the face of more established
agricultural interests, primarily in attempts to alleviate rural
poverty.133 Not until the last decades, however, has the conceptual
structure of a local-food system emerged as a part of federal
action to increase participation in agriculture policy. Below is a
brief summary of the various actions the federal government has
taken to promote such a food system.
Federal policies and programs that support local foods
often do not specifically limit themselves to or target local foods;
instead, their breadth covers a wide range of food-system issues,
including those associated with local foods.134 Increasingly,
however, Congress and the USDA are carving out policies to
particularly support the localization of food systems. This section
identifies examples of both sorts. Because of the capacity of
many federal laws to attract local foods into their purview, this is
not an exhaustive list.

See Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 88–95
(1953) (discussing the work of the USDA Farm Security Agency in addressing
rural poverty through programs designed to make impoverished families more
self-sufficient, including promoting marketing and purchasing cooperatives,
increased farm ownership, and overall community development, as well as
focusing on bringing more Southern black farmers out of dire economic
distress).
134
Johnson, supra note 114, at 28; Coit, supra note 112, at 63.
133
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i. Promotion of Localized Food-System Transactions
Federal statutes regulating the marketing of agricultural
products, such as through commodity-specific price controls and
marketing orders, have been in place since the early twentieth
century, but this focus on transactions began to widen in the
century’s latter half.135 In 1976, when Congress passed the
Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act (Direct Marketing
Act), federal agricultural-marketing legislation veered away
from principally regulating commodities markets and expanded
into the broader category of local foods.136 The purpose of this
law was to “promote, through appropriate means and on an
economically sustainable basis, the development and expansion
of direct marketing of agricultural commodities from farmers
to consumers.”137 Additionally, through this new law, Congress
empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to create and maintain a
program “designed to facilitate direct marketing from farmers to
consumers for the mutual benefit of consumers and farmers.”138
The Direct Marketing Act effectuated this program by directing
the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate with state departments
of agriculture and local Extension Service offices for the
development of direct-to-consumer activities most needed in the
particular states.139 The activities could include, among other
things, (1) sponsoring related conferences, (2) identifying state
and local laws pertinent to direct-marketing and advocating for
improved legislation, or (3) providing technical assistance to
deepen understanding of direct marketing.140
The Direct Marketing Act is remarkable not only for its
authorization of $3,000,000 for these collaborative and local
programs, but it is an early example of Congress’ willingness
See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat.
31; Agricultural Marketing Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1282 (2006).
136
Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-463, 90
Stat. 1982 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3001).
137
Id. § 2.
138
Id.
139
Id. § 5.
140
Id.
135
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to encourage the activities of community food systems.141 In
defining “direct marketing from farmers to consumers,” Congress
noted several examples where such transactions occurred—
roadside stands, city markets, house-to-house marketing—which
existed “to lower the cost and increase the quality of food to such
consumers while providing increased financial returns to the
farmers.”142 To the modern locavore, these examples resemble
the current picture of local-food marketplaces, comprising
farm-stands, farmers’ markets, and CSA subscriptions. At a
time when direct marketing among farmers and consumers was
widely viewed as “a step backward into inefficiency,”143 the
Direct Marketing Act’s empowerment of the USDA to assist
local communities in localizing their food system, especially as
an alternative to the increasingly industrial food supply, began
to legitimize the importance of community-controlled local-food
economics and policies.144
In the years that followed, the American farmers’ markets
never succumbed to their alleged inefficiencies, and by 1992, as
they continued to flourish, Congress passed the WIC Farmers’
Market Nutrition Act, which amended the Child Nutrition Act of
1966,145 and created the WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program
(WIC Nutrition Program) to both expand the public’s awareness
for farmers’ markets and “provide resources to women, infants,
and children who are nutritionally at risk in the form of fresh
nutritious unprepared foods (such as fruits and vegetables), from

Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-463, §
7(b), 90 Stat. 1982, 1984 (authorizing $1,500,000 “for each of the fiscal years
ending” in 1977 and 1978).
142
Id. § 3.
143
Allison Brown, Counting Farmers Markets, 91 Geographical R. 655, 669
(2001).
144
For an excellent analysis of the role of farmers’ markets across the United
States during the period leading up to the passage of the Farmer-to-Consumer
Direct Marketing Act and speculation about their demise in the face of the
industrialized food-supply chain, see Jane Pyle, Farmers’ Markets in the
United States: Functional Anachronisms, 61 Geographical R. 167 (1971).
145
WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-314, 106 Stat.
280.
141
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farmers’ markets . . . .”146 Specifically, Congress authorized
funding for grants that states could use, in coordination with the
USDA, to create programs in which qualified beneficiaries could
exchange coupons for locally grown food.147 States could only
use these grants, however, if they agreed to contribute their own
dollars to fund the programs.148 In 1998, Congress reauthorized
the WIC Nutrition Program, thus solidifying its role in supporting
local-food systems.149 With the passage of the WIC Farmers’
Market Nutrition Act, Congress now found itself as a direct funder
of local-foods system.
Also, in 1998, the USDA National Commission on
Small Farms recognized the significance of locally grown food
on local communities, and it developed a thorough policy vision
to promote local-food systems. Specifically, it urged the USDA
“to develop an interagency initiative to promote and foster local
and regional food systems featuring farmers markets, community
gardens, Community Supported Agriculture, and direct marketing
to school lunch programs.”150 Among the principles guiding
these policies were developing relationships between farmers and
consumers, strengthening rural communities, fostering sustainable
farming practices, creating diverse market outlets, and expanding
opportunities to all Americans to engage in farming.151
Just four years later, Congress amended the Direct
Marketing Act through the 2002 Farm Bill152 and created the
Farmers Market Promotion Program (FMPP). The FMPP was
added to the Direct Marketing Act to “develop . . . new farmers’
markets, roadside stands, community-supported agriculture
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
148
Id.
149
William F. Goodling Child Nutrition Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L.
105-336, § 203(o), 112 Stat. 3143, 3163-64.
150
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Comm’n on Small Farms, A Time to Act:
A Report of the USDA National Commission on Small Farms (1998),
https://www.iatp.org/files/258_2_106175.pdf (the report is not paginated).
151
Id. (search for “Guiding Principles for Federal Farm Policy”).
152
Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, 116
Stat. 134.
146
147
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programs, and other direct-to-consumer infrastructure.”153 The
grants created to put the program into force could be awarded
to a variety of entities, such as local governments, nonprofit
organizations, an agricultural cooperative, or an economic
development corporation.154 Moreover, it instructed the Secretary
of Agriculture to work with states to train farmers’ market
managers, assist local Extension Service office in developing
marketing techniques, and to help local producers develop
farmers’ markets.155 Congress gave the Secretary of Agriculture
discretion to establish the guidelines and criteria of the FMPP.156
Initially, Congress authorized that the FMPP be funded from
2002 through 2006; however, the program did not receive funds
until Congress provided $1 million in 2005.157 It continued to
reauthorize funding for the FMPP in the 2008 and 2014 Farm
Bills, as well.158
In addition to establishing and funding the FMPP, the
2002 Farm Bill also created the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition
Program (Senior Nutrition Program). The Senior Nutrition
Program, like the FMPP, amended the Direct Marketing Act.159
The purposes of the Senior Nutrition Program were numerous;
some reiterated the desire to expand local direct-to-consumer
marketplaces, while another explicitly promoted local foods,
specifically to “provide resources in the form of fresh, nutritious,
unprepared, locally grown fruits, vegetables, and herbs” at these
marketplaces.160 Congress authorized $5,000,000 in 2002 and
$15,000,000 each year from 2003 to 2007 to support this nutrition
7 U.S.C. § 3005(b)(1)(B) (2002).
Id. § 3005(c).
155
Id. § 3004(b).
156
Id. § 3005(d).
157
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Agric. Marketing Serv., Farmers Market
Promotion Program: 2016 Report 2 (2017).
158
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 10003, 128 Stat. 649, 940-41;
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 10106, 122
Stat. 1651, 2098-99.
159
See 7 U.S.C. § 3007 (2002).
160
Id. § 3007(b).
153

154
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program.161 As with the FMPP, it was up to the USDA to figure
out how this program would work.162 In December 2006, the
USDA Food and Nutrition Service finalized its rule, just in time
to begin its operation at the start of 2007.163 The 2008 Farm Bill164
not only reauthorized funding for this program with $20,600,000
for each year through 2012,165 but it provided tax benefits, as
well: purchases of qualifying food would not be subject to state
or local sales taxes, and the economic benefits conferred on senior
individuals would not be subject to local, state, or federal income
tax.166 One small, but noteworthy amendment also included
the addition of honey as a qualifying food.167 By adding honey,
Congress once again recognized the actual activities occurring
within local-food systems: in the face of honeybee colony
collapse, many communities supported the sweet pay-offs of their
local apiarists at their weekly farmers markets.168
The 2002 Farm Bill also looped in the WIC Nutrition
Program by providing it mandatory funding.169 With an eye
toward expanding the program and supporting local communities
addressing hunger issues through local foods, Congress directed
the USDA to examine the potential of food-stamps funded
transactions at farmers’ markets, by way of the electronic benefits
transfer (EBT) systems.170 This instruction came as the USDA
Id. § 3007(a).
Id. § 3007(c).
163
See Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program Regulations: Final Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. 74,618. 74,618 (Dec. 12, 2006) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 249).
164
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, 122 Stat.
923.
165
7 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2008).
166
Id. § 3001(c), (d).
167
Id. § 3001(b)(1).
168
See, e.g., MJ Paul Espinoza, The Honey Ladies: Saving Bay Area Bees One
Swarm at a Time, Ctr. for Urban Educ. about Sustainable Agric. (June
16, 2017), https://cuesa.org/article/honey-ladies-saving-bay-area-bees-oneswarm-time; Emily Sunblade, Local Beekeeper Saving Bees, Serving Honey
at Farmers Market, Patch Media (last updated Aug. 9, 2011), https://patch.
com/illinois/bolingbrook/thousands-of-ladies-one-beekeeper.
169
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4307,
116 Stat. 134, 332; 42 U.S.C. § 1786(m)(9)(A) (2002).
170
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4111(b)
161

162
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was shifting away from paper coupons and toward the paperless
EBT platform.171 Two years later, the Child Nutrition and WIC
Reauthorization Act of 2004 extended this mandatory funding
through fiscal year 2009, thus ensuring federal support of localfood systems for several years to come.172 While the 2008 Farm
Bill reauthorized the Senior Nutrition Program, it did not touch
the WIC Nutrition Program; rather, the WIC Nutrition Program
would not receive an extension until two years later through the
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010.173 Under the 2010 law,
Congress made funds available for the program through fiscal
year 2015. 174
The 2014 Farm Bill extended funding for the Senior
Nutrition Program, it did not do the same for the WIC Nutrition
Program.175 At the same time, the 2014 Farm Bill amended the
2008 Farm Bill to create the Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive
(FINI).176 FINI is a grant program that “supports projects to
increase the purchase of fruits and vegetables among lowincome consumers participating in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) by providing incentives at the point
of purchase.”177 Grantees eligible for the millions of dollars in
funding include farmers’ markets and community-supported
(3)(A), 116 Stat. 134, 309.
171
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Food & Nutrition Serv., Nutrition Assistance in
Farmers Markets: Understanding Current Operations: Final Report 2
(2013), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/FarmersMarketsOps.
pdf.
172
42 U.S.C. § 1786 (m)(9)(A) (2004).
173
Healthy, Hungry-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183.
174
Id. § 424; 42 U.S.C. § 1786(m)(9)(A) (2010).
175
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4203, 128 Stat. 649, 822-23
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2014)).
176
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4208, 128 Stat. 649, 826 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7517 (2014)).
177
Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/foodinsecurity-nutrition-incentive-fini-grant-program (last visited May 16, 2018).
Congress changed the name of food stamps to SNAP in the 2008 Farm Bill.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
Food & Nutrition Serv., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap
(last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
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agriculture programs.178 The USDA coordinates the dispensing of
FINI funds through cooperation with state agencies responsible
for administering SNAP.179 Since its inception, FINI has
supported local efforts across the United States to promote and
expand use of SNAP benefits at farmers’ markets; these programs
target not only beneficiaries of the Senior Nutrition Program and
WIC Nutrition Program, but of all SNAP beneficiaries.180
Although with modest roots, the federal support of
farmers’ markets and direct-to-consumer markets has greatly
expanded through the most recent Farm Bills. The Senior
Nutrition Program and the WIC Nutrition merited particular
attention. So strong is federal support for these two programs that
they are regarded as the “single most important federal or state
program[s] relating to farmers markets”181 Not only is this federal
support more than forty years old, but it is diverse, manifesting as
stated purposes of support, direct funding of market transactions,
and various grants designed to promote and expand direct-toconsumer marketplaces.
ii. Promotion of Participation Among Traditionally
Underrepresented Food-System Stakeholders
An essential characteristic of the localization of a food
system is the ability of representatives of the entire community
to participate in decision-making, market transactions, and goalsetting. Accordingly, policies and programs that encourage
and incentivize groups traditionally under-represented in these
processes to more equitably access them should be regarded as

U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., Food Insecurity
Incentive (FINI) Grant Program: 2018 Request for Applications (RFA)
19 (2017), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa/FY%202018%20FINI_
Final.pdf.
179
Food Insecurity Nutrition Incentive (FINI) Grant Program, supra note 180.
180
See NIFA Programs Support Farmers Markets Nationally, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://nifa.usda.gov/
announcement/nifa-programs-support-farmers-markets-nationally.
181
Neil D. Hamilton, Farmers Market Policy: An Inventory of Federal,
State, and Local Examples 7 (Oct. 26, 2005)
178
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efforts to localize food systems.182 This is especially exemplified
among those laws targeting beginning and socially disadvantaged
farmers and ranchers.
1. Beginning Farmers
Through the Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development
Program, the 2002 Farm Bill introduced the concept of “the
beginning farmer” to federal legislation. In creating the Beginning
Farmer and Rancher Development Program, the bill defined a
“beginning farmer or rancher” as a person who, on top of other
conditions set by the USDA, has either (a) never operated a farm
or ranch or (b) who has operated a farm or ranch for fewer than
ten years.183 This program gave the USDA a means of providing
training, education, outreach, and technical assistance for this
group.184 Specifically, beginning farmers or ranchers could
compete for federal grants in numerous subject areas of farm
ownership and operation, such as mentoring and apprenticeships,
farmland transfers, marketing strategies, conservation, and
financial management.185 Only collaborative projects involving
various entities would be eligible for these grants, some of which
would be required to match the federal funds.186 In rolling out this
program, the USDA was tasked with undertaking a democratic
survey based on input from a wide array of food-system
stakeholders.187 In his first publicized vision of the 2018 Farm
It is important to note that in the history of American agriculture, and
perhaps today in some circles, “localization,” “democracy,” and “grassroots”
participation were effectively, and often intentionally, proxies for race-based
exclusion. See generally Nathan A. Rosenberg, The Butz Stops Here: Why the
Food Movement Needs to Rethink Agricultural Policy, 13 J. Food L. & Pol’y
12 (2017). It is our hope and expectation that with a clear focus on entire
communities and specific efforts to overcome the lasting impacts of racial
discrimination in particular, the concept of local and democratic participation
in agriculture can overcome its past.
183
Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 7405,
116 Stat. 134, 458–61.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. (describing the process for soliciting “Stakeholder Input”).
182
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Bill, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue noted his support of
providing resources to beginning, veteran, and underrepresented
farmers, particularly in the areas of access to land and capital,
as well as strengthening the USDA management to better serve
these groups.188 This program remains a central force for carrying
out that vision.
To effectively bring new federal programs and conduct
other outreach efforts among beginning farmers, the 2008 Farm
Bill created the USDA Office of Advocacy and Outreach.189
Congress created the Office to ensure that beginning farmers or
ranchers, as well as socially disadvantaged farmers or ranchers,
had access to and equitable participation in USDA program
services.190 It did this through goal-setting, self-assessments,
outreach, intra-agency coordination, analysis of program
outcomes, and recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture to
further the Office’s objectives.191 As part of the Office, Congress
created the Small Farms and Beginning Farmers and Ranchers
Group, which would work with the USDA National Institute of
Food and Agriculture to administer the Beginning Farmer and
Rancher Development Program, as well as perform other duties
to promote the Office’s policies among beginning farmers.192
Congress authorized the Office through 2012,193 and the 2014
Farm Bill subsequently reauthorized it through 2018.194
Meanwhile, Congress expanded USDA loan funding to
beginning farmers. Although Congress had mandated reserving
loan funds for beginning farmers and ranchers several years
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2018 Farm Bill & Legislative Principles 2, 4
(2018), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018-farm-billand-legislative-principles.pdf.
189
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 14013, 122
Stat. 923, 1450. See also Office of Advocacy and Outreach (OAO), U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., https://www.outreach.usda.gov (last visited May 16, 2018).
190
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 14013, 122
Stat. 923, 1450.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12202, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
188
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before, the 1996 Farm Bill established an entire subsection of
the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act dedicated
to ensuring this group had access to federal funds.195 The new
subsection increased reserved funding for beginning farmers from
both the direct loan and guaranteed loan programs.196 The 2002
Farm Bill maintained these same levels of reserved funding and
reauthorized the program through 2007.197 The 2008 Farm Bill
further increased the amount of reserved funding for beginning
farmers and reauthorized the program through 2012.198 Finally,
the 2014 Farm Bill maintained these same increased reservations
and reauthorized the program through 2018.199 Congress
authorized funds to be appropriated for carrying out this program
through 2007.200 The 2008 Farm Bill subsequently reauthorized
the program through 2012,201 and the 2014 Farm Bill, extending
the funds to related farm-to-school programs, reauthorized the
program through 2018.202
The 2002 Farm Bill also amended the Consolidated Farm
and Rural Development Act to create the Beginning Farmer Land
Contract Development Program.203 This program provided the
USDA the means of launching a pilot program, in no fewer than
five states, which encouraged private farmland or ranchland sales
to beginning farmers or ranchers. It did this by guaranteeing loans
used by qualifying beginning farmers or ranchers to purchase

Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104127, § 641, 110 Stat. 888, 1098–1102.
196
Compare 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b) (1996) with 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b) (1995).
197
Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5312,
116 Stat. 134, 347.
198
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5302, 122
Stat. 923, 1151-52 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 1994(b)(2)).
199
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5305, 128 Stat. 649, 840.
200
Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 7405,
116 Stat. 134, 458–61.
201
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 7410, 122
Stat. 923, 1254–55.
202
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 7409, 128 Stat. 649, 898–99.
203
Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5006,
116 Stat. 134, 432.
195

222

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

land from private sellers.204 The 2008 Farm Bill made permanent
the structure of this pilot project and called the new program
the Beginning Farmer or Rancher and Socially Disadvantaged
Farmer or Rancher Contract Land Sales Program.205 The 2008
update greatly expanded access to the USDA’s loan guarantee,
but it set limits on receipt of it, including requiring the beginning
farmer or rancher to invest at least a 5-percent down-payment into
the acquired land.206 The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for
the program through 2018.207
In addition to the expansion of loan funding and loan
guarantee program, Congress also expanded the Federal Crop
Insurance program to better service beginning farmers. Federal
Crop Insurance emerged in 1938 as farmers were devastated by
the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, and over the twentieth
century, the program, increasingly vital to the agricultural
economy, underwent substantial changes, especially with its
expansion in the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980208 and the
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994.209 At the turn of the
next century, Congress passed the Agricultural Risk Protection
Act, which increased the amount premium subsidies to eligible
farmers.210 Not until 2008, however, did Congress begin targeting
beginning farmers as potential beneficiaries for these insurance
assistance programs. Through an amendment to the Federal
Crop Insurance Act of 1980, the 2008 Farm Bill created a riskmanagement program, which instructed the USDA to focus energy
on educating, reaching out to, and otherwise training beginning
farmers and ranchers, as well as socially disadvantaged farmers
Id.
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5005, 122
Stat. 923, 1145.
206
Id.
207
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5305, 128 Stat. 649, 840.
208
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-365, 94 Stat. 1312.
209
Erik O’Donoghue, The Importance of Federal Crop Insurance Premium
Subsidies, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Serv. (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014/october/the-importance-offederal-crop-insurance-premium-subsidies.
210
Id.
204
205
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and ranchers, about managing financial risks on their farms.211
But it was the 2014 Farm Bill, through another
amendment to the Federal Crop Insurance Act, that brought
actual savings to the new group. The 2014 Farm Bill created
provisions incentivizing beginning farmers to purchase crop
insurance, specifically subsidized premiums for the federal cropinsurance policies, a similar benefit many farmers had long been
enjoying.212 An additional financial incentive included a waiver
of administrative fees for “limited resource” beginning farmers
and ranchers.213
The new law also roped beginning farming and ranching
operations into the insurance program’s crop-yield determinations,
although the benefit seems only calculated to make quantifying
loss more streamlined with the rest of the program.214 A
beginning farmer enrolled in the federal crop insurance program
could, in instances of catastrophic loss or other covered losses,
record a loss based on the actual loss incurred by the previous
farmer of the farmland or simply use the option available to other
enrolled farmers who could not prove actual loss, whichever is
higher.215 This move for efficiency, rather than for encouraging
underrepresented stakeholders to participate more in the food
system, is evidenced by the definition of “beginning farmer or
rancher,” which differed from that established by the Beginning
Farmer or Rancher Development Program.216 The amendment
defined a beginning farmer or rancher as “a farmer or rancher
who has not actively operated and managed a farm or ranch with
a bona fide insurable interest in a crop or livestock as an owneroperator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper for more than 5 crop
years, as determined by the Secretary.”217 The five-year threshold
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 12026, 122
Stat. 923, 1390.
212
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 11016, 128 Stat. 649, 963–64.
213
Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 1508 (b)(5)(E) (2014).
214
Id. § 1508(g)(2)(B).
215
Id. § 1508(b).
216
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 11016, 128 Stat. 649, 963–64.
217
Id. Congress also used a five-year minimum as part of eligibility for farm211
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is likely tied to the provision requiring farmers or ranchers to
show five years of actual production to prove loss.218
Nevertheless, beginning farmers and ranchers did catch
a small break in one narrow circumstance regarding transitional
yields. Each crop year, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation—a
sub-agency of the USDA charged with administering the Federal
Crop Insurance program219—assigns a maximum average
production per acre to each crop. This is called the transitional
yield.220 The transitional yield is used when the farmer or rancher
does not provide acceptable proof of actual loss of a crop or
livestock.221 In other words, the transitional yield is the USDA’s
best guess at how much crop a farmer loses when the farmer is
unable to prove how much he or she actually lost. When a farmer
tries to prove actual loss, the transitional yield is used if the value
of that crop lost, based on the current or one of the previous years,
falls below 60 percent of the applicable transitional yield.222 Thus,
if a farmer records 59 lost crops, but the transitional yield says the
farmer should have lost 100 crops, then the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation will use the transitional yield. Generally, farmers
may recover 60 percent of the transitional yield.223 However,
the 2014 Farm Bill allowed beginning farmers and ranchers to
recover 80 percent of it.224
In a similar vein, the 2008 Farm Bill amended the 1985
Farm Bill to incentivize limited-resource beginning farmers
or socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers to use the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) by providing

operating loans in the Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106224, § 255, 114 Stat. 358, 424.
218
See 7 U.S.C. § 1508(g)(2)(A) (requiring present year plus four previous
years of recorded losses).
219
Id. § 1503.
220
Id. § 1502(b)(11).
221
Id.
222
Id. § 1508(g)(4)(B).
223
7 U.S.C. § 1508(g)(4)(B)(iii) (2014).
224
Id. § 1508(e)(2)(E).
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them payments higher than the standard set for others.225 EQIP
is a competitively-awarded, voluntary conservation program
administered by the USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service
that provides farmers and ranchers with federal funds in exchange
for implementing efforts to conserve natural resources, like water,
and air.226 The 2008 Farm Bill allowed beginning farmers of
limited resources to receive payments above the statutory limit
for other producers.227 By providing limited resource farmers and
ranchers greater access to EQIP, Congress formally recognized
that many beginning farmers had been seeking to or practicing
conservation agricultural programs, undoubtedly a product of
community food systems, in which communities seek to improve
the health of themselves and their environment.228 The 2014
Farm Bill expanded this program to veterans and reauthorized its
funding through 2018.229
The gains for beginning farmers and ranchers under
the Federal Crop Insurance Program and EQIP may be small,
but Congress including them in these programs is a first step
in giving these underrepresented stakeholders a foothold in
economic stability and, thus, greater access to local food-system
engagement.
One last program of note is the Beginning Farmer and
Rancher Individual Development Account Pilot Program. In
an effort to help low-income beginning farmers and ranchers
save enough money to invest in farmland, Congress created the
Beginning Farmer and Rancher Individual Development Account
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 2503, 122
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
226
Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Natural
Resources Conservation Serv. (last accessed February 3, 2018), https://
www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip.
227
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 2503, 122
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
228
For more on limited resource farmers and ranchers, see Limited Resource
Program Definition, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Natural Resources Cons. Serv. (last
updated Oct. 17, 2017), https://lrftool.sc.egov.usda.gov/LRP_Definition.aspx.
229
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 2203, 128 Stat. 729 (Feb. 7,
2014).
225

226

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

Pilot Program in the 2008 Farm Bill.230 This Farm Bill addition
required the Secretary of Agriculture to create the New Farmer
Individual Development Accounts Pilot Program in coordination
with the Farm Service Agency.231 The pilot program would allow
qualified low-income farmers and ranchers to set up a savings
account with a qualified entity, and the USDA would match 50
percent of the individual contributions to that account.232 The
money thus earned could be used by the farmer or rancher to
purchase farmland, crops, or other related expenditures.233 The
2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for this program through
2018.234 Despite the reauthorization, Congress has not yet
appropriated funds for this program, and the absence of the grants
in the 2018 USDA Budget Report suggests the Secretary of
Agriculture has stopped requesting money to launch it.235 With
seemingly mixed messages, the USDA National Institute of Food
and Agriculture remains committed through 2018 to requesting
applications from the public for grants that fund education about
this nonfunctional program.236
2. Socially Disadvantaged Farmers
Many of the programs and benefits for beginning
farmers discussed in the previous section also apply to socially
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFRs), but the Farm Bill
has also created programs specifically for this group of agricultural
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 5301, 122
Stat. 923, 1147.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 5301, 128 Stat. 649, 839.
235
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY 2018 Budget Summary 10, https://www.
obpa.usda.gov/budsum/fy18budsum.pdf. On the other hand, the 2017 Budget
Summary itemized the Development Fund. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FY
2017 Budget Summary 16, https://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/fy17budsum.
pdf (“Individual Development Grants”).
236
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Agric., Beginning Farmer
and Rancher Development Program: Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Request
for Applications (RFA) 7 (2018), https://nifa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rfa/
FY18-BFRDP-RFA-FINAL.pdf.
230
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producers. Socially disadvantaged groups made their appearance
in federal agricultural policy with the passage of the 1990 Farm
Bill.237 Congress defined a “socially disadvantaged farmer or
rancher” as a member belonging to a “socially disadvantaged
group.”238 This group was defined as one “whose members have
been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice because of their
identity as members of a group without regard to their individual
qualities.”239 Today, the USDA Office of Advocacy and Outreach
uses this same definition and provides examples of such recognized
groups—African Americans, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives,
Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders—as well as provides the
Secretary of Agriculture to determine whether additional groups
qualify under this definition.240
Congress’ biggest statement of support for SDFRs is the
Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and
Ranchers (“2501 Program”). The 1990 Farm Bill created the
Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and
Ranchers, also called the 2501 Program in reference to the Farm
Bill section under which the program fell.241 Congress created
the 2501 Program to encourage and assist SDFRs, and later
veteran farmers and ranchers, with farm ownership and equitable
participation in USDA programs.242 Congress mandated that
the USDA be responsible for administering this program, and it
permitted the USDA to make grants to and enter into contracts
with eligible entities able to carry out these outreach, education,
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624,
104 Stat. 3359.
238
Id. § 2501(e)(2).
239
Id. § 2501(e)(1).
240
Definitions, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Off. of Advocacy & Outreach,
https://www.outreach.usda.gov/grants/oasdfr/definitions.htm (last visited
May 16, 2018).
241
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, §
2501, 104 Stat. 3359, 4062–65. See also Outreach and Assistance for Socially
Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers
Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Off. of Advocacy & Outreach, https://
www.outreach.usda.gov/sdfr/index.htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
242
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624,
§ 2501(a)(1), 104 Stat. 3359, 4062.
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and technical assistance efforts.243 Congress authorized funding
for the 2501 Program through 2018.244 The 2014 Farm Bill
extended this program to veteran farmers and ranchers.245 The
2501 Section remains “the only farm bill program dedicated to
addressing the needs of family farmers and ranchers of color.”246
SDFRs did not reappear again in the Farm Bill until 2002,
when Congress allocated certain funds for them. In that year’s
Farm Bill, Congress amended a subsection of the Consolidated
Farm and Rural Development Act dealing with the target
participation rates of federal loans.247 This small amendment
affected funds related to farm-operating loans. Specifically,
federal funds are made available to states in order to help the
states reach their target participation rates among SDFRs in the
farm-operating loan programs. These target rates are supposed
to be proportionate to the number of SDFRs in each of the state’s
counties.248 Before Congress passed this amendment, unused funds
reserved to states to help them implement this loan program were
reallocated to the states.249 The amendment, however, instructed
the Secretary of Agriculture to keep those unused funds, instead,
and use them to satisfy pending applications before reallocating
the money to the states.250 Although a slight modification, this
amendment prioritized SDFRs by using already existing funds to
further support the 2501 Program’s mission of providing SDFRs
equitable access to USDA programs.251
But in 2008, with the creation of the Office of Advocacy
Id. § 2501(a)(3).
Id. § 2501(a)(4).
245
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12201, 128 Stat. 64, 983–84.
246
Funding Available to Support Outreach to Underserved Farmers, Nat’l
Sustainable Agric. Coal. (June 27, 2016), http://sustainableagriculture.net/
blog/2501-funding-available.
247
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5315,
116 Stat. 134, 384.
248
7 U.S.C. § 2003(c)(2).
249
Id.
250
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 5315,
116 Stat. 134, 384.
251
See id.
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and Outreach, Congress once again made a bold statement of
support for SDFRs. When the 2008 Farm Bill created the Office
of Advocacy and Outreach, it created not only the Small Farms
and Beginning Farmers and Ranchers Group, discussed above,
but it also created the Socially Disadvantaged Farmers Group.252
Congress created this group to carry out the 2501 Program and
gave it power to oversee and implement other programs related to
the 2501 Program’s purpose.253
Another statement of support came through the
establishment of the Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and
Ranchers Policy Research Center. The 2014 Farm Bill created the
center through an amendment to the 1990 Farm Bill.254 Congress
authorized one grant to an eligible college or university—socalled 1890 Institutions255—to establish the policy research center
for the purpose of “developing policy recommendations for the
protection and promotion of the interests of socially disadvantaged
farmers and ranchers.”256 The USDA subsequently awarded that
grant to Alcorn State University.257
Together with several of the programs and displays
of support of beginning farmers and ranchers, these SDFRsexclusive programs show how Congress has continued to localize
food systems by encouraging and incentivizing more diverse
representation among agricultural producers. Often, these
producers were excluded from such robust participation because
of race, a lack of wealth, or shallow or nonexistent agricultural
networks. Encouraging these groups to again become agricultural
producers also supports community food systems, since these
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-264, § 1403, 122
Stat. 923, 981–82.
253
Id.
254
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12203, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
255
See 1890 Land-Grant Institution Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l
Inst. of Food & Agric., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/1890-land-grantinstitutions-programs (last visited May 16, 2018).
256
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 12203, 128 Stat. 649, 984.
257
Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranchers, Alcorn, https://www.
alcorn.edu/discover-alcorn/socially-disadvantaged-farmers-and-ranchers
(May 16, 2018).
252

230

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

producers generally operate outside of Lyson’s industrial
agriculture or Hamilton’s Big Food, and they are thus likely to
search for markets in their local food supply chains.
iii. Promotion of Local-Food System Infrastructure
The federal government’s support of local-food-system
infrastructure is characterized less by large and continuous
programs, as its support of direct-to-consumer transactions and
farmers’ market is, and more by hodgepodge policy decisions to
support various aspects of local decision-making. Accordingly,
this section is organized based on the law or program, rather than
presented as a chronology of evolution.
The most direct federal support of local-food system
infrastructure is in the form of grants, awarded on a competitive
basis by the USDA. Because so many grants potentially support
the localization of food systems, this not a comprehensive list.258
Rather, this comprises the most explicit programs.
Through an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1977,259
the 1996 Farm Bill established Community Food Projects for the
purposes of helping low-income people meet their food needs,
increasing the self-reliance of local communities providing their
own food, and promoting “comprehensive responses to local food,
farm, and nutrition issues.”260 Congress funded these programs to
private nonprofit organizations with grants, administered by the
USDA, through 2002,261 and it prioritized projects that connected
different sectors of the food system, including links between
For comprehensive overviews of federal grants supporting local and
regional food systems, see Office of U.S. Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand,
A Guide to Funding Opportunities and Incentives for Food Hubs and
Food Systems: How to Navigate the Funding Process (2014), https://
www.gillibrand.senate.gov/download/food-hub-and-food-systems-grantguide&download=1; Kate Fitzgerald et al., The National Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition’s Guide to USDA Funding for Local and
Regional Food Systems (2010), http://sustainableagriculture.net/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/6.18-FINAL-Food-System-Funding-Guide2.pdf.
259
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913.
260
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104127, § 25, 110 Stat. 888, 1027.
261
Id.
258
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nonprofit and for-profit sectors, supported entrepreneurial
projects, and encouraged long-term planning projects and multisystem approaches to problem-solving.262 Each Community Food
Project received a one-time grant, and Congress expected each
project to thereafter become self-sustaining.263
The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for the
Community Food Projects program through 2007 and expanded
its scope.264 For example, it specified the sorts of “comprehensive
responses” the program was intended to support: infrastructure
improvements and developments, plans for long-term
solutions, and “innovative marketing activities that mutually
benefit agricultural producers and low-income consumers.”265
Additionally, the 2002 Farm Bill provided examples of the multisystem projects that deserved priority: “long-term planning
activities, and multisystem, interagency approaches with multistakeholder collaborations, that build the long-term capacity of
communities to address the food and agricultural problems of
the communities, such as food policy councils and food planning
associations.”266 Finally, the 2002 Farm Bill added a provision for
programs that could innovatively address community problems,
including loss of farms and ranches, rural poverty, welfare
dependency, hunger, the need for job training, and the need for
self-sufficiency by individuals and communities.267
Between 2005 and 2009, the USDA funded 307 Community
Food Projects in thirty-nine states.268 During this five-year
period, these projects formed nearly forty food policy councils

See id.
See id.
264
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, § 4125,
116 Stat. 134, 326–27.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Michelle Kobayashi et al., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., The Activities and
Impacts of Community Food Projects 2005-2009 3 (2010), http://www.
hungerfreecommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CPF_Activities_
Impacts_2005-09.pdf.
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and network, representing a quarter of all program funding.269 In
these councils, more than 560 organizations were represented,
comprising more than 700 individuals.270 Collectively, these food
policy councils implemented 183 policies, introduced or produced
383 policies, and began to develop 422 policies.271 The topics
of these policies were diverse, covering market and economic
development, consumer access, local-food-system infrastructure,
communication improvements between local regulating agencies,
and much more.272
Following the trend set by the previous legislation, the
2008 Farm Bill reauthorized funding for the Community Food
Projects program through 2012 and expanded its purview to urban
areas.273 Specifically, it reserved funding for a Healthy Urban
Food Enterprise Development Center, a nonprofit organization,
individual, school, or other qualifying entity, with a purpose to
increase underserved-community access to healthy and affordable
foods, including local foods.274 The Center was required to give
priority to projects that benefited underserved communities and
developed market opportunities for small and mid-sized farms
and ranches.275 Finally, the 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized funding
for the Community Food Projects program, strengthened its
commitment to address hunger, and expanded it reach to tackle
food waste.276
Thus, over the span of eighteen years, Congress created
and maintained a grant program that directly funded community
Id. at 3.
Id. at 18.
271
Id. at 19.
272
Id.
273
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4402,
122 Stat. 923, 1135–37. The 2008 Farm Bill also changed the name of the
Food Stamp Act of 1977 to the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, thus moving
the Community Food Projects program into it. See Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), supra note 180.
274
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4402, 122
Stat. 923, 1135–37.
275
Id.
276
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4026, 128 Stat. 649, 810–12.
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efforts to solve local problems. Notably, with each iteration of the
Farm Bill, Congress expanded the scope of the Community Food
Projects program, so that by 2014, local communities could apply
for federal funding to organize democratic food policy councils,
build local-food infrastructure, develop marketplaces for localfood producers and manufacturers, innovate strategies to fight
hunger and food waste, and coordinate these projects with local
and state agencies.
In addition to Community Food Projects, Congress
established the Local Food Promotion Program (LFPP). The
2014 Farm Bill expanded the FMPP by creating the LFPP, a
grant program dedicated to supporting local food systems.277
The purposes of the LFPP is to increase domestic consumption
of and access to local foods and to expand market opportunities
for farmers and ranchers serving local consumers.278 The LFPP
is administered by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service,
and that agency awards two types of grants in furtherance of
it: Planning Grants and Implementation Grants.279 Either grant
may be awarded, through a competitive process, to agricultural
businesses or cooperatives, producer networks and associations,
farmers’ market authorities, community supported agriculture
networks, and others.280 Often bundled with the FMPP, the LFPP
is distinguished by the USDA based on the food supply chain:
the LFPP involves non-direct-to-consumer supply chain, and
the FMPP involves direct-to-consumer marketing.281 Another
difference between the two programs relates to financing. Unlike
the FMPP, the LFPP requires the entity awarded the grant to

Id. § 10003.
Id.
279
Local Food Promotion Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Marketing
Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/lfpp (last visited May
16, 2018).
280
Id.
281
See What AMS Grant Is Right For Me?, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric.
Marketing Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
Combined%20Grants%20Decision%20Trees.pdf.
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match 25 percent of the grant’s value.282 In its first year, the LFPP
funded 184 projects, with grant awards ranging from around
$25,000 to up to $100,000.283 These figures remained consistent
through 2017, and they will likely remain so in 2018.
Although less explicit than Community Food Projects and
the LFPP, farm-to-school programs are hugely important to the
localization of the food system. Congress expanded local-foodsystem infrastructure into schools in 2004 with the passage of the
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004.284 This Act
amended Section 18 of the Richard B. Russell National School
Lunch Act by adding a provision that expanded access to local
foods at schools and promoted school gardens.285 Specifically, it
permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to award grants and provide
technical assistance to schools and nonprofit organizations for
projects that, among other things, (1) improved access to local
foods in schools and other eligible entities, such as through
farm-to-cafeteria or school garden projects; (2) were designed to
procure local foods from small and mid-sized farms for school
meals and support school garden programs; and (3) supported
farm-based experiential education in local food and agriculture.286
The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 reauthorized this
program through 2015 and continued its mission of connecting
schools and other institutions to local-food systems.287
As part of this broad farm-to-school effort, the 2008 Farm
Bill also amended the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch
Act to create an agenda that made it easier for schools and other
institutions covered by the Act, as well as those covered by the
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 10003, 128 Stat. 649, 940–41.
See LFPP 2014 Final Performance Reports, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Agric. Marketing Serv., https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/grants/lfpp/
reports/2014-reports (last visited May 16, 2018).
284
Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-265, §
122, 118 Stat. 729, 759.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-296, § 243, 124 Stat.
2183, 3203.
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Child Nutrition Act of 1966, to procure “unprocessed agricultural
products, both locally grown and locally raised, to the maximum
extent practicable and appropriate” and “use a geographic
preference for the procurement” of these products.288
Building on this stated farm-to-institution language, the
2014 Farm Bill launched a pilot project for the procurement of
unprocessed fruits and vegetables to provide participating states,
among other reasons, flexibility in their local-food purchases by
allowing “geographic preference, if desired, in the procurement
of the products under this pilot project.”289 The Secretary of
Agriculture was tasked with determining which eight states
would participate in this pilot, and priority was based, in part,
on the amount and variety of local growers and the demonstrated
commitment of statewide farm-to-school program efforts.290
Additionally, the 2014 Farm Bill created the Food and
Agriculture Service Learning Program, which instructed the
Secretary of Agriculture, working through the Director of the
National Institute of Food and Agriculture and in coordination
with other federal agencies, to competitively award $25,000,000
in grants to eligible entities that “increase knowledge of agriculture
and improve the nutritional health of children.”291 The purposes
of this program included increasing food, garden, and nutrition
education within the host organizations or at schools; adding
to the momentum of the farm-to-school programs implemented
under section 18(g) of the Richard B. Russell National School
Lunch Act; and fostering higher levels of community engagement
and volunteering opportunities.292 The Secretary of Agriculture
was directed to give priority to, among others, those entities that
facilitated a connection between schools and local and regional

Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 4302, 122
Stat. 923, 1126.
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Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 4202, 128 Stat. 649, 822.
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farmers and ranchers.293 In other words, the Food and Agriculture
Service Learning Program explicitly promoted and directly
funded local-food education, local-food-system engagement, and
community empowerment across the nation.
Another important structural contribution is Congress’
definition of local foods. The 2008 Farm Bill amended the
Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act to create USDA
loans and loan guarantees for locally or regionally produced
agricultural food products.294 For the first time, Congress
attempted to delineate local from non-local food by defining
“locally or regionally produced agricultural food products” as:
[A]ny agricultural food product that is raised,
produced, and distributed in . . . the locality or
region in which the final product is marketed,
so that the total distance that the product is
transported is less than 400 miles from the origin
of the product; or . . . the State in which the product
is produced.295
The Secretary of Agriculture was required to reserve
at least 5 percent of available funds for this program through
2012.296 The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized this program through
2018 and affirmed Congress’ support of promoting community
food systems.297
The final important structural contribution is the Local
Food Production and Program Evaluation program. While
Congress places various reporting and evaluation requirements
on the USDA for many of the programs mentioned in this article,
the 2014 Farm Bill specifically created the Local Food Production
Id.
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 6015, 122
Stat. 923, 1167–68.
295
Id. See also Marne Coit, Support for Local Food in the 2014 Farm Bill,
20 Drake J. Agric. L. 1, 2–3 (2015) (“[T]he first federal definition of ‘local
food’ was provided by the federal government in the text of the 2008 Farm
Bill.”).
296
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, § 6015, 122
Stat. 923, 1167–68.
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Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-79, § 6014, 128 Stat. 649, 845.
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and Program Evaluation program.298 This standalone research
program directed the Secretary of Agriculture to collect data on
(1) production and marketing of locally or regionally produced
agricultural food products; and (2) direct and indirect regulatory
compliance costs that affect the production and marketing of
these products.299 Congressional concern with the burden of
forcing small and mid-sized farms to comply with some costly
requirements of the Food Safety Modernization Act, and thus
disrupting the local-food-system efforts developing across the
country, led to the so-called Tester-Hagan Amendment, which
exempts qualifying farms from produce-safety standards and
preventative-controls standards.300 Besides collecting data, the
2014 Farm Bill directed the Secretary to monitor the effectiveness
of programs designed to promote local-food systems and barriers
to this promotion because of federal regulations of small-scale
production.301 Finally, the Secretary was tasked with evaluating
how local-food systems contribute to improving community food
security and help communities increase access to food.302 This
comprehensive report came with various reporting requirements,
including annual updates to Congress on the progress of the
report.303 In other words, Congress appeared to take this report
very seriously and fully expected the USDA to zealously write it.
The USDA published its report in February 2016.304
As these programs show, with Congress’ support
communities have become better funded to localize their food
systems. Combined, these several programs and benefits to
local food system transactions, local food system representation,
Id. § 10016.
Id.
300
For the efforts of local-food advocates in encouraging Congress to pass
this amendment, see Schieber, supra note 122, at 247–55; Peter Anderson,
Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the Food Safety
Modernization Act’s Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough Barriers?, 9
J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 145, 155–57 (2012).
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and local food system infrastructure show clear support by the
federal government to incentivize and legitimize individuals
and organizations determined to govern their local food supply
chains. But even though these various programs acknowledge
some of the localization momentum occurring through American
communities, the bill still “fails to adequately address the needs
of our modern food system,”305 and that modern food system is
increasingly being shaped at the local level. These changes have
undoubtedly come about bit-by-bit, with small adjustments to
existing programs and quiet additions to existing titles. By doing
this, however, Congress has shown a clear willingness to provide
communities with the funds and framework for developing their
own community food systems. With support for transactions and
marketplaces, traditionally underrepresented stakeholders, and
necessary infrastructure, future Farm Bills are poised to bring
about further systemic reform to local food systems, especially
with respect to policy self-governance and more inclusive
decision-making mechanisms—the very fiber of community food
systems.
III. Toward Deliberative Food Democracy: Framework
and Federal Agricultural Policies
In Part I, we showed how communities are localizing
their food systems with a conceptual framework that guides
these efforts and why such conceptual frameworks have realworld and measurable benefits for communities. In Part II, we
discussed how laws promoting local foods are essentially laws
promoting community self-governance within their local food
systems, followed by many examples of how the Farm Bill has
brought a systematic order to such laws. Having identified how
the Farm Bill has contributed to structural and financial support
of community food systems, we turn in Part III to the democratic
spirit of these laws and examine how the Farm Bill’s programs,
implicating deliberative democracy, can advance the goal of
D. Lee Miller, A Seat at the Table: New Voices Urge Farm Bill Reform, 127
Yale L. J. Forum 395, 398 (2017).
305
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increasing diverse representation and local decision-making in
the food system.
The policy ideal, effectively, if not intentionally,
underpinning the Farm Bill programs in Part II is diverse
and equitable participation.
Promoting direct-to-consumer
transactions allows consumers greater decision-making in their
purchasing options and allows producers to choose how and where
to market their food products. Promoting the participation among
food-system stakeholders traditionally underserved by decisionmaking directly contributes to more equitable representation in
the food-system. Promoting local-food programs in a variety
of forms eventually empowers individuals and communities to
remodel their own food systems. Democracy, however, requires
mechanisms. In order to promote legislation that edifies the
localization of food systems, these mechanisms must be flexible
enough to adapt to diverse communities by providing the
structure for direct participation in decision-making. Deliberative
democracy is that political process.
A. Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democratic theory is an approach to public
governance that grounds the legitimacy of political decisionmaking in, unsurprisingly, deliberation.306 Some traditional
conceptions of democracy assert that legitimacy arises out of
vote aggregating, while more modern ideals, often called neoliberalism, identify legitimacy in the aggregate signals of private
economic activity.307 Deliberative democracy, however, promotes
conversation, discussion, communication, and other forms of
reflective decision-making as the source of, or best argument for,
democratic legitimacy.308
See HK Pernaa, Deliberate Future Visioning: Utilizing the Deliberative
Democracy Theory & Practice in Futures Research, 5 European Journal
Of Futures Research 13, 13 (2017).
307
Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 Ann. Rev. Pol.
Sci. 307, 308 (2003).
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According to Professor Simone Chambers, in deliberative
democracy, “[t]alk-centric democratic theory replaces votingcentric democratic theory. Voting-centric views see democracy
as the arena in which fixed preferences and interests compete
via fair mechanisms of aggregation. In contrast, deliberative
democracy focuses on the communicative process of opinion and
will-formation that precede voting.”309 Despite describing this
as a replacement, one could also view deliberative democracy
as both a normative theory that argues for more deliberation as
well as a positive description of how the public forms opinions
about the issues on which it eventually votes. The identification
of deliberation as a source of ideas and opinions then lends itself
to the normative calls for increasing deliberation through new or
better intuitions. Professor Chambers agrees that “deliberative
democracy is not usually thought of as an alternative to
representative democracy.”310 Deliberative democracy, rather than
a challenge to other views, is a way to—among other important
benefits—increase satisfaction with the political process.
Although the formal idea of deliberative democracy
post-dated his work, John Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism
dealt with some of the same features.311 Dewey’s philosophy
called for moving away from absolutist assertions in forming
government policy.312 Instead of absolutism, Dewey championed
a communicative process to generate, mold, and settle on public
goals.313 Like deliberative democracy theorists today, Dewey did
not expect consensus, but he did expect that the very process
of communication and reflection would produce, at least, more

Chambers, supra note 310, at 308.
Id. at 309.
311
See, e.g., James Bohman, The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy, 6
J. of Pol. Phil. 400, 400 (1998) (stating that the idea of deliberative democracy
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312
Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially Pragmatic
Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 Colum. J. Env. L. 425, 436–439 (2017).
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satisfying results.314 At base, the ideal of deliberation is not merely
to shape somehow objectively better public opinions, or public
opinions on which political decisionmakers can more confidently
rely. Instead, the ideal is to develop a system of governance that
produces more satisfaction, despite individual outcomes.315
In aiming for satisfaction in a pluralist system, deliberative
democracy is a natural fit for food policy decision-making. The
Food Movement itself is an immensely diverse category, to
say nothing of the larger population of American eaters. The
Movement includes “sustainability, equity, access, economic
development, fair labor, animal health, food security, human
health through prevention of foodborne illness and obesity or
other diet-related illness, hunger relief, environmental protection,
farm security (in terms of economic resilience), energy efficiency
and conservation, and more.”316 A goal, therefore, is to fashion
food policy that can account for this diversity while still producing
meaningful and satisfying outcomes. Some legal scholars have
already begun to merge the concepts of deliberative democracy
and food policy, focusing primarily on a comparison of broad
legal regimes such as common law versus administrative law.317
In this Section, however, we focus not on general principals, but
on specific strategies and opportunities.
B. Deliberative Democracy in Food Policy
As the several laws summarized in Part II show, various
iterations of the Farm Bill have strengthened local food systems
and community decision-making and participation in food systems
through grants, loans, research initiatives, outreach efforts, and
agency programs. The expansion of these programs and benefits
through decades of various congressional bodies highlights the
non-partisan nature of these issues and the realistic opportunity of
future farm bills to take up these issues with even greater vigor.
314
315
316
317

Id. at 158–60.
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Galperin, supra note 18, at 356.
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Many of these policies began as victories earned by the lobbying
efforts of the so-called Food Movement—a coalition of groups and
individuals competing against the Farm Bloc and Hunger Lobby
to convince Congress to pay more attention to sustainability and
social issues in the food system.318 With new bills promoting and
expanding these policies currently before Congress, the Food
Movement, as a political coalition, appears to retain its place in
the fight to gain access to congressional offices. Consequently,
it has made the issue of supporting community food systems an
established and expected one among Congress and the public.
While these and other policies discussed in this Article
have brought legitimacy to the Food Movement’s political
influence, they have also created, shaped, and broadened political
processes that allow more dynamic public participation in the
food system. This comes at a pivotal time in the broader food
movement because “[a]lthough the need for public participation
in food policy is clearly recognized, there is limited consensus on
the appropriate mechanisms for promoting it.”319
Deliberative democracy is becoming a component of
those appropriate political mechanisms. In the last decade or so,
scholars have begun identifying various approaches of deliberative
democracy taking shape in food policy throughout the world.320
See Christopher Bosso, Framing the Farm Bill: Interests, Ideology,
and the Agricultural Act of 2014 63–66 (2017) (detailing four broad
coalitions who influenced policy decisions in the 2014 Farm Bill); Jennifer
Steinhauer, Farm Bill Reflects American Menu and a Senator’s Persistent
Tilling, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/
us/politics/farm-bill-reflects-shifting-american-menu-and-a-senatorspersistent-tilling.html (mentioning that the 2014 Farm Bill emphasizes
“locally grown, healthful food” and noting the political popularity of “farmto-table . . . national figures[,]” including the National Sustainable Agriculture
Coalition).
319
Rachel A. Ankeny, Inviting Everyone to the Table: Strategies for More
Effective and Legitimate Food Policy via Deliberative Democracy, 47 J.
Social Philosophy 10, 10 (2016).
320
See, e.g., Mortazavi, supra note 311, at 936–38; Jeannette M. Blackmar,
Deliberative Democracy, Civic Engagement and Food Policy Councils, 2
Rivista di Studi sulla Sostenibilita 43 (2014) (food policy councils); Julie
Henderson et al., Evaluating the Use of Citizens’ Juries in Food Policy: A
Case Study of Food Regulation, 13 BMC Pub. Health 596 (2013) (citizen
juries); G.C. Barker et al., Can a Participatory Approach Contribute to Food
Chain Risk Analysis?, 30 Risk Analysis 766 (2010) (general stakeholder
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These approaches include (1) soliciting public feedback through
form submissions; (2) consensus conferences; (3) citizens’ juries;
and (4) local food planning.321
Soliciting public feedback through form submissions, or
consultation by submission, refers to governmental bodies and
regulating agencies using the Internet to ask members of the public
for their views on a specific issue.322 The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regularly solicits the public’s comments on
the agency’s proposed rules—the so-called notice and comment
rulemaking process.323 This form of democratic participation in
the rulemaking process is highly structured. For example, the
FDA sought public comments on the agency’s regulation of the
term “natural” on food labels.324 In its solicitation, the FDA
provided the public with a comprehensive summary of the issue
followed by specific questions for which it sought answers.325
While the comment period was open, the FDA received 7,690
public comments, from concerned individuals to large food-retail
companies.326 The ability of any person to submit a comment
to the FDA is, at least in theory, a political mechanism to allow
wider participation in the decision-making process of food-system
rules. It is unclear, however, to what extent the FDA actually
participation in otherwise technical decision-making); Gary E. Merchant,
GM Foods: Potential Public Consultation and Participation Mechanisms, 44
Jurimetrics 99 (2003) (applying public participation to GM-foods policies);
Ankeny, supra note 322.
321
Id. at 13–17.
322
Id. at 13.
323
What is the Difference Between the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FD&C Act), FDA Regulations, and FDA Guidance?, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194909.
htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
324
“Natural” on Food Labeling, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.
gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/
LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm (last visited May 16, 2018).
325
Use of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products;
Request for Information and Comments, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 10,
2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-1207-0001.
326
See User of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=FDA2014-N-1207 (last visited May 16, 2018) (click “View all documents and
comments in this Docket”).
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relies on this input. Back to the “natural” example: the FDA has
tried numerous times to seek public comment on its regulation
of the term on food labels.327 After again receiving thousands
of public comments, the FDA ultimately appeared unresponsive
to this input and left its rule unchanged and maintained its lax
enforcement status quo. This deliberative democratic approach,
if it can be called that, therefore, suffers from at least three serious
limitations: the rule-maker narrowly sets the agenda, its use of
the public input is entirely opaque, and it is free to downplay any
and all putative consultation it solicits.328 This does not mean the
democratic value of soliciting public feedback is minimal. Just
as torts provide both individual relief and promote policy goals,
the process here allows the individual to voice his or her own
concerns, but also allows public access to the catalog, thereby
providing knowledge-building among the public and government
agencies, providing accountability of the regulating agency, and
building a record for judicial review, all of which it accomplishes
by allowing the public to see what others think.329
Consensus conferences typically comprise a small group
of non-experts brought together to discuss a controversial issue
or policy proposal.330 Like consultation by submission, these
conferences are arranged by one party seeking input from another
party, such as in 2013, when the FDA convened several groups of
various stakeholders before finalizing the Produce Safety Rule,
mandated by the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA).331 This
was in addition to the legally required notice and comment period
associated with the proposed rulemaking process. Specifically, the
FDA FSMA implementation team met with affected stakeholders,
For a brief overview of the 1991 establishment of the term and FDA’s
subsequent lax enforcement of its misuse, see Janney v. Mills, 944 F. Supp. 2d
806, 811–14 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
328
See Ankeny, supra note 322, at 13–14.
329
See Galperin, supra note 18, at 374–90; Mortazavi, supra note 311, at 936–
38 (2015).
330
Ankeny, supra note 322, at 14-15.
331
Michael R. Taylor, Let’s Keep Talking—and Listening—About Food Safety,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (May 6, 2013), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/
index.php/2013/05/lets-keep-talking-and-listening-about-food-safety.
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especially farmers, to discuss the proposed rules, solicit feedback
on how to improve those rules, and answer questions.332 The
conferences ranged from small-group meetings to large public
forums, in which the FDA “learned that a broad cross-section of
our industry and consumer stakeholders are eager to push forward
and look with us to successfully complete this crucial rule-writing
step in FSMA implementation.”333
Consensus conferences
have the advantage of bringing together laypeople to share their
personal insight into the effects of otherwise impersonal technical
policies. But the advantage is only so influential; after all, the
public has no actual leverage over how the policies are made and
its influence is thus limited to what decision-makers choose to be
persuaded by.334
Citizens’ juries are similar to consensus conferences,
but take on the structure of trial juries, including random jury
selection, cross-examination with a different perspective, and
compulsory verdict selection.335 These have been used throughout
the world to explore public attitudes toward genetically modified
foods (United Kingdom, France, and South Korea), policies
aimed at reducing childhood obesity (Australia), and consumer
attitudes toward “organic” food labeling (United Kingdom).336
Unlike consensus conferences, which rely on volunteers to form
a group, the randomization of the citizens’ jury pool is a method
of creating a diverse group of apparently average citizens; as
a result, any self-selection bias that affects randomization in
consensus conferences is absent here.337 Moreover, urging jury
members to inform themselves, deliberate, and make a decision
is a simple and strong example of deliberative democracy in
action.338 However, given the time- and resource-intensive
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
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Ankeny, supra note 322, at 15.
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nature of creating and administering citizens’ juries, their model
is difficult to implement on a routine basis, and, like consensus
conferences, there is no mechanism for transferring participation
into policymaking.339 They apparently have not been used in the
United States.
Local food planning, which is the diverse participation of a
community in creating a local food plan, has become the approach
most favored by grassroots organizations and community leaders,
particularly in the form of food policy councils.340 Each food
policy council is free to adopt its own mechanisms for engagement,
but typical formats assign chairpersons or facilitators who guide
meetings, gather people into informal groups, provide information
on key policy issues, and assemble the goals of the group based
on council input.341 Importantly, these representatives are not
favored as so-called experts. 342 Often, participants represent
different communities who are stakeholders in the food system
and thus have interests in certain policy goals, and this especially
includes stakeholders traditionally underrepresented in decisionmaking.343 In 2016, the United States had at least 262 verified
food policy councils, of which 214 were active, 29 were in
development, and 19 were in transition.344 At the time of this
Article’s print, the total number of food policy councils had
apparently reached 359.345
As Part II mentions, the majority of these councils found
support for their existence in the Farm Bill. Their popularity
demonstrates, in part, their capacity to be adopted flexibly among
different communities. While some cities or municipalities
Id. at 16.
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Lily Sussman & Karen Bassrab, Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable
Future, Food Policy Council Report 2016 7 (2017), https://assets.jhsph.
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officially sanction the activities of food policy councils, often
they are formed outside of governmental activities and comprise
volunteers. Thus, they may be formed without the direction of
an agenda-setter. Their limitation, however, tends to appear
in the deliberations, whether officially sanctioned or not. The
organization participants usually have “predetermined agendas”
that “often are opposed to industrialized food in any form . . . .”346
Though these approaches are not the only available
structures to deliberative democracy in the food system, they
are the ones most widely experimented with. Of these, two
approaches have prevailed in the United States: governmental
bodies must use consultation by submission as embodied in the
notice and comment process, for certain policymaking and local
communities have drifted toward local food planning, evidenced
by their independently creating hundreds of food policy councils.
Congress has decidedly taken the latter approach in the latest
iterations of the Farm Bill, favoring the inclusiveness and selfempowerment that local food planning offers. While the USDA
is now beginning to assist individuals and communities begin to
democratize their food systems, their experience in doing so is
not at all new to them.
C.
Roots of Deliberative Democracy in Federal
Agricultural Policy
Although apparently long forgotten, deliberative
democracy once held a preferred position among influential
program administrators at the USDA. This is embodied in the
work of agricultural economist and USDA undersecretary M.L.
Wilson. In 1935, with the blessing of Secretary of Agriculture
Henry Wallace, Wilson established the Program Study and
Discussion (PSD) under authority of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933—the first iteration of the Farm Bill.347 The PSD
primarily consisted of two programs: group discussions for
Ankeny, supra note 322, at 17.
Jess Gilbert, Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and
the Intended New Deal 105 (Yale Univ. Press 2015).
346
347
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farmers and schools of philosophy for Cooperative Extension
workers.348
The discussion groups “emphasized broad social issues
of agriculture and public policy.”349 In collaboration with state
Extension workers, farmers in these groups discussed not only
specifics of various USDA programs, but they spoke about the
policy choices of the federal government and about systemic
issues facing agriculture.350 The schools of philosophy, organized
by USDA staff, brought together Extension workers (and later
local planning leaders) at four-day conferences to discuss
democracy in rural societies and agriculture, although the USDA
encouraged participants to speak about topics beyond just those
outlined in the government pamphlets.351 Even within the
parameters of official discussion topics, the USDA encouraged
attendees to question federal policy decisions and vocalize their
criticism.352 The USDA held more than 150 such conferences,
and the dominant question invoking discussion—What is a
desirable agricultural program?—was one the USDA knew it
could not answer on its own.353 Under the direction of Wilson’s
former philosophy professor, Carl F. Taeusch, the PSD programs
ultimately comprised more than 3 million rural men and women
in the discussion groups, tens of thousands of whom were trained
as discussion leaders, as well as more than 50,000 Extension
workers and other rural community leaders who attended the
Schools of Philosophy for Extension Workers.354
Wilson’s emphasis on education was a deliberate one.
Similar to John Dewey, Wilson believed that democracy was
Id.; see Carl F. Taeusch, Schools of Philosophy for Farmers, in Farmers
in a Changing World: The Yearbook of Agriculture 1940 1112-19 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. ed. 1940).
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more akin to a way of life, rather than a rigidly structured political
process.355 In the penumbra of the Progressive Era, when federal
policymakers seemed to rely as much on experts as ordinary
citizens, Wilson “hoped for a renaissance” across the country
“in which people would ‘search their souls for the deeper, more
fundamental philosophical meanings’ and create new models of
democratic processes.”356 For Wilson, the belief in democracy as
a successful way of life was based on three assumptions. First,
its adherents must believe that the average person was capable
of making informed decisions; second, democracy requires
participation by citizens who, in turn, learn the democratic process
through that participation; and, third, the first two assumptions
are primarily driven by educational processes.357 For Wilson, “[d]
emocracy required participation—and informed participation was
based on education.”358 The PSD, therefore, with its educational
discussion groups and schools of philosophy, were ultimately
Wilson’s method of reshaping a political institution to encourage
his vision of a deliberative democracy.
Despite the apparent widespread success of the program,
the PSD’s eventual demise in 1943 was part of a larger effort
among established farm organizations to narrow the role of the
USDA in American agriculture during a time that has been called
“the bleakest in the history of agricultural politics.”359 When the
PSD folded, it did so because of pressure from the American Farm
Bureau Federation and some staff of the land-grant schools, all
of whom believed the PSD’s democracy-strengthening programs
in rural America deviated from the USDA’s traditional role of
simply providing statistical and scientific data to farmers.360 But
this ostensible realignment of the USDA with its traditional role
Id. at 143.
Id. (quoting M.L. Wilson, Facets of County Planning: I. On Using
Democracy, 1 Land Pol’y Rev. 2, 2 (1939)).
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may not tell the whole story. By this time, the Farm Bureau had
already launched attacks against outgrowths of the New Deal
it could not heavily influence, specifically the Farm Security
Administration.361
During the years preceding the Great Depression,
agricultural policy largely centered on prices, and as the economic
crisis worsened, farm credit was a common subject among farm
leaders, educators, and administrators.362 Meanwhile, public
policy was primarily concerned with discovering more efficient
methods of agriculture and sharing those methods with farmers,
although tenancy, corporate farming, and soil conservation
occasionally entered public discussions.363 Nevertheless, the
established agricultural organizations were principally interested
in policy that addressed prices, and the Farm Bureau did what it
could to control agricultural policymaking.364
When President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office,
the USDA was not generally recognized as being organized to
address rural poverty, despite the Extension Service’s “long arm
of the department going out to nearly all the farming counties of
the nation, in touch with the problems of farmers everywhere and
ready to help in all their troubles.”365 Yet, rural poverty was a
rampant problem, like urban poverty, that had to be solved. Since
the USDA appeared to be the inappropriate agency to tackle that
problem, that challenge fell on the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration.366 In addition to fixing rural poverty, the New
Deal programs sought to support the back-to-the-farm movement
occurring at the time through a subsistence-homestead scheme.367
Spearheaded by Wilson, the undersecretary who created the
PSD and who had played a key role in developing the Extension
See McConnell, supra note 136, at 97–111.
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363
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Service, this scheme became the subject of public policy.368 Soon,
the National Industrial Recovery Act codified this policy and
authorized President Roosevelt to turn this scheme into action.369
Rather than focusing almost exclusively on prices, federal
agricultural policy began to address social issues, specifically
rural poverty and subsistence homesteads. By 1935, as the PSD
was formed, these two programs came under the purview of the
Resettlement Administration, separate from the USDA, though
former agricultural undersecretary Rexford Tugwell headed it.370
Within a couple of years, however, the Resettlement Administration
merged into the USDA and the controversial Tugwell, in order to
save his program, resigned.371 As this transition was underway,
Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of
1937, which primarily assisted farm tenants with becoming
landowners.372 As a result of this legislation, the Secretary of
Agriculture dissolved the Resettlement Administration and
created the Farm Security Administration.373
Eventually, the Farm Security Administration far outgrew
its predecessor and had become its own “poor man’s Department
of Agriculture.”374 Through its rural rehabilitation efforts, it
became an advocate for small farmers planting diversified
crops, and it resisted foisting on these farmers the efficiency
methods favored by larger producers.375 It installed loan and
grant programs that targeted some of these farmers, and the
Farm Security Administration provided assistance in helping this
new group of farmers formulate and execute their farm plans.376
Although facing enormous practical and social challenges, the

368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376

Id.
National Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-67, § 208, 48 Stat. 195, 205–06.
McConnell, supra note 136, at 86.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90–91.

252

Journal of Food Law & Policy

[Vol. 14

Farm Security Administration persevered and advocated for farm
ownership among small-scale farmers.377
Because the programs from the Resettlement
Administration originated outside of the USDA, farm organizations
were unable to influence them as they had been able to influence
other agricultural programs. In 1941, the Farm Bureau began
its attacks, and by 1943, vice-president of the Farm Bureau
Edward O’Neal insisted that the Farm Security Administration
clients should stop receiving any federal help because “2,000,000
smallest farms consumed on the average about one-half of the
production of these farms and sent only $100 worth of products
to market. This group produced only about 3 per cent of the
marketed crops. They do not have the land, facilities, or labor
to produce large quantities of food.”378 Through this argument
and prompting investigations into alleged program waste and
violations, the Farm Bureau sought to put an end to the agricultural
policies it had no voice in shaping.379 By 1946, the Farm Security
Administration formally ended, and whatever was left of it fell
under the Farmers’ Home Administration, primarily a veterans’
agency at the time.380
The life of these two major agricultural programs—the
PSD and Farm Security Administration—demonstrate, first, that
federal agricultural policy has long held multiple identities, and,
second, one of those identities is the democratization of local
and regional food systems through promoting self-empowerment
among diverse stakeholders in agriculture, as well as funding
economic and social programs to help farmers transition to
owning small-scale, diversified farms, similar to those powering
local-food efforts today. The back-to-the-farm movement of the
early 20th Century might well have emerged as the farm-to-table
movement of the early 21st Century. Regardless, it is clear that
deliberative democracy has played a critical role in developing
377
378
379
380
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federal agriculture policy and has been identified as critical to our
food system.
IV. Leveraging the Farm Bill to Support Food
Localization
As Part III shows, deliberative democracy is an effective
policy basis for empowering communities to engage more directly
and inclusively in their food system, and federal agricultural
policy has a deep history of promoting the determination of
individuals to participate democratically. Because of the Farm
Bill’s established role in promoting community food systems, this
Part identifies ways in which future Farm Bills should support the
movement toward localized food democracy.
First, Farm Bills should be utilized to ensure that a wide
array of stakeholder groups have full access to participate in
decision-making bodies. Both local and federal boards wield
authority over issues that are of concern to a wide range of
stakeholders, yet representation does not currently reflect the
diverse interests of these stakeholders. The proposals included
here would help amplify the voices of stakeholders, thus supporting
food democracy. Second, Farm Bills should work towards
increasing representation of traditionally underrepresented groups
in Farm Bill programs and food governance. These groups have
historically been excluded from full participation in the food
system; efforts to localize the food system should include these
marginalized groups so that the entire community is effectively
represented. Finally, Farm Bills should continue to bolster local
food authorities, enabling citizens to have greater direct influence
over their local food systems. As discussed earlier, Food Policy
Councils are multiplying as citizens take an interest in food
governance. Future Farm Bills present opportunities to encourage
the creation and maintenance of such entities.
A. Diversifying Representation Among Agricultural
Producer Stakeholders
In order to be truly representative, the entities that make
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decisions at each level of government must include all relevant
stakeholders. A democratic food system requires that everyone
have a voice at the table. The following recommendations aim to
ensure that a diverse array of stakeholder interests are included in
decision-making processes.
i. Increasing Organized Labor’s Representation at the
Federal Policy Level
The food system—including production, processing,
distribution, retail, and service—employs roughly one-sixth
of workers in the United States.381 These workers face many
challenges. Less than 15 percent of food workers earn a living
wage,382 despite the fact that 40 percent work more than 40 hours
per week, and 11 percent work more than 60 hours per week.383
Wage theft runs rampant,384 and over half of workers do not have
health care coverage of any kind.385 In an unfortunate irony, almost
one-third of food system workers experience food insecurity386
and nearly 14 percent depend on food stamps, compared to 8.3
percent for the general workforce.387 Given the various problems
that food-chain workers endure, organized labor should have a
voice in food policy decision-making processes. Of the dozens of
advisory committees listed on USDA’s website, though, not one
focuses on labor issues.388 This is a missed opportunity to directly
address the interests of the 22 percent of food-system workers
that are employed in production or processing—over four million
The Food Chain Workers Alliance, The Hands that Feed Us:
Challenges and Opportunities for Workers along the Food Chain
1 (2012), https://foodchainworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HandsThat-Feed-Us-Report.pdf.
382
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people389—and to consider the impacts that these segments of the
food system have on workers further down the chain.
Creating a new labor advisory committee in the Farm Bill
is just one potential way to include this group of stakeholders in
policy making. Another possibility is to integrate representatives
of organized labor into existing committees. This approach, which
could supplement an independent committee, would help ensure
that labor issues are not overlooked when discussing policies that
could impact workers. For instance, the National Agriculture
Research, Extension, Education, and Economics Advisory Board
(NAREEEAB) would benefit from the representation of labor.
NAREEEAB provides advice to the Secretary of Agriculture and
to land-grant institutions regarding research, extension services,
education, and economics.390 The Board has twenty-five members,
each representing a specific category of stakeholders as mandated
by the 2008 Farm Bill.391 Represented stakeholders include
commodity producers, nutritional scientists, and consumers—but
not labor.392 The Farm Bill should be used as an opportunity to
amend the membership requirements of NAREEEAB to include
one additional member, from a non-profit representing labor
interests in agriculture (for a total of twenty-six members).
Another area where federal policy stands to benefit from
the representation of labor interests is in the National Organic
Program (NOP). In 1990, the Organic Food Production Act
(OFPA) established the National Organic Standards Board
(NOSB) to act as a critical advisor to USDA regarding organic

The Food Chain Workers Alliance, supra note 384, at 17.
See U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. Research, Extension, Educ. &
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policy.393 The NOSB, composed of fifteen members, issues
recommendations that serve as the basis for NOP policy.394 The
NOSB’s responsibilities also include periodically reviewing
the National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances, which
identifies the substances that may be used in organic food
production, and making formal recommendations to USDA about
its contents.395
Like NAREEEAB, the NOSB’s composition is mandated
by statute to include representatives of certain interest groups.
For instance, three members must represent public interest or
consumer groups, while two must own or operate organic handling
operations. Under current law, no members are designated
to represent labor interests. Fair labor practices are also not
included as part of organic certification, as USDA claims that
OFPA does not authorize the inclusion of labor-related standards
in the NOP.396 Yet, the NOSB’s vision statement aims to “instill[]
trust among consumers, producers, processors, retailers and other
stakeholders.”397 Given that farmworkers constitute a key group
of stakeholders, and that many commenters asked the NOP to
develop fair labor standards as part of the program,398 the Farm
Bill should amend the OFPA to both clarify that labor-related
standards may be included in the NOP and to incorporate labor
representatives in the NOSB. Two chairs could be allocated for
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101624, § 2119, 104 Stat. 3359, 3947–49.
394
Standards: The Groundwork Protecting Organic Integrity, Organic
Integrity Q. 2 (May 2016), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., https://www.ams.
usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/2016%20Organic%20May%20
Newsletter.pdf.
395
7 U.S.C. § 6517(d); National Organic Standards Board
(NOSB), Agric. Marketing Serv., U.S. Dep’t Of Agric.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic/nosb.
393

National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,547, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).
397
Nat’l Organic Standards Bd., NOSB Policy And Procedures
Manual 4 (2016), https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
NOSB-PolicyManual.pdf.
398
National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,547, 80,556 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205).
396
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representatives of labor: one from a union representing agricultural
workers, and one from a non-profit focused on labor in agriculture.
Such an amendment may either raise the total number of chairs
to seventeen, or it may reduce by one each the number of organic
farm owners and operators and the number of public interest
and consumer representatives. Including labor representatives
on the NOSB would encourage the Board to revisit labor issues
and would ensure that workers are not excluded from reaping the
benefits of the NOP.
ii. Improving Specialty Crops Representation at the
Federal Policy Level
Over the last few decades, specialty crops—including
fruits and vegetables—have gained prominence in federal
agricultural policy.399 Specialty crop production now generates
roughly a quarter of the value of U.S. crop production, to the tune
of $60 billion per year.400 To advise USDA on policy relating to
this important area of agriculture, Congress created the Specialty
Crop Committee (SCC). The SCC is tasked with studying issues
that specifically affect the specialty crop industry. As a permanent
subcommittee of NAREEEAB, representatives are appointed
by the Board.401 The only statutory requirement regarding
membership is that it “shall reflect diversity in the specialty crops
represented.”402 This standard, while perhaps a worthy goal, is too
vague to ensure that different groups of stakeholders are included
in the democratic process.
Specialty crops are grown by a range of particularly diverse
stakeholders, who may have unique viewpoints to contribute to
See generally Farm Bill Law Enterprise, Title X: Horticulture
&
Organics
(2017),
http://www.farmbilllaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/Title-10-Horticulture.pdf.
400
Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., Fruits, Vegetables, And Other
Specialty Crops: Selected Farm Bill And Federal Programs 1 (2014),
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R42771.pdf.
399

7

401

402

Id.

U.S.C.

§

3123(a)(1).
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policy development. For instance, small-scale farmers are more
likely to produce specialty crops than commodity crops,403 perhaps
because the labor-intensive nature of specialty crop production is
often not well suited to large-scale production.404 The average
size of all farms is 1.82 times greater than the average specialty
crop farm, and over one-third of specialty crop farms have fewer
than 15 acres.405 In addition, minority farmers disproportionately
produce specialty crops, as compared to commodities. For
instance, in 2012, 63.6 percent of Asian American farmers grew
fruits and vegetables, compared to just 8.5 percent of white
farmers.406 The particular issues that affect these groups, such as
obstacles to accessing loans, therefore affect the specialty crops
sector as a whole. However, of the ten members currently on the
Committee, none specifically represent small-scale or minority
growers.407 The Farm Bill presents an opportunity to ensure that
the SCC includes the voices of small-scale and minority farmers,
who will be able to contribute their distinctive expertise to policy
research and analysis.

Tamar Haspel, Small vs. Large: Which Size Farm is Better for the
Planet?, Wash. Post (Sep. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.
com/lifestyle/food/small-vs-large-which-size-farm-is-better-for-theplanet/2014/08/29/ac2a3dc8-2e2d-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html?utm_
term=.5f60314c8255; Solutions: Expand Healthy Food Access, Union of
Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/food-agriculture/
solutions/expand-healthy-food-access#.WTmbRhPyvVo (last visited May 16,
2018).
404
Hossein Ayazi & Elsadig Elsheikh, Haas Inst. for a Fair and Inclusive
Soc. at Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, The U.S. Farm Bill: Corporate Power
and Structural Racialization in the U.S. Food System 58 (2015), http://
haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haasinstitutefarmbillreport_
publish_0.pdf.
405
U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric. Statistics Serv., 2012 Census of
Agriculture: Specialty Crops 2 (2012); U.S. Dep’t Agric.: Nat’l Agric.
Statistics Serv., 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary
and State Data 7 (2012).
406
Ayazi & Elsheikh, supra note 407, at 58.
407
Specialty Crops Subcommittee, U.S. Dep’t Agric., Nat’l Agric.
Research, Extension, Educ. & Econ. Advisory Bd., https://nareeeab.ree.
usda.gov/subcommittees/specialty-crops-subcommittee (last visited May 16,
2018).
403
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iii. Creating Opportunities for Urban Agriculture to Be
Represented at Federal Policy Level
The previous recommendations have all focused on
improving committee representation of specific stakeholders,
including workers, small-scale farmers, and minority farmers.
Another way to enhance the democratic process is to ensure that
specialized venues for specific substantive topics exist, such that
appropriate forums are available for discussion. To that end, the
USDA would benefit from the creation of an Urban Agriculture
Advisory Committee.408 As urban farming gains steam,409 it is
important to have democratic channels for information sharing
and policy development dedicated to issues particular to the
challenges of farming in cities.
In keeping with the previous recommendations, the
membership of the suggested Urban Agriculture Advisory
Committee should include a diverse range of stakeholders. For
instance, membership categories could include urban agricultural
producers, urban food aggregators, experts on farm-to-school
programs, public health experts, city government representatives,
urban planners, institutional buyers, and experts on farmers
markets. This approach would facilitate deliberation regarding
urban food policy and enhance food governance more generally.
In turn, the long-term effect of the committee’s efforts would
contribute to the localization of food systems by providing
communities participating in urban farming with additional
resources to strengthen their work and enhance democratic
engagement.
B.
Increasing Representation of Traditionally
Underrepresented Groups
Inherent in the idea of a democratic food system is an
See S.3420, 114th Cong. § 101 (2016).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Royte, Urban Farms Now Produce 1/5 of the World’s
Food, GreenBiz (May 5, 2015), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/urbanfarms-now-produce-15-worlds-food; Betsy McKay, A Farm Grows in the
City, Wall St. J. (May 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-farm-growsin-the-city-1494813900.
408

409
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understanding that a diverse cross section of the community will be
able to participate in governance, production, and consumption.410
The 2018 Farm Bill presents several opportunities to improve this
aspect of our food system by fostering the inclusion of socially
disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (SDFRs). Three proposals
that would improve representation of underrepresented groups in
the food system are detailed below.
i. Matching Representation to Appropriate Demographics
It is not just federal boards and committees that stand to
benefit from including a more diverse range of stakeholders in
decision-making processes; local governing bodies should also
serve to amplify the voices of a variety of stakeholders. The
importance of local participation in community food systems
further underscores the need to ensure that local bodies are
representative of their constituents. While the Farm Bill admittedly
focuses on federal programs, it does still play a role in supporting
local food systems, as Part II showed. The Farm Service Agency
(FSA) oversees a county committee system, where members
comprise a “critical component” of FSA operations.411 These
committees were first authorized by Congress in the 1930s in a
push for local democracy, “allow[ing] for grassroots input and
local administration” of federal agricultural programs.412 Elected
committee members help deliver FSA farm programs to their
county and play a role in deciding which programs their counties
will offer.413
Recognizing the need for fair representation, Congress in
the 2002 Farm Bill mandated that county committees be “fairly
representative” of producers within the area, and authorized the
See supra II.A.2.
County Committee Elections, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/news-room/county-committee-elections/
(last
visited May 16, 2018).
412
Selection and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County
Committees, 78 Fed. Reg. 13,771, 13,771 (Mar. 1, 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 7).
413
Id.
410
411
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Secretary of Agriculture both to promulgate guidelines to “ensure
fair representation of disadvantaged groups” and to insure their
inclusion through the power of appointment.414 Pursuant to that
authority, the Secretary may appoint a socially disadvantaged
(SDA)415 farmer or rancher to committees where no SDA member
was elected, and the demographics of the county are such that one
is needed to ensure fair representation.416 This regulation is an
important first step to ensuring the inclusion in local democratic
processes. Unfortunately, the method used to determine which
counties qualify for an appointed member is flawed. The
calculation of countywide demographics, for the purposes of the
Secretary’s appointment power, is based on the eligible county
committee voters—essentially, producers—rather than total
population.417 This approach fails to consider or correct the
historical discrimination and inequities in agriculture that have
impacted today’s demographic makeup of farmers.418 Future Farm
Bills could improve the existing rule by directing the Secretary to
wield the appointment power based on demographics of the entire
population of each county or even the entire state, thus ensuring
that minorities and women are adequately represented on local
committees even when they have been largely excluded from
agriculture.

Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, §
10708(b), 116 Stat. 134, 522.
415
SDA groups are defined as African Americans, American Indians, Alaska
Natives, Hispanics, Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders and women. Selection
and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County Committees, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 13,772.
416
Selection and Function of Farm Service Agency State and County
Committees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 13,773.
417
Id.; see also COC Socially Disadvantaged (SDA) Voting Member and COC
Advisor Appointments, Notice AO-1673, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv.
Agency (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_Notice/
ao_1673.pdf (“An analysis by the National Office determined the counties in
which the percentage of SDA producers indicates there is a need for increased
SDA representation.” (emphasis added)).
418
For instance, between 1920 and 1997 the population of African American
farmers in the U.S. fell from 926,000 to fewer than 20,000—a decline that
was 2.5 to 5 times steeper than that experienced by white farmers. See Ayazi
& Elsheikh, supra note 407, at 54–60.
414
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Continuing and Expanding Outreach Programs to

In 2013, in an effort to provide more a more flexible
financing option, FSA created the Microloan program to “better
serve the credit needs of several types of farmers: small, beginning,
veteran, and/or from historically socially disadvantaged groups
(women/minorities).”419 Although FSA launched the program
under their authority through the Direct Operating Loan Program,
Congress permanently authorized the Microloan program in the
2014 Farm Bill.420
Following implementation of the Microloan program,
ERS conducted a study to investigate program outcomes.421 The
study revealed that the number of new FSA direct loan borrowers
receiving traditional operating loans fell after the Microloan
program became available—indicating that the Microloan
program may have attracted some of those applicants as well
as additional new borrowers.422 Based on the findings, ERS
made two conclusions. First, new borrowers prefer microloans
to traditional operating loans. Second, all else being equal, “at
least some of the new borrowers who received Microloans would
likely have applied for and received traditional [direct operating
loans] if the Microloan program did not exist.”423
With this understanding, the ERS proceeded to examine
the impact of the Microloan program on SDFRs. ERS found
that white borrowers received 86 percent of microloans to new
borrowers in the first two years of the program, although new
black borrowers over that same period received 25 times more

USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation Patterns and Effects of
Outreach, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (last updated Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.
ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=81870.
420
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79 § 5106(a), 128 Stat. 837 (2014),
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1943(c) (2018).
421
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation
Patterns and Effects of Outreach (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/81871/err-222.pdf?v=42761.
422
Id. at 15.
423
Id. at 18.
419
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Microloans than small traditional operating loans.424 Eight
percent of microloans to new borrowers went to black borrowers,
and another 7 percent to other minorities. This represented a
substantial increase over traditional operating loans of similar
size from recent years.425
These findings seemed to indicate that the Microloan
program’s outreach efforts were initially successful. To examine
the issue more closely, USDA conducted a controlled experiment
designed to test the effectiveness of the agency’s targeted messages
to SDFRs about the Microloan program.426 The results showed
both that “the outreach increased interest in Microloans and the
number of borrowers who received them” and that outreach “may
have strong effects on some subgroups . . . and low effects on
other subgroups.”427 The study also found that traditional direct
operating loans are “still an important source of credit for targeted
farmers.”428
USDA’s findings demonstrate the importance of outreach
among SDFRs as it relates to loan and grant awareness. In
addition, the study’s results suggest that outreach may be
useful in the context of other programs, as well. USDA should
expand broader outreach among SDFRs to increase diversity
within the food system, and it should consider launching a more
comprehensive study regarding outreach to determine the most
effective methods and to identify underserved subgroups that
could benefit from targeted tools.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19
426
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Microloans for Farmers: Participation
Patterns and Effects of Outreach 21–24 (2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/81871/err-222.pdf?v=42761. Drawing from behavioral
economics, USDA personalized each letter with the recipient’s name, and a
staff member personally signed each letter. USDA then sent these letters to
approximately 144,924 operations in 1,848 ZIP codes. The agency found that
farmers in ZIP codes receiving the letters expressed much more interest in the
program than farmers in ZIP codes not receiving the letters. Id.
427
Id. at 25.
428
Id. at 12.
424
425
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iii. Including Native American Voices
It is undeniable that the Farm Bill greatly impacts Indian
Country in the United States. More than 50 million acres of tribal
lands are engaged in food production and agriculture;429 Native
American or Alaska Natives make up more than 30 percent of
minority farmers in the country.430 However, the Farm Bill leaves
much to be desired in terms of supporting Native farmers and
including Native voices in the democratic process.
In light of these deficiencies, Native advocates have been
working towards a better Farm Bill that would include Native
voices and open up opportunities for Native farmers. Last
year, the Native Farm Bill Coalition published an impressively
thorough report brimming with policy proposals that would result
in a more fair and inclusive Farm Bill.431 The Coalition aims to
give Native Americans a united voice in advocating for changes
to the next Farm Bill.432 Stalwarts in this policy arena include the
Intertribal Agriculture Council (IAC) and the National Congress
of American Indians (NCAI), both of which are involved in the
Coalition.433
As a result of these groups’ research and advocacy,
Congressional leaders are beginning to pay attention. Senator
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Nat’l Agric. Statistics Service, 2012 Census
of Agriculture Highlights: American Indian Farmers (2014), https://
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/
American_Indian_Farmers/Highlights_American_Indian_Farmers.pdf
430
Kim Baca, Native Communities are Fighting for a More Inclusive Farm
Bill, Civil Eats (Feb. 26, 2018) https://civileats.com/2018/02/26/nativecommunities-are-fighting-for-a-more-inclusive-farm-bill/.
431
Janie Simms Hipp & Colby D. Duren, Regaining Our Future: An
Assessment of Risks and Opportunities for Native Communities in the 2018
Farm Bill, Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (June 2017), http://
seedsofnativehealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Farm-Bill-Report_
WEB.pdf.
432
Native Farm Bill Coalition, Seeds of Native Health, http://
seedsofnativehealth.org/native-farm-bill-coalition/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2018).
433
Id. (“The Native Farm Bill Coalition is a joint project of the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community’s Seeds of Native Health campaign, the
Intertribal Agriculture Council, the National Congress of American Indians,
and the Indigenous Food and Agriculture Initiative to improve Native dietary
health and food access.”)
429
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Udall (D-NM) has expressed his support for increased inclusion
of tribal representatives in Farm Bill discussions,434 while
Senator Heitkamp (D-ND) recently introduced a bill that would
permanently authorize a Rural Development Tribal Technical
Assistance Office within USDA, among other things.435
Congress should take advantage of the upcoming
opportunity to democratize our food system by ensuring that
Indian Country is fully included in Farm Bill programs and
administration. Many of the Coalition’s recommendations would
allow Native farmers and ranchers to participate more fully in
the food system. For instance, the report recommends changing
the Specialty Crop Block Grant Program to ensure that tribal
departments of agriculture are eligible for funding and that tribal
projects do not need to go through state agencies in order to receive
support.436 Other proposals in the report aim at a different goal:
including Native voices in food governance and administration.
These types of recommendations would address the structural
exclusion of Native interests in decision-making processes.
Examples include creating of an Interdepartmental Task Force
on Indian Agriculture437 and mandating tribal representation on
USDA’s numerous advisory committees.438 Taken together, these
recommendations would go a long way towards democratizing
the Farm Bill.
C. Supporting Local Food System Governance Structures

Baca, supra note 433.
Press Releases: Heitkamp Introduces Legislation to Prioritize Native Issues
in Next Farm Bill, Office of Senator Heidi Heitkamp (Mar. 1, 2018), https://
www.heitkamp.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=4C096269910A-43A6-9D73-6425A0F283FA. The Native Farm Bill Coalition has
endorsed the bill. Id.
436
Hipp & Duren, supra note 434, at 109.
437
Id. at 131.
438
Id. at 132.
434
435
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i. Increasing Coordination Among and Between Federal
and Local Organizations.
In order to enhance food governance, substantive
areas—which, as suggested in the previous recommendation,
may merit specialized attention—should not be entirely siloed.
Food policy spans a range of issue areas, including agriculture,
public health, labor, environment, and urban development. The
multifaceted nature of food policy is evident in the Farm Bill
itself, with roughly a dozen titles spanning topics from forestry
to trade.439 The USDA plays a major role in implementing
agricultural policy, but many other agencies are also implicated
in the Farm Bill, such as the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Food & Drug Administration, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department
of Energy. With so many actors involved, policies are often not
crafted to complement one another. For instance, in its public
health role, the USDA recommends that fruits and vegetables
comprise half of an individual’s daily diet.440 Yet, a mere fraction
of farm subsidies—less than 1 percent—is directed at specialty
crop production.441
To overcome this coordination problem, the Farm
Bill could establish a new interagency Food Policy Advisory
Committee. Such a committee would facilitate communication
and information sharing between relevant government agencies,
and it would include (at a minimum) representatives from the
agencies mentioned above. The committee should also have the
authority to add participants on a temporary or permanent basis,
as it finds necessary. Tasks would include studying and making
recommendations regarding substantial policy proposals that
Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 (2014).
Mark Bittman et al., How a national food policy could save millions of
American lives, Wash. Post (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could-save-millions-of-americanlives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html?utm_
term=.d6d51cae42b4.
441
Id. See also Agriculture and Health Policies in Conflict, Physicians
Committee for Responsible Medicine, http://www.pcrm.org/health/reports/
agriculture-and-health-policies-ag-versus-health, (last visited April 18, 2018).
439
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implicate multiple agencies. The committee could also tackle
the development of a national food policy that would help guide
agencies, resulting in a more coherent and consistent approach to
food governance.442
Horizontal coordination between federal agencies is just
one piece of the governance puzzle; vertical coordination between
different levels of government is also crucial. Food policy is
both important to the nation as a whole, yet particular to specific
regions and locales. Local, state, and regional organizations play
important roles in shaping agricultural systems, complementing
the federal policy enacted by the Farm Bill. Local involvement
in food policy is an excellent way to support community food
systems—yet for local entities to truly have a voice, they must
not be isolated from other decision-making bodies. Increased
coordination would serve to strengthen local leadership and
democracy, and it would capitalize on the wealth of localized
knowledge that communities possess. Established methods of
communication and exchanges of information should therefore
exist between local, state, regional, and federal entities.
The Farm Bill can be used as a vehicle to ensure
that coordination between levels of government takes place.
Statutory language could mandate federal advisory boards and
committees, such as NAREEEAB, the SCC, and the NOSB, to
liaise with local, state, and regional entities, just as the FDA met
with communities in consensus conferences across the country
while it was developing its FSMA regulations.443 For instance,
the committees could be required to hold at least one meeting
each year specifically for the purpose of hearing testimony from
representatives of those entities. They could also be required to
solicit input from such entities when considering policies that
will impact local practices. These requirements, of course, would
not solve the issue of vertical coordination; however, they form
See generally Mark Bittman et al., A National Food Policy for the 21st
Century, Medium (Oct. 2015), https://medium.com/food-is-the-new-internet/
a-national-food-policy-for-the-21st-century-7d323ee7c65f.
443
See supra III.B.
442
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an important step toward localizing the food system. To further
advance coordination, committees could additionally be directed
to formulate recommendations to streamline the channels between
levels of government.
ii. Incentivizing Creation and Maintenance of Food
Policy Councils
Of course, coordination across levels of government
can only take place if a robust network of local entities exists.
Currently, food policy councils serve as the primary vehicle for
local food democracy. Food policy councils come in a variety
of forms, but they essentially serve as forums to deliberate over
local and regional food issues.444 As Part II showed, the Farm
Bill has greatly bolstered the existence of these councils. There
are hundreds of food councils currently in the United States.445
Some were formed as part of government agencies, while others
are independent grassroots networks; some comprise volunteers,
while others operate on funding from foundatons.446 Food
policy councils frequently coordinate with government officials;
indeed, the most effective ones enjoy positive relationships with
government.447
Legislators could use the Farm Bill to encourage the
creation and maintenance of food policy councils, thus supporting
and strengthening community food systems. Food policy councils
often struggle to find sufficient funding.448 To support these
entities, then, the Farm Bill could include a program to provide
Alethea Harper et al., Inst. for Food & Dev. Pol’y, Food Policy
Councils: Lessons Learned 19 (2009), https://foodfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/DR21-Food-Policy-Councils-Lessons-Learned-.pdf.
445
Directory, Food Policy Networks, http://www.foodpolicynetworks.org/
directory/ (last visited May 16, 2018).
446
Harper et al., supra note 447, at 22–3.
447
Id. at 24, 38.
448
Johns Hopkins Ctr. for a Livable Future, Stories from the Field:
The Role of Local and State Food Policy councils in Federal
Policy Making Implementation 1 (2015), https://assets.jhsph.edu/clf/
mod_clfResource/doc/Engaging%20FPCs%20at%20Federal%20Level%20
Draft%20Final.pdf.
444
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grants to food policy councils. This would be more than the
Community Food Projects program,449 which covers a range of
issues; rather, this would specifically target food policy councils.
The program could be modeled on similar programs authorized
by the Farm Bill, such as the Beginning Farmer and Rancher
Program,450 which helps fund a variety of projects every year that
train, provide technical assistance, and educate new farmers to
ensure their businesses are viable and successful.451 This program
requires that recipients share the cost of their programs by
contributing an amount equal to at least 25 percent of the awarded
funds, and project grants are capped at $600,000.452 Similarly, a
program to fund FPCs could include a matching condition and a
cap, thus keeping the total cost low while boosting these crucial
instruments of food democracy.
Like many existing Farm Bill programs that support food
localization, our proposals are attempts to fill those gaps that
civic agriculture and food democracy recognize as existing and
being vital to democratization efforts. By promoting programs
founded on deliberative democratic principles, our proposals not
only follow the natural progression of one substantial strand of
federal agricultural policy, but they provide a theoretical structure
to many of the programs Congress has already promulgated and
the USDA has spent countless resources administering.
Conclusion
Increasingly, the Farm Bill is becoming a tool for the
democratization of the food system as much as it is a tool for
crop insurance, agricultural credit, nutrition programs, trade, and
so forth. More than that, though, Congress has included within
some of these programs democratic mechanisms that empower
See supra II.B.3.
See supra II.B.2.a.
451
Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Program (BFRDP), U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Nat’l Inst. of Food & Ag., https://nifa.usda.gov/program/
beginning-farmer-and-rancher-development-program-bfrdp (last visited May
16, 2018).
452
Id.
449
450
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individuals and communities to make decisions about what the
programs support. With this steady momentum, the future of
the Farm Bill looks increasingly more democratic. And why
shouldn’t this be the case? Although deeply flawed by various
forms of discrimination, the earliest Farm Bills quite explicitly
sought greater democratic participation in federal farm programs.
With this long view, the recent flirtations with democratization
are a return to form rather than a radical departure.
It is, therefore, time that Congress begin taking these
trends more seriously. By adopting some of our proposals
founded on deliberative democracy, it will add legitimacy and
structure to a policy that provides countless communities with
the determination to make their own choices about how their
food system should look—how the supply chain should function,
which social issues to fund, and what aspects of the food system
to experiment with. That policy is a deliberative food democracy.
The Farm Bill, bolstered by the many efforts before it, should
finally make that policy explicit.
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